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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines the applicability of criminological theory to police 
decision-making during police-initiated encounters with suspects. Specifically, how 
indicators of social disorganization can be used to predict officers’ use of coercive action 
(i.e., frisk, search, use of force, and arrest) during the street stop of suspects. I also 
investigate whether neighborhood disadvantage, as a moderator, impacts suspects’ 
likelihood of receiving greater levels of coercive action when stopped for reasons listed 
in the New York City Police Departments’ Unified Form 250 (UF-250) reports.  
Three theoretical arguments connecting an officer’s decision-making in a socially 
disorganized area are outlined. First, an area with an increased amount of disorganization 
and crime is believed to have increased levels of police coercive activities, compared to 
an organized and low crime area, simply based on the amount of police activity occurring 
in these areas (e.g., Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Second, as a result of the need for police to 
step in as sources of social control in disorganized areas, police may increase their use of 
coercive action (e.g., Clear, Rose, Waring, and Scully, 2003). And third, officers’ heavy 
workload and cynicism toward residents in socially disorganized high crime areas leads 
to less police coercion in disorganized and high crime areas (e.g., Klinger, 1997).  
Two research questions were examined using data collected from the New York 
Police Department Stop, Question, and Frisk Database, 2011 combined with 
neighborhood-level census data:
vi 
(1) Does neighborhood disorganization play a role in an officer’s decision to 
frisk, search, use force against, or arrest a suspect? 
 
(2) Does concentrated disadvantage strengthen or weaken the relationship 
between predictors of a stop and an officer’s decision to frisk, search, use 
force against, or arrest a suspect?  
 
Three outcomes measures were created to assess whether the contemporary measures of 
social disorganization (e.g., concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and 
concentrated immigration) can be used to predict officer use of coercive action: (1) as a 
dichotomy of each coercive response occurring or not occurring during the stop (2) on a 
continuum of coercive action and (3) using the highest level of coercive action that 
occurred during the stop.  
Results from multilevel analyses of stop incidents nested within neighborhoods 
confirm that certain indicators of social disorganization (e.g., concentrated immigration) 
affect officer use of coercive action. However, whether concentrated disadvantage 
strengthens or weakens the relationship between each stop predictor (e.g., suspect fits a 
relevant description) and officer coercive action (e.g., use of force), remains unknown in 
the empirical literature. The dichotomous and coercive action continuum outcomes reveal 
that neighborhood disadvantage weakens the relationship between the predictors of a stop 
and the likelihood of coercive action, while the highest level of coercion used outcome 
reveals that neighborhood disadvantage strengthens the relationship between the 
predictors of a stop and the likelihood of coercive action. The contradictory findings may 
indicate inaccuracy of the UF-250 reports or a conscious decision, by officers, to report 
dissimilarly in disadvantaged versus affluent neighborhoods. Nonetheless, suggestions 
for future research include a deeper examination into the causes behind these 
conclusions.   
vii 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Police officers have one of the most visible positions of authority in society. An 
officer’s role is to serve and protect, while ensuring safety and wellbeing among citizens. 
One of the most important aspects of the criminal justice system is police officer 
decision-making, or his
1
 use of discretion. In each stage of an encounter with a citizen, an 
officer calls upon his discretion or his freedom to decide which action is best for the 
situation at hand (Wilson, 1978). Wilson (1978) explains that discretion plays a major 
role in an officer’s daily routine, from the moment he responds to a call for service to the 
point of using deadly force against a suspect. Although the types of encounters police 
have with citizens vary extensively (e.g., providing directions, attending town hall 
meetings, arresting a suspect, or becoming engaged in a fire fight), the majority of police 
research examining an officer’s use of discretion focuses on coercive police activities 
(see e.g., Sun, Payne, and Wu, 2008).  
Coercive police activities are those that emphasize an officer’s power over 
citizens and include compliance methods, such as stop and frisk (Tedeschi and Felson, 
1994). Stop and frisk, also known as a Terry stop, gives an officer the right to stop, 
                                                 
 
1
 For simplicity, police officers and suspects/citizens are referred to in the masculine 
sense throughout this paper, even though the points made may also apply to female police 
officers and/or female suspects/citizens (see e.g., Clear, 2007). 
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question, and frisk any person they feel is involved in criminal activity, a common 
method for detecting illegal weapons in New York City (Harris, 1994b). Regardless of 
the constitutional issues first proposed against the policy (i.e., violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights), stop and frisk has remained a popular policing strategy in New York 
City and has become even more widespread over the years. The 1968 Supreme Court 
ruling Terry v. Ohio not only ruled that stop and frisk does not violate Fourth 
Amendment rights, but also upheld an officer’s right to stop a person solely based on 
reasonable suspicion (Terry, 1968).  
The New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) stop and frisk policy has been 
one of the most controversial uses of an officer’s coercive power. The NYPD’s stop and 
frisk policy was designed to control low-level disorder, however, it is often argued that 
officers misuse their discretionary authority in these stops. Scholars have recognized the 
potential for disparities in stops among racial minorities, arguing that minorities make up 
a significant amount of police stops (e.g., Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss, 2007). Further, 
scholars have also found a relationship between a neighborhood’s level of social and 
economic disadvantage and an officer’s use of coercive activity (e.g., Terrill and Reisig, 
2003). Due to the potential inequality in the application of stop and frisks, a common 
theme among police researchers is to examine the motives that drive an officer’s 
discretion during a police-citizen interaction (PCI). 
Researchers argue that several factors influence an officer’s discretion during a 
PCI (see National Research Council, 2004). Specifically, researchers have observed four 
conceptual frameworks that influence an officer’s use of discretion: (1) the situational 
dynamics of the incident, including the suspect’s race and behavior; (2) the officer’s 
3 
individual traits and personality; (3) the type of organization in which the officer works; 
and (4) the structural features of the community (e.g., socioeconomics and demographics) 
in which the officer works (National Research Council, 2004). Community characteristics 
are thought to be more statistically consistent in explaining an officer’s decision to act 
coercively, compared to the other conceptual frameworks (National Research Council, 
2004). Although scholars have attempted to explain an officer’s decision-making using 
the structural components of the community (e.g., concentrated disadvantage), the role of 
macro-level criminological theory applied to police decision-making remains 
understudied.  
Some scholars have applied criminological theories, normally used to explain 
crime, to explain an officer’s decision-making processes (e.g., Gelman et al., 2007; Kane, 
2002). Conflict theory, posits that the dominant group in society creates laws to keep the 
minority populations powerless (Khruakham and Hoover, 2012). Researchers examining 
police decision-making from a conflict perspective argue that officers use coercive 
activities in order to maintain the status of the dominant group in society (Sun et al., 
2008). Studies, however, have provided mixed results of the effects of a community’s 
minority population on an officer’s use of coercion (e.g., Lee, Jang, Yun, Lim, and 
Tushaus, 2010; Sun et al., 2008). 
Social disorganization theory has also been used to explain an officer’s decision-
making (Kane, 2002). As a theory predicting criminal behavior, social disorganization 
theory argues that the structural features of the community create an environment 
conducive for criminal activity (Shaw and McKay, 1942). The amount of crime within 
the disorganized community, along with the lack of informal social controls are, 
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arguably, theoretically connected to an officer’s decision-making processes. First, an area 
with an increased amount of disorganization and crime is believed to have increased 
levels of police coercive activities, compared to an organized and low crime area (e.g., 
Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Second, scholars have argued how the lack of informal social 
controls in a disorganized neighborhood may increase the use of police coercion (e.g., 
Clear, Rose, Waring, and Scully, 2003). And third, research has also recognized the 
potential for police to use less coercion in disorganized and high crime areas because of 
their increased workload and cynicism toward residents (e.g., Klinger, 1997).  
Over the years, scholars have created contemporary measures that can now be 
used to test community disorganization (i.e., concentrated disadvantage, immigration 
concentration, and residential instability) (e.g., Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997). 
Although several studies have addressed how the structural features of the community 
(e.g., disadvantage) influence police decision-making (see National Research Council, 
2004), to date, no study has examined the influence of social disorganization on the 
relationship between predictors of a stop (e.g., suspect fits a relevant description) and an 
officer’s use of coercion that may occur during a PCI (e.g., frisk, search, use of force, or 
arrest). That is, how neighborhood disorganization impacts (or moderates) the 
relationship between the reason for the suspect being stopped and the coercive action the 
officer uses during the stop, remains unknown. 
1.1 Current Gaps in Literature Examining Police Decision-Making 
Scholars have long addressed the potential factors that influence an officer’s 
decision-making processes (see Sherman, 1980; National Research Council, 2004). The 
majority of scholars who have tested these factors, unfortunately, have found mixed 
5 
results (National Research Council, 2004). On the one hand, situational factors (e.g., 
suspect’s race), officer characteristics, and organizational factors alone have not proven 
to significantly impact an officer’s discretion in PCIs. On the other hand, community 
factors (e.g., neighborhood disadvantage) have proven to be stronger predictors of an 
officer’s use of discretion. Further, researchers suggest that where an officer works 
shapes his discretion in PCIs (Smith, 1986; Terrill and Reisig, 2003).  
According to Terrill and Reisig (2003), the amount of literature examining how 
neighborhood structural features shape police discretion is relatively scant, compared to 
literature examining the other influencing factors (situational, officer characteristics, and 
organizational). The authors do, however, recognize an overall theme among the 
neighborhood context literature; police decision-making is driven by the features of the 
environment, which “may result in suspects encountered in disadvantaged and high-crime 
neighborhoods being subjected to higher levels of force. It may also result, however, in 
less forceful behavior” (p. 297). For example, Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) study found that 
officers were more inclined to use coercion in areas marked by high disadvantage and 
high crime, while Klinger (1997) argued that areas with higher disadvantage and crime 
would be subjected to less coercive police action. Other scholars have examined the 
relationship between community-level features and an officer’s decision-making. In his 
1986 study, Smith proposed the “neighborhood context hypothesis” and argued that 
where an officer works shapes his discretion. Specifically, Smith concluded that officers 
use more coercion in low-income and racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. Contrasting 
Smith’s (1986) propositions, Klinger (1997) developed an ecological theory of police 
behavior, stating that officers will be more lenient in these areas because crime is more 
6 
commonplace; Khruakham and Hoover (2012) confirmed Klinger’s ecological theory. 
What is largely missing from the police literature, however, is an analysis of the 
applicability of social disorganization, normally used to explain crime, to an officer’s 
decision-making processes.  
Kane (2002) observed that social disorganization and conflict theories could be 
used to explain an officer’s behavior. In examining whether police misconduct (e.g., 
bribery) is shaped by the environment in which he works, Kane (2002) argued that the 
same factors that shape a resident’s decision to act deviant (e.g., neighborhood 
disadvantage) can be used to explain an officer’s malpractice. Kane’s research, however, 
does not fully explain how neighborhood factors shape police decision-making in a PCI. 
A study has not yet applied the three contemporary measures of social disorganization 
(concentrated disadvantage, concentrated immigration, and residential instability) to 
explain an officer’s coercive activity during a street encounter (e.g., frisk, search, use 
force against, or arrest a suspect).  
Additionally, research has not examined the possible moderating effects between 
predictors of a stop and an officer’s decision-making. In 2008, Sun et al. analyzed 
whether neighborhood concentrated disadvantage moderated the relationship between a 
citizen’s behavior and an officer’s coercive and noncoercive responses (e.g., providing 
physical assistance). They found that the relationship between a citizen’s irrational 
behavior and an officer’s noncoercive action was strengthened by concentrated 
disadvantage. That is, an officer was more likely to use noncoercive responses toward 
irrational citizens encountered in disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, the authors did 
not find significant results for concentrated disadvantage alone impacting the relationship 
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between a citizen’s demeanor and an officer’s coercive action. Sun et al. (2008), though 
representing a relevant significant step forward in the analysis of social disorganization 
theory predicting police behavior, still does not uncover the degree that social 
disorganization strengthens (or weakens) the relationship between the stop predictors and 
an officer’s decision to act coercively in a PCI. 
1.2 Research Questions and Plan of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation aims to provide insight into whether social disorganization 
theory can predict an officer’s decision-making processes. Chapter 2 opens with a brief 
discussion on the role of a police officer in a contemporary society and how it sets the 
stage for an officer’s responsibilities while serving his community. The chapter then 
provides a literature review identifying the types of encounters the police may have 
during interactions with citizens, with a focus on the most common types of coercive 
police responses (e.g., stop and frisk, search, use of force, and arrest). As a typical 
coercive action used by the NYPD and its potential for discrimination, the infamous stop 
and frisk policy is discussed in detail. Reasons behind an officer’s decision-making 
processes during a PCI are then examined and analyzed, using the conceptual 
frameworks that shape an officer’s use of discretion (situational factors, officer 
characteristics, organizational factors, and community characteristics). Chapter 3 
explores the theoretical frameworks used in explaining an officer’s decision-making, with 
a focus on how theories normally used to explain crime can be used to explain police 
decision-making.  
Chapter 4 discusses the proposed data collection and analytic strategy for this 
research. Among other things, this research will use data collected from the NYPD Stop, 
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Question, and Frisk database, combined with data from the U.S. Census. There are two 
primary research questions of interest, described below. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 represent 
illustrations for each hypothesis.  
(1) Does neighborhood disorganization shape an officer’s decision to frisk, 
search, use force against, or arrest a suspect? 
 
(2) Does concentrated disadvantage strengthen or weaken the relationship 
between the predictors of a stop and an officer’s decision to frisk, search, use 
force against, or arrest a suspect?  
 
Neighborhood-level/ 
Level-2   Neighborhood disorganization 
 
 
 
Stop-level/         
Level-1   Reasons for stop     Coercive action 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Illustration of Hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
Neighborhood-level/ 
Level-2           Concentrated disadvantage 
 
 
 
Stop-level/         
Level-1   Reasons for stop     Coercive action 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Illustration of Hypothesis 2 
 
Analyses will proceed using multi-level modeling and Chapter 5 will discuss the findings 
reported from the analyses. The dissertation will conclude with Chapter 6 that provides a 
discussion of the importance of the current research in the broader context of policing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLICE-CITIZEN INTERACTIONS AND POLICE USE OF DISCRETION 
2.1 A Police Officer’s Role 
In 1980, Black recognized that police work is a profession with its own 
subculture, stratification, progress, socialization, and politics. The profession is unlike 
any other in that an officer dedicates his life to serving the public and protecting people 
from harm. Not only must he be a leader and enforce the laws but he must also be 
someone who the public can trust to save lives and apply justice (Black, 1980).  
According to Van Maanen (1978b), there are two occupational perspectives that 
provide insight into a police officer’s work life. The outsider perspective focuses on the 
policeman’s position in society. In his uniform, he provides a unique role to the extent 
that he is constantly under public scrutiny and he may generate anxiety among the public. 
At the same time, he is protecting himself and others from harm (see also Skolnick’s 
1966 discussion of police solidarity and social isolation). A second perspective, the 
survival method, the officer pursues a safe, yet active, routine where he also must learn 
not to expect much from the job and to play by the rule of law (Van Maanen, 1978b). An 
officer’s working personality is not only based on the balance between the two 
occupational perspectives, but also incorporates elements of both his authoritative and 
protective roles in society.
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Skolnick (1966) summarizes the development of an officer’s working personality, 
stating, “The police officer’s role contains two principle variables, danger and authority, 
that should be interpreted in the light of a ‘constant’ pressure to appear efficient” (p. 43). 
Danger generates the officer’s natural suspicion, while authority becomes his means to 
prevent danger, allowing him to enforce the law when necessary. Muir (1977) and Reuss-
Ianni and Ianni (1983) also emphasize that an officer’s self-defensive reactions and “gut” 
feelings play a role in forming his working personality.  
The police officer’s role encompasses a variety of responsibilities; the National 
Research Council (2004) reports that 65% of police work is comprised of responding to 
citizens’ calls for service. An officer’s main goal, however, is to maintain order within 
society - to control and prevent citizen behaviors that disturb the peace (e.g., public 
drunkenness or loud noises). Therefore, both police researchers and the public are most 
concerned with the interactions the officer has with citizens and exactly how the officer 
“controls” citizens’ behaviors. 
2.2 Police-Citizen Interactions 
The types of encounters police have with citizens vary extensively. According to 
the National Research Council (2004), an officer’s daily function includes a multitude of 
actions and engagements with citizens; no two days are the same. An officer’s daily 
responsibilities vary, yet the central element of police authority, managing relationships 
with citizens while seeking their compliance, is an everyday occurrence (Reiss and 
Bordua, 1967). When police interact with citizens, Manning (1977) describes that officer 
behavior should be characterized by “proper emotional tone, proper attitude, control of 
information, efficacious tactics, and skill in the manipulation and use of objects” (p. 233). 
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PCIs may be categorized into two types, based on the officer’s response to the 
interaction; coercive and noncoercive police action (Sun et al., 2008). 
Noncoercive police action consists of citizen support, such as physical assistance 
and providing legal advice to citizens (Sun et al., 2008). Researchers have concluded that 
the majority of PCIs can be categorized as noncoercive action and involve police service 
situations (Black, 1980; Mastrofski, 1983; Wilson, 1978). However, because of their 
potential to be harmful and/or discriminatory toward citizens, coercive police action is 
the focus behind many studies involving PCIs, and is the central element of the current 
paper. 
An essential role of a police officer is to maintain order within society (National 
Research Council, 2004). In some situations (e.g., dealing with a suspected criminal), an 
officer has the right to use coercive action to control citizen conduct (Bittner, 1990). 
Coercive actions may involve frisking or searching a citizen, interrogation, arrest or use 
of restraints (e.g., handcuffs), and drawing/discharging a weapon (see Sun et al., 2008). 
Police use coercive actions in order to establish their social identity and protect their role 
in society, what Tedeschi and Felson (1994) refer to as social interactionism. Social 
interactionism is a theory of coercive actions that (1) interprets coercive action as social 
influences (i.e., intended to change the behavior of a person) and (2) emphasizes the 
social interaction between the officer and the noncompliant citizen (Tedeschi and Felson, 
1994). 
Types of Coercive Police Actions 
In order to serve and protect, an officer must make it a priority to gain citizen 
compliance, sometimes through coercive police action (Sun et al., 2008). Common 
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coercive actions police use most often include: stop and frisk, search, an officer’s use of 
force, arrest, and traffic stops (e.g., Ridgeway, 2007). Although traffic stops are one of 
the most frequent coercive encounters citizens have with police (Ingram, 2007), 
researchers believe they should be treated separately from street encounters (see Smith 
and Visher, 1981; Klinger, 1996b).
2
  
Stop and Frisk. In 1964 the New York State legislature adopted a new “stop and 
frisk” policy that allowed police to stop and question any person in a public space, based 
on the officer’s suspicion of involvement in a crime (Ronayne, 1964). Stop and question 
occurs when an officer becomes suspicious of a person, stops the person (temporarily 
detaining them) and questions the person about potential involvement in a crime (e.g., 
what the person is doing at the time, where the person is headed, etc.) (Spitzer, 1999). 
The officer may have decided to question the person based on feelings of distrust, 
initiated by the citizen’s furtive movements (e.g., walking between parked cars and 
looking into their windows), the citizen’s inappropriate attire (e.g., wearing a trench coat 
in the summer), the visible outline of a weapon on the citizen, or any other circumstance 
that may pose a threat to the well-being of the officer or others; the official stop, 
however, must be based on lawful circumstances (Spitzer, 1999). For example, an officer 
may not stop a person based exclusively on his type of clothing, but may decide to stop a 
                                                 
 
2
 Unless otherwise noted, the empirical literature referenced throughout this paper 
includes findings from police-citizen interactions during street encounters (e.g., 
pedestrian stops) and excludes studies analyzing motor vehicle stops. Note that some 
studies do not include a detailed description of data. For example, Smith and Klein 
(1983) state, “police-citizen contacts were observed and recorded by trained civilians 
riding on 900 patrol shifts” but do not specifically state whether these encounters include 
or exclude motor vehicle stops (p. 74). Studies without a detailed data description are 
assumed to be applicable to the current paper.  
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person because the person is near the scene of a recent crime and fits the description of 
the suspected criminal.  
Since its enactment in 1964, the stop and frisk policy has been scrutinized for its 
vagueness and potential for unconstitutionality. Sindell (1966) reported, “Already those 
interested in the preservation of freedom of privacy are pitted against those who clamor 
for greater police protection and laws to facilitate this end. There are those who feel that 
the statute dangerously impinges upon their civil liberties and is in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment” (p.180). Addressing constitutional rights set forth in the Fourth 
Amendment, the 1968 Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio set the stage for the stop and 
frisk policy we know today.   
In 1967 a Cleveland police officer, McFadden, suspected Terry (the defendant) 
and two other men of criminal activity, stopped them, frisked them, arrested them, and 
charged them with carrying concealed weapons (Terry, 1968). Although Officer 
McFadden’s suspicions of criminal activity were correct, the stop occurred without 
probable cause, the requirement under the law in 1967. Terry, an African-American man, 
claimed his constitutional rights had been violated and filed an appeal, which resulted in 
the case being upheld in the state’s appeals court. Later appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Ohio in 1968, the conviction of the defendant was affirmed (Terry, 1968). 
Terry v. Ohio effectively reduced the volume of evidence required of police 
officers to stop and frisk a citizen. Prior to the 1968 ruling, a stop and frisk required 
probable cause, or the officer’s belief that the searching officer will uncover evidence of 
criminal activity (Barrett, 1998). The ruling allowed officers to stop and frisk any person 
they felt was reasonably suspicious of being involved in criminal activity (Terry, 1968).  
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Several lower court rulings have also addressed who may be frisked and the 
circumstances that justify a frisk. Sibron v. New York was decided the same day as Terry 
v. Ohio. In the case, Sibron (the defendant) was arrested and charged with possession of 
narcotics. Sibron filed a motion to suppress the narcotics evidence as illegally seized. It 
was ruled by the trial court that the arresting officer had probable cause to make the 
arrest; the ruling was upheld by the state appellate court and later by the New York Court 
of Appeals (Sibron, 1968). Sibron addressed the circumstances that substantiate a lawful 
stop and frisk; the case hashed out the difference between an officer’s “reasonable 
suspicion” and an officer’s “hunch.” 
Since Terry v. Ohio, courts have heard several cases related to stop and frisk 
policies (e.g., Adams v. Williams, Ybarra v. Illinois, Minnesota v. Dickerson). Overall, 
Terry permitted certain police actions during encounters with citizens (e.g., right to stop 
based on reasonable suspicion), while Sibron limited police power (e.g., stop cannot be 
based on a “hunch”). Several case appeals since the 1960’s have ensured that officers act 
in accordance with the law.  
In its most basic form, a stop and frisk may be conducted when the officer feels 
there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (Terry, 1968). Furthermore, as set forth 
in Sibron, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or will be 
committed, which includes “specific and articulable facts,” not solely “a hunch” (U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, 2013, p.1). For example, the Supreme Court ruling Illinois 
v. Wardlow (2000) ruled that a person fleeing at the sight of police in a high crime area is 
enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. Once the stop and questioning of the person 
has occurred, a frisk may (or may not) occur, depending on the officer’s suspicion that 
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the person has been, or will be, involved in criminal activity (Spitzer, 1999). The act of 
frisking involves “patting down,” or moving the hands quickly over the person’s body in 
order to detect weapons or other illegal contraband (Harris, 1994a).  
The NYPD is well known for its aggressive policing strategies in PCIs, especially 
for pedestrian stop and frisks (Fagan and Davies, 2000). Many of the NYPD aggressive 
policing strategies were derived from the theoretical foundations of Wilson and Kelling’s 
(1982) broken windows theory, where community physical disorder is proposed to led to 
an increase in criminal behaviors (see also Spitzer, 1999); New York City police officers 
often rely on stop and frisks to address low-level disorders. Specifically, the NYPD’s 
1994 Police Strategy No. 5, Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York included 
aggressively targeting minor offenses in order to control more serious violations (Fagan 
and Davies, 2000). The most famous pursuit of disorder or nuisance was the “squeegee” 
people in New York City during the late 1990s. The NYPD focused their efforts at 
eliminating “squeegee” people that disturbed and annoyed law-abiding citizens. As Parks, 
Mastrofski, DeJong, and Gray (1999) states, “Under Commissioner William Bratton, 
New York City discontinued the ‘Officer Friendly’ community policing approach of the 
previous commissioner in favor of a focus on rigorous law enforcement to rid the streets 
of ‘squeegee men’” (p. 487). Aggressive policing on the squeegee people, however, 
opened the door for an influx of aggressive policing on many types of public social 
disorders (e.g., public intoxication, graffiti, and public urination) (Fagan and Davies, 
2000).  
Another NYPD directive, Police Strategy No. 1, Getting Guns Off the Streets of 
New York focused on seizing illegal firearms in order to reduce gun violence (Fagan and 
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Davies, 2000). These two initiatives (No. 5 and No. 1) gave police ultimate power over 
citizens, allowing police to stop and frisk any person they felt was suspicious or 
disorderly, while still acting under the laws outlined by Terry v. Ohio. Although this led 
to multiple arrests for misdemeanor offenses, it also exposed the NYPD to attacks of 
discrimination. Trone (2010) reported that stop and frisk encounters within the NYPD 
caused considerable debate as to whether the stops were racially biased and whether the 
policy worked at reducing crime (see also Harris, 1994a, 1994b). 
In situations involving stop and frisk, or more serious coercive police actions 
(e.g., search, arrest, or use of force), the responding officer must fill out a Unified Form 
(UF-250) report (Fagan and Davies, 2000). Depending on the circumstances of the 
incident, the officer may or may not complete the UF-250 report. The NYPD Patrol 
Guide mandates officers to fill out the report under four specific circumstances (1) person 
is stopped by use of force (2) person stopped is frisked or frisked and searched (3) person 
is arrested or (4) person stopped refused to identify himself (Spitzer, 1999). Although 
non-mandated UF-250 reports make up some of the total reports, it is estimated that 
mandated UF-250 reports account for approximately 72% of the total reports (Gelman et 
al., 2007). The UF-250 reports provide details of each stop, on behalf of the police officer 
involved; the information collected includes, but is not limited to: the officer's reasons for 
initiating the stop, whether the stop led to an arrest, demographic information for the 
person stopped, and the suspected criminal involvement. Appendix A provides an image 
of the front and back of the NYPD’s UF-250 report.  
One of the first notable studies of NYPD stop and frisk UF-250 reports in 1998 
described that the number of reports more than doubled over a span of ten years (Fagan 
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and Davies, 2000). The dramatic increase in the number of stops in New York City has 
continued since the original implementation of the policy in the 1960s. In fact, each year 
the number of stops by New York City police increases (CCR, 2012). The Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) provides status reports and updates on all statistics and cases 
dealing with the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy. The latest statistical account conveyed 
that there were 576,394 stops made in 2009 and 685,724 stops made in 2011, a 16% 
increase over a two-year period (CCR, 2012). Fagan and Davies (2000) discuss the 
implication of these large number of stops, which are vastly increasing arrest rates for 
misdemeanors and not following the original propositions set forth by order maintenance 
policing (to reduce the more serious criminal offenses). Further, as the quality of arrests 
decline, so does the ability to prosecute under a court of law. From 1993 to 1998, the 
number of misdemeanor and felony arrests that were dismissed doubled, showing that the 
“the evidentiary quality of arrests suffered as their [stop and frisk] number rose” (Fagan 
and Davies, 2000, p.476). 
Some researchers explain that the number of stops is actually not as high as it may 
appear. A Philadelphia Police Commissioner, John Timoney (in Trone, 2010), estimates 
that if all NYPD officers made one stop a week, the total number of stops would surpass 
one million, making the 600,000 stops seem more reasonable. Further, Heather Mac 
Donald (2001), a scholar on police behavior, argues that it is unfair of policy makers and 
researchers to look simply at raw numbers of stops and they must take into consideration 
where the police are stopping citizens and what police are doing during the stops. She 
believes police are being proactive and targeting areas with higher amounts of crime.  
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Advocates of the stop and frisk policy (e.g., some citizens, police officers, 
politicians, etc.) believe that police have the right to stop and frisk whomever they feel is 
suspicious and argue that the policy has positively impacted crime in New York City. 
The majority of citizens, however, are skeptical of these findings, arguing that statistics 
reveal that crime rates have been on the decline even before the implementation of the 
strict stop and frisk policy (see Rose, 2013). For example, Fagan and Davies (2000) point 
to cyclical changes in rates of violent crime and neighborhood collective efficacy as 
sources of changes in crime rates. The majority of citizens also believe that the policy 
violates right to privacy and is unconstitutional.  
In a recent federal class action lawsuit, Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., 
defendants claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, racial profiling, and 
unconstitutional stop and frisks (CCR, 2013a; House, 2013; Rose, 2013). On March 27, 
2013, the NYPD included a memo as evidence in the case that instructed officers give a 
narrative description of every stop, in addition to checking the boxes on the UF-250 form 
(CCR, 2013b).  
On August 12, 2013 U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD’s 
stop and frisk policy violated constitutional rights of citizens (CCR, 2013c). Scheindlin 
(2013) stated, “the public interest in liberty and dignity under the Fourth Amendment, 
and the public interest in equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, trumps whatever 
modicum of added safety might theoretically be gained by the NYPD making 
unconstitutional stops and frisks” (p. 5). As a result, the Judge ordered a reform to the 
policy, which included the appointment of an independent monitor. The monitor is to 
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oversee the agreed-upon reforms of the policy (e.g., changes to stop and frisk 
documentation) in the department, including aspects of officer training, supervision, and 
discipline (CCR, 2013c).  
However, these judge-ordered reforms came to a halt when New York City filed 
appeals. Upon appeals, Judge Scheindlin was subsequently removed from the case, the 
city arguing that the judge did not act in a fair and impartial manner (CCR, 2013c). In 
November 2013, New York City adopted a new mayor, de Blasio, as well as a new Police 
Commissioner, Bratton. In January 2014, de Blasio dropped the appeals and reached an 
agreement with the Floyd plaintiffs (CCR, 2014). Although Bratton feels strongly that 
stop, question, and frisk is a basic tool used in the NYPD, the reform process of the 
policy has begun. Compared to months in the second-half of 2012, stops in the same 
months in 2013 saw an 80% reduction of police stop and frisks (Long, 2013). 
Search. Four years after the rulings of Terry and Sibron, a case under the Terry 
ruling appeared in Connecticut. In 1972, Adams v. Williams was heard by the Court of 
Appeals. Officer Adams was approached by an informant saying that the defendant, 
Williams, was in possession of narcotics and an illegal firearm. When Officer Adams 
approached Williams in his parked car, Williams refused Officer Adams’s requests to get 
out of the car. Upon refusal, Officer Adams reached into the car and took possession of a 
firearm in Williams’s waistband. Subsequent searches also revealed heroin and a machete 
located in Williams’s car. Williams was convicted of possession of a handgun and 
narcotics. He appealed the ruling on behalf of unlawful search. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the decision that the right to stop and frisk can be based on information from other 
people, not solely on behalf of reasonable suspicion by the officer (Adams, 1972).  
 20 
Police officers have the right to search a person they believe he has been 
involved, or will be involved, in a crime in order to uncover evidence or contraband 
(Spitzer, 1999). A search occurs when the officer investigates, or combs through, the 
suspect’s possessions or on his person (e.g., his bag or his pant pockets) (Harris, 1994a). 
The Fourth Amendment protects Americans from illegal searches and seizures by police, 
stating that a search must be based on probable cause, or if a search warrant has been 
issued by a judge declaring probable cause for the search (U.S. Const., amend. IV). The 
Supreme Court’s ruling Terry v. Ohio, however, allowed a search and seizure without 
probable cause, but under circumstances of reasonable suspicion.  
When discussing the difference between frisks and searches, Harris (1994a) 
states, “Frisks could not go beyond a pat down of outer clothing to locate a weapon; once 
the officer knew no weapon was present, further searching was improper” (p. 662). A 
street encounter often begins with an officer’s stop and frisk of a suspect before 
furthering into a search, however, a search does not have to originate from a frisk (Harris, 
1994a). A person that is frisked will not always be searched (e.g., when there is no 
reasonable suspicion that evidence will be obtained) and a person searched does not first 
have to be frisked.  
Use of force. Bittner (1990) recognizes that the primary activity that sets the 
police apart from other government agencies is their authority to use force. Force can be 
defined as the exertion of power to coerce or contain the behaviors of others (Kania and 
Mackey, 1977). Brown (1981) argues that police are constantly under the unpredictable 
pressures of violence from citizens stating, “the thought that violence (or the threat of it) 
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often begets violence” (p.77). A police officer, therefore, must always expect violent 
behaviors and be prepared to use force to protect himself and others from harm.  
Some common forms of police use of force include, but are not limited to: strong 
verbal cues
3
, intimidation, compliance methods, physical force, and deadly force 
(Klinger, 1995). Researchers have different methods for measuring police use of force 
(dichotomous, ordinal, and continuous measures). The most common method is to place 
the use of force actions on a continuum based on the level of force used in the encounter, 
ranging from the least severe to most severe option (see e.g., Klinger, 1995; Paoline and 
Terrill, 2007; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002). It is also common practice to examine the 
highest level of force used during an encounter, which allows researchers to gain an 
understanding of the type of force police use to gain citizen compliance. To illustrate, 
Paoline and Terrill’s (2007) study used the highest level of force that occurred in each 
encounter placed on a continuum, beginning with verbal commands and threats and 
ending with impact methods, such as hitting, use of baton, or stun gun (because of their 
interest in citizen compliance, Paoline and Terrill excluded police use of firearms in their 
study).  
Police use of force has long been a central topic of research involving police 
activity. Two theoretical perspectives are often used to explain an officer’s use of force 
(1) sociological and (2) psychological (Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002). The sociological 
perspective explains police use of force in terms of the citizen – who the citizen is and 
what the citizen does – while the psychological perspective explains police use of force in 
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 Following the practices of Terrill and Mastrofski (2002), this discussion includes verbal 
commands as a type of force (see also Sun and Payne, 2004; Paoline and Terrill, 2005). 
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terms of the officer’s background, personal characteristics, and experiences (Terrill and 
Mastrofski, 2002).
4
 Research on police use of force has pursued a number of avenues, 
including excessive use of force (e.g., Adams, 1996; Klinger, 1995; Lee et al., 2010) and 
deadly force. 
A frequently studied type of police use of force is deadly force, which occurs 
when a suspect is killed because of the officer’s use of force (e.g., gunshot) (Geller and 
Scott, 1992). Police use of deadly force has gone through substantive changes over the 
years. In order to reduce racial disparities seen in the use of deadly force in the 1960s and 
1970s, police departments adopted the “defense of life” rule in the 1970s, where police 
shootings became limited to situations that pose a threat to life (Garner, 1985; Walker, 
Spohn, and DeLone, 2000). The defense of life rule, as estimated by Fyfe (1978), reduced 
New York City police officer firearm discharges by almost 30% within a few years. 
Furthermore, the 1985 Supreme Court case Tennessee v. Garner ruled the “fleeing felon 
rule” unconstitutional, which accelerated the “defense of life” standard in situations 
involving police use of force. 
In 1985 the Supreme Court ruled on a case regarding an officer’s use of deadly 
force, Tennessee v. Garner. A Memphis police officer attempted to arrest a young man, 
Garner, for suspected burglary; the suspect fled the scene and was shot and killed by the 
officer (Garner, 1985).  Garner’s father (defendant) brought an action in Federal District 
Court, arguing violation of his son’s constitutional rights. The District Court ruled that 
the officer’s actions did not violate Garner’s constitutional rights; the Court of Appeals 
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 For further discussion on factors affecting police coercion, refer to chapter 2.4 of this 
dissertation. 
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reversed the lower court’s decision (Garner, 1985). The Court of Appeals ruled, “such 
force may not be used unless necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical 
injury to the officer or others” (Garner, 1985, p. 7). Although not the topic of the current 
paper, many researchers have addressed an officer’s use of deadly force in PCIs (see e.g., 
Klinger, 1995), especially in terms of racial disparities (Fyfe, 1982; Geller and Karales, 
1981; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998). Many of the racial disparities found, however, often 
dissipate when researchers control for at-risk status (e.g., felony suspect) (Geller and 
Karales, 1981). 
Even though there are no specific criteria that state what a police officer must do 
in each situation when it comes to use of force, Bittner (1990) explains three specific 
restrictions placed on police officers. First, police use of deadly force is limited (e.g., in 
life-threatening circumstances). Second, police may only use force in performance of 
their duties. And third, police may not use force maliciously or frivolously (Bittner, 
1990). Researchers acknowledge that officers infrequently use physical force in police-
citizen encounters and, when they do use force, they more often choose the less physical 
options (e.g., Klinger, 1995 reported that voice commands were used in 58% of 
“forceful” cases). 
Arrest. Another common tool an officer may use during a PCI is arrest. Terrill 
and Reisig (2003) define arrest as a physical restraint, where the suspect is handcuffed for 
the safety of himself and/or others. An official arrest includes taking the suspect to the 
police department, completing a booking sheet, a property voucher, and other paperwork 
for processing; an officer’s decision to arrest must be based on probable cause (Spitzer, 
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1999). For example, an officer who searches a person and finds a handgun has the right to 
arrest the person based on illegal carrying of a concealed weapon (Barrett, 1998).  
An officer’s decision to arrest is one of many possible alternative coercive 
actions; he has the authority to arrest and the freedom to not arrest. Black (1980) reports 
that officers tend to be more lenient and use their power to arrest less frequently than the 
law would permit. For example, Sun and Payne (2004) reported that only 5% of their PCI 
sample resulted in arrest, with the other coercive actions (e.g., threats and restraints) 
having a higher likelihood. A suspect has the highest chance of being arrested (95%) if an 
officer observes the crime; all other factors (e.g., testimonial evidence and disrespectful 
suspects) run a 70% chance or less of the suspect being arrested (Mastrofski, Worden, 
and Snipes, 1995). In every PCI, the officer makes a choice as to which coercive action, 
if any, will be used to gain citizen compliance. 
2.3 Police Use of Discretion in PCIs 
Throughout the training process, police officers are taught to identify suspicious 
persons or behaviors and to recognize those situations that may pose a threat to their 
well-being (Skolnick, 1994). These identifications and recognitions may stem from what 
is called the symbolic assailant. The symbolic assailant theory was developed to explain 
how officers categorize people and differentiate between citizens and suspects, based on 
what most often relates to criminal activity (e.g., being an African-American young male) 
(Skolnick, 1994). On top of the officer’s distinction between law-abiders and law-
breakers, the decision an officer decides to make in a situation is often based on what the 
officer “feels” is appropriate (Brown, 1981). In every PCI, police have the discretion to 
respond in a manner they deem fit.  
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An officer’s use of discretion can be distinguished by two characteristics (1) their 
aggressiveness, or taking initiative in crime fighting and (2) their selectivity, or the 
increased likelihood to enforce the law (Brown, 1981). According to Brown (1981), these 
two characteristics come together to form one of four officer operational styles: selective 
and highly aggressive; selective and less aggressive; non-selective and highly aggressive; 
and non-selective and less aggressive (p. 224). The officer’s predisposition toward 
aggressiveness and selectivity can help clarify the varying degrees (e.g., decision to arrest 
versus not arrest) of an officer’s use of discretion in each PCI. That is, an officer who is 
selective and highly aggressive is more likely to seek out suspects and make more arrests, 
compared to an officer who is non-selective and less aggressive.  
Often times, officer decision-making is not only based on the officer’s working 
personality (see Brown, 1981) but also on the “type” of person present during the 
interaction (Van Maanen, 1978). As stated by Van Maanen (1978), “the asshole is a part 
of every policeman’s world” (p. 221). Of course Van Maanen is not referring to every 
citizen in PCIs, but is referencing those who are treated harshly simply because of their 
behavior during the interaction (e.g., the citizen attempts to fight or flee). Mastrofski, 
Snipes, and Supina (1996) showed that people who were irrational toward police were 
more likely to be noncompliant with police efforts. “The asshole,” compared to the other 
typologies (“suspicious persons” and “know-nothings”) is a higher candidate for street 
justice, or the officer’s use of authority aimed at correcting ill behaviors (Van Maanen, 
1978).  
In the decision-making process, an officer’s use of discretion takes one of two 
roles - delegated or unauthorized (Skolnick, 1994). Delegated discretion is that response 
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which is clearly allowed by the police (e.g., arresting a murder suspect), while 
unauthorized discretion deals with police actions where they may not have authority (e.g., 
misuse of force) (Skolnick, 1994). Problems arise when the lines of authority in delegated 
discretion are unclear; not every person would agree on the correct course of action taken 
by police officers, which invites scrutiny into an officer’s use of discretion (Brooks, 
2001; Skolnick, 1994). 
Bittner (1990) explained that a police officer’s use of discretion is based on 
keeping the peace and is not founded upon direct compliance with the law. Even with the 
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, Maclin 
(1998) believes that Terry v. Ohio gave officers an extraordinary amount of discretion. If 
police have reason to believe the law has been broken they will have authority to stop the 
person.  
Skolnick (1994) recognized that specific laws are purposefully made subjective 
(e.g., disturbing the peace) in order for the police officer to maintain order. Officers use 
legal recourse as a tool to control unwanted behaviors by citizens, ensuring that their 
discretion is in line with the appropriateness of the situation (Black, 1980). For example, 
officers use less discretion in serious felony offenses and more discretion in 
misdemeanors (Black and Reiss, 1970). They are also less likely to use legal recourse in 
situations in which the victim and offender have a relationship (e.g., a family member), 
whereas incidents involving no victim-offender relationship are more likely to be 
formally handled by police (Black, 1980). An officer’s discretion encompasses the ability 
to decide which rule(s) to impose on a citizen and the power to decide whether or not to 
apply the rule(s); not doing something may hold as much importance as doing something 
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(Brooks, 2001). Brown (1981) recognized that an officer uses discretion as a way to 
implement laws, but also acknowledged that officers are limited in their decision-making 
because of laws.  
From the manner with which they choose to interact with citizens to the decision 
to invoke the law, police use of discretion is a subject under constant attention by 
researchers (Novak, Frank, Smith, and Engel, 2002). Wilson (1978) explained that an 
officer’s discretion is based on the perceived costs and benefits from the situation at hand 
– “the net gain and loss to the suspect, the neighborhood, and the officer himself of 
various courses of action” (p. 84). An officer’s decision-making is based on the “recipe of 
rules” he has developed through his experiences as an officer. The recipe of rules acts as 
a guide on how to do the job and what is acceptable to the department, but may not 
always align with legal or legitimate rules (Manning, 1977).  
Because police behavior is shaped my many factors (e.g., recipe of rules, 
departmental policies, personal values, and social relationships), understanding police use 
of discretion is a difficult undertaking. While emphasizing that discretion is based on 
laws and the officer’s individual morals and beliefs, Brown (1981) stated, “In the act of 
discretion, although the decision maker accepts a framework of values and goal, some 
aspects of the decision process are unspecified or contingent on circumstances and thus 
up to the judgment of the individual” (p. 25). Brown (1981) explained that a police 
officer’s use of discretion in a PCI is under political control and constant examination as 
to whether or not the officer acted “accordingly” in each situation. Police are trained to 
respond to each situation in a manner they deem necessary, which is shaped by many 
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components, including the factors of the situation, the characteristics of the suspect, the 
officer’s prior experiences, his department’s values, and the location of the encounter. 
2.4 Conceptual Frameworks Shaping Police Use of Discretion in PCIs 
An officer’s use of discretion during a PCI is driven by a variety of factors. First 
and foremost, an officer’s use of discretion is heavily dependent upon the legal factors of 
the situation, including evidence against the suspect, seriousness of the offense, and the 
presence of a complaint (Sherman, 1980). Police are much more likely to arrest a suspect 
in situations where police witness the commission of a crime, because the evidence 
against the suspect is greater (Black, 1971). The seriousness of the offense also shapes an 
officer’s discretion during a PCI. Mastrofski et al. (1995) reported that, compared to 
minor offenses “the odds of arrest are almost ten fold when the offense is serious” (p. 
551).  
In some circumstances, however, police decide not to invoke formal action (e.g., 
taking a juvenile home to be punished by his parents, instead taking him to the police 
station) (Ericson, 1982; Goldstein, 1960). It is when officers decide to stray from the law 
and not invoke formal action that peeked police researchers’ interests. Because officers 
have the freedom to decide what is “necessary” in every PCI, police discretionary 
research has become very popular over the years. Researchers have investigated other 
factors that drive police use of discretion, instead of focusing solely on the legal factors 
that impact an officer’s decision-making. 
In 1980, Sherman offered one of the first substantive evaluations of police 
behavior. In his paper, he uses a framework of five approaches to explain police use of 
discretion, one being legal, and the other four being extralegal. The extralegal factors 
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include: situational factors, officer characteristics, organizational factors, and community 
characteristics. Following Sherman’s research, Riksheim and Chermak (1993) and the 
National Research Council (2004) have also provided a summary of the extralegal factors 
that shape police use of discretion. Riksheim and Chermak (1993) state that over the 
years, “our understanding of the causes of police behavior has become more refined” (p. 
353).  
The substantive points taken from these important reviews of police discretionary 
literature is that (1) situational factors, officer characteristics, organizational factors, and 
community characteristics continue to be recognized as driving forces in police use of 
discretion and (2) the impact of each extralegal factor on police decision-making (i.e. his 
decision to act more or less coercively) is relatively unknown, with various studies 
providing mixed results. The current paper, although not an exhaustive review of the 
literature, examines the four factors that have been commonly attributed to shaping an 
officer’s decision-making processes during a PCI. 
Situational Factors 
When it comes to police use of discretion, scholars have recognized that police 
may act differently in each PCI. The first extralegal factor that is recognized to shape 
police use of discretion is situational factors. Situational factors are the characteristics of 
the situation that are unique to each PCI; these variables may include the suspect’s 
gender, age, race, social class, and demeanor toward police (see Sun et al., 2008). In their 
overview of PCI literature, Walker et al. (2000) state, “officer behavior is heavily 
determined by the contextual or situational variables: location (high-crime versus low-
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crime precinct); the perceived criminal involvement of the citizen; the demeanor of the 
citizen; and in the case of physical force, the social status of the citizen” (p. 99).  
Police often use situational characteristics to form judgments of citizens in each 
PCI; these judgments construct an officer’s decision-making processes (see Berk and 
Loseke, 1981). Although there have been general statements made regarding the effects 
of situational characteristics shaping an officer’s use of discretion (e.g., National 
Research Council, 2004; Sun et al., 2008), each situational factor (e.g., suspect gender, 
race, demeanor) has been examined separately by researchers. When situational factors 
are examined separately, evidence of each component shaping police use of discretion 
becomes less clear. For example, in terms of the suspect’s race, the National Research 
Council (2004) reported that some scholars found that, compared to whites, racial 
minorities received lower amounts of police coercive action; some reported null effects; 
and others reported that racial minorities received higher amounts of police coercive 
action. Overall, situational factors remain an important driving force in police decision-
making processes, but the individual components that make up the situational factors 
have produced mixed statistical conclusions.  
Gender. The evidence regarding a suspect’s gender and an officer’s decision-
making has been inconclusive. Some scholars have reported that males are more likely to 
be subjected to coercive police actions, while others reported that females are handled 
more formally by police. Still others have found no significant difference between the 
sexes.  
Terrill and Reisig (2003), for example, controlled for several encounter-level 
variables (e.g., suspect characteristics, officer characteristics, and citizen audience) and 
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found that males are more likely to be on the receiving end of police officer force. Also, 
Sealock and Simpson (1998) reported that male contacts with police are more likely to 
result in arrest (61.3%), compared to female contacts (37.1%). In their study, the 
researchers controlled for legal factors (e.g., offense seriousness, prior police contacts, 
and whether or not an officer observed the offense). Sealock and Simpson (1998) also 
examined the significance of offense seriousness in arrest decisions between males and 
females and concluded that offense seriousness plays a more significant role in female 
arrests than it does in male arrests (15.53% versus 11.82%), showing that both legal and 
extralegal factors are at play in shaping an officer’s decision-making. 
Contrary to these findings, Hindelang (1979) reported that females were actually 
overrepresented in arrest statistics for robbery and aggravated assault, compared to males. 
According to Visher’s (1983) research, females who exhibit “appropriate gender 
behaviors and characteristics” are less likely to be arrested, while women who “deviate 
from stereotypic gender expectations” can be expected to be arrested more frequently (p. 
5) (see also Gelsthorpe, 1986).  
In the meanwhile, Smith and Visher (1981) examined PCIs from 24 metropolitan 
police departments and concluded, in terms of arrest and controlling for other factors 
(e.g., suspect demeanor), “police do not discriminate in favor of women” (p. 174); their 
research reported that males and females had an equal chance of being arrested. The main 
point taken from these reports on how a suspect’s gender impacts an officer’s use of 
discretion is that an officer’s coercive action may or may not be driven by gender; 
empirical evidence on the subject remains mixed.  
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Age. Police researchers have also examined the impact of the suspect’s age on 
police coercive action. Brown, Novak, and Frank (2009) examined the impact of age on 
an officer’s decision to arrest. Controlling for the suspect’s race, gender, intoxication, 
demeanor, offense type, and whether the officer witnessed the crime, they found that 
juveniles (under the age of 18) ran a higher risk of being arrested than adults. These 
findings, however, did not hold when the location of the encounter was factored in; 
juveniles encountered in distressed communities were more likely to be arrested, while 
adults encountered in less distressed communities were more likely to be arrested.  
In partial support of Brown et al.’s findings, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found a 
positive relationship between younger suspects and police coercion (measured as a 
continuum of force). However, contrary to Brown et al., Terrill and Reisig reported that 
police use of force was more often applied to younger suspects, regardless of 
neighborhood context. Likewise, Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002)5 study of situational 
determinants on police use of force (verbal and physical forms) revealed that younger 
suspects (age measured on an ordinal scale) are more likely to be subjected to higher 
levels of force, controlling for the suspect’s other characteristics (e.g., demeanor), the 
number of officers and bystanders present during the PCI, the anticipation of violence 
(through the dispatcher’s indication), and whether the PCI occurred in a community-
oriented or traditional policing style jurisdiction. 
                                                 
 
5
 Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002) study analyzed data from the Project on Policing 
Neighborhoods (POPN) that incorporated both street and motor vehicle police-citizen 
encounters, but it is unclear which type of encounter dominates the analyses. 
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On the other hand, studies also report a negative, or even insignificant, 
relationship between the suspect’s age and police coercive behaviors. For example, 
Lundman (1974) found no statistically significant differences between juvenile and adult 
arrest rates, controlling for citizen race, social class, and the location of the encounter. 
Similarly, Sun and Payne (2004) reported that youthful suspects (age 18-29 years old) did 
not impact the officer’s decision to use coercive action (measured on a continuum of use 
of force). Moreover, in their study of NYPD arrest decisions, Khruakham and Hoover 
(2012) found that older suspects were more likely to be arrested than youth, net of other 
situational-level variables. Similar to literature examining the impact of suspect gender 
on police decision-making, the impact of the suspect’s age on police use of discretion 
remains inconclusive.  
Social Class. Bittner (1990) argued that an officer is not concerned with the 
connections between economic inequality and criminality and that an officer does not 
purposefully seek to enforce the laws differently for certain types of people. However, 
research in this area, more often than not, supports the notion that suspects of low-income 
status can expect to receive more severe and more punitive police responses (Black, 
1976, 1980). Several scholars have provided empirical support for the finding that people 
in lower socio-economic statuses receive harsher treatment by police.  
Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002) study of situational determinants on police use of 
force (verbal and physical forms) showed that higher levels of force are more often 
applied to economically poor suspects, net of other factors (e.g., suspect demeanor, 
anticipation of violence, jurisdiction). Terrill and Reisig (2003) also reported a positive 
relationship between lower class individuals and rates of arrest, irrespective of other 
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situational characteristics and neighborhood context. Further, Sun et al.’s (2008) 
multilevel analysis of factors impacting police behavior revealed that, compared to 
affluent citizens, poor citizens were more likely to be subjected to police coercive 
activities (e.g., searching the suspect, police discharging a weapon).  
Overall, most research supports the notion that a suspect’s social class will factor 
into an officer’s use of discretion, although some studies contradict the consensus that 
suspects in a lower social class receive more coercive police action. For example, 
Mastrofski et al. (1995) uncovered that police treated the poor less harshly. The authors 
conveyed their perplexity by stating that officers are “less likely to arrest when the 
suspect is poor is a puzzle” (p. 555). This seems to reveal that some other extralegal 
factors are at play; possibly other factors (e.g., community characteristics) have a more 
influencing impact on shaping an officer’s use of discretion.  
Race. The majority of empirical evidence examining police use of discretion 
indicates that minorities receive harsher treatment by police. For example, Smith and 
Visher (1981) reported that African-Americans are more likely to be arrested, net of other 
factors (including offense seriousness and suspect demeanor). Also, Sealock and 
Simpson’s (1998) study reported racial bias in arrest practices and stated that African-
Americans were more likely to be arrested than whites, while taking other factors into 
consideration (e.g., offense seriousness). Later, Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002) study of 
situational determinants on police use of force (verbal and physical forms) showed that 
racial minorities have a higher chance of being on the receiving end of increased force, 
controlling for several other predictors (e.g., suspect’s demeanor, number of bystanders, 
and jurisdiction). 
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Some studies, however, do not follow this pattern. Geller and Karales (1981) 
examined racial disparities in police shootings and found that when they controlled for at-
risk status (defined as forcible felony arrest), whites were subjected to deadly force more 
often than minorities. Further, Mastrofski, Reisig, and McCluskey (2002) examined 
police officer disrespect towards whites and minority citizens and showed that whites 
received harsher treatment by police. In their study, police officer disrespect was 
measured as illegitimate speech and gestures that target the citizen’s identity; the authors 
revealed that in St. Petersburg, whites received more police disrespect than minorities, 
controlling for neighborhood context. Although police officer disrespect is not considered 
a specific type of coercive action, per se, it is argued that these findings are applicable to 
the current review. Mastrofski et al. (2002) noted that some research observers code more 
serious forms of police misbehavior (e.g., excessive force) as police disrespect. Further, 
the authors’ hypotheses are guided by findings from prior literature examining the effects 
of situational factors on an officer’s use of coercive action (e.g., arrest).6 
In terms of the suspect’s race impacting an officer’s use of discretion, some 
studies have provided null findings. In their study of community policing, Mastrofski, 
Worden, and Snipes (1995) reported that race had no statistically significant impact on an 
officer’s decision to arrest a suspect. Also, Garner, Maxwell, and Heraux (2002) 
examined the influence of situational factors on police use of force (verbal commands to 
                                                 
 
6
 In forming their hypotheses, Mastrofski et al. (2002) discussed findings from studies 
reporting on situational factors impacting police use of coercion in order to estimate 
influences on police disrespect. For example, they hypothesized that police would exhibit 
higher amounts of disrespect toward minority citizens and they cited Black’s (1976) 
predictions that certain groups of society would be subjected to an increase in punitive 
action by the criminal justice system.  
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use of a weapon) from six law enforcement agencies. They reported that the difference in 
use of force between whites and nonwhites was statistically insignificant, even after 
controlling for the suspect’s resistance. Again, it may be that research on the suspect’s 
race shaping an officer’s decision-making is mixed because other extralegal factors that 
are not the focus of these particular studies (e.g., community characteristics) potentially 
have a greater impact in shaping an officer’s decision-making processes.  
Suspect Demeanor. Unlike demographic characteristics, citizen demeanor has 
proven to be a stronger and more consistent situational predictor of police decision-
making during a PCI (e.g., Mastrofski et al. 2002). The majority of research examining 
situational factors impacting police coercive action concludes that citizens who exhibited 
disrespectful or irrational behavior toward police were subjected to an increase in police 
coercive actions (e.g., Reiss, 1968; Sun et al., 2008). Disrespectful or irrational behavior 
on behalf of the citizen includes discourteous actions directed at police, such as ignoring 
police commands, displaying obscene gestures, and making derogatory remarks (see e.g., 
Sun and Payne, 2004).  
Reiss (1968) was one of the first scholars to examine data from an observational 
study of police use of nonlethal force in Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D.C. He 
concluded that a suspect who acted defiantly had a higher likelihood to be on the 
receiving end of nonlethal force. Following Reiss’s (1968) study, Friedrich (1977) 
reanalyzed the observational data in a more comprehensive manner (i.e., he examined the 
relationship between organizational, situational, and individual factors and police 
behavior). Friedrich (1977) reported that one out of every three suspects arrested 
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displayed antagonistic behavior toward police, while those whose behavior was civil ran 
a one out of seven risk of arrest.  
The surge of research examining the impact of suspect demeanor on an officer’s 
decision-making also brought skepticism to the validity of findings. In his 1994 article, 
Klinger criticized prior studies’ measurements of suspect demeanor because of their 
inclusion of both noncriminal and criminal behaviors. Klinger (1994) reported that 
demeanor, as properly measured (i.e., exclusion of criminal behaviors, e.g., resisting 
arrest), was not a statistically significant predictor of police behavior (see Fyfe, 1996 and 
Worden and Shepard, 1996 for further discussion). Contrary to the majority of empirical 
evidence supporting Reiss (1968) and Friedrich’s (1977) findings (e.g., Sun et al., 2008), 
Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) found that suspect demeanor did not play a role in 
predicting an officer’s use of coercive action (verbal and physical force). They stated, 
“males, nonwhites, poor suspects, and young suspects were all treated more harshly, 
irrespective of their behavior” (p. 243). Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002) contradictory 
findings may possibly have occurred due to measurement deficiencies of suspect 
demeanor in other studies, what Klinger (1994) had proposed.  
Many studies have been reanalyzed due to Klinger’s response, yet continued to 
illustrate that demeanor is a worthy predictor of police coercive actions (see Lundman, 
1994; Novak et al., 2002; Worden and Shepard, 1996). Studies have illustrated that the 
probability of police coercive action increases when the suspect is disrespectful toward 
police, controlling for other situational factors (e.g., race, age, offense). Myers (2002) 
found that 26% of disrespectful juvenile suspects were arrested, compared to 10% of 
respectful juvenile suspects. Further, Garner et al. (2002) reported that the odds of force 
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(ranging from verbal commands to use of a weapon) directed at suspects who displayed 
an antagonistic behavior toward police increases by 163%, compared to suspects who 
displayed a civil demeanor.  
Citizens who display a hostile demeanor have an increased risk of police 
coercion, regardless of the other factors that may shape an officer’s use of discretion. Sun 
et al. (2008) reported that a suspect’s disrespectful demeanor was the strongest predictor 
of police coercive action (on a scale ranging from searching the suspect to police 
discharging a weapon), compared to all other individual- and officer-level variables in 
their study (e.g., age, gender, race, evidence strength, officer experience). 
Some researchers explained that the influence of a suspect’s demeanor on police 
action is attributable to interaction effects, where multiple factors act together to explain 
officer decision-making processes (see e.g., Klinger, 1996a). For example, it is thought 
that compared to any unruly person, a young, minority male with a bad attitude will be 
subjected to higher amounts of police coercive action. Using recommendations from 
Klinger’s (1994, 1996a) work, Engel, Sobol, and Worden (2000) conducted a study of 
interaction effects, hypothesizing that a suspect’s disrespectful demeanor would raise the 
probability of his arrest, when combined with other extralegal factors (e.g., individual 
characteristics). They tested their hypotheses using several interaction dichotomies 
(suspect’s demeanor with age, race, sex, alcohol or drug use, public or private location, 
number of bystanders, other officers present, and crime suspected) on an officer’s 
decision to arrest. Their findings provided minimal support for their hypotheses, 
concluding that the interaction effect between “suspect demeanor and drug or alcohol 
use” and the interaction effect between “suspect demeanor and other officers present” 
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increased the probability of the suspect’s arrest; all other interaction terms were 
insignificant. The authors noted, “with few exceptions, the effects of demeanor do not 
appear to be contingent on suspects' characteristics or on other features of police-citizen 
interactions” (Engel et al., 2000, p. 256), providing evidence that suspect demeanor alone 
is a consistent predictor of officer coercive actions. 
Bittner (1990) declares that a police officer should not reduce a man’s right to 
dignity because of his race, age, social status, or even his behavior toward police. 
However, often times, this becomes embedded within the police officer’s daily routine. 
Researchers recognize several situational factors that may influence an officer’s use of 
discretion; however, evidence for situational factors impacting an officer’s decision-
making remains mixed. Sun et al., (2008) found that “males, minorities, and poor citizens 
were more likely to be subjected to coercive activities than were females, non-minorities, 
and affluent citizens” (p. 29). Similarly, Terrill and Reisig (2003) reported, “male, 
minority, youthful, and lower income suspects were more likely to be on the receiving 
end of higher levels of police force” (p.303) (see also De Coster and Heimer, 2006). 
Several empirical studies, however, have contradicted these general conclusions (e.g., 
Khruakham and Hoover, 2012; Mastrofski et al., 1995; Mastrofski et al., 2002).  
The National Research Council (2004) proposed that mixed results on situational 
factors impacting police decision-making may be attributed to differences between 
studies. That is, studies varied in their location or jurisdiction, time period, and 
measurement techniques used to reach conclusions. For example, in studies examining 
social class, the National Research Council (2004) recognized that some studies were 
based on the suspect’s physical appearance and speech patterns, while others were based 
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on suspect surveys of their wealth and occupation. Although situational factors are seen 
as a driving force of police decision-making, evidence on the impact of each factor 
remains mixed; other extralegal factors may hold greater weight in shaping an officer’s 
use of discretion. 
Officer Characteristics  
The impact officer characteristics have on police decision-making in a PCI has 
also been examined, with researchers describing police use of discretion as being heavily 
influenced by the officer’s values and beliefs (Brown, 1981). Officer characteristics not 
only include his values and beliefs, but also include his demographics (e.g., race, gender), 
career experience and education, as well as his personality, opinions, and perceptions 
(e.g., National Research Council, 2004). Paoline and Terrill (2005) recognized four 
officer demographic characteristics that “have been identified as dimensions of social 
differences that permeate contemporary police (and criminal justice) organizations” (p. 
105); these include: officer gender, race, level of education (e.g., high school graduate), 
and experience (in terms of number of years served as a police officer). Researchers have 
also examined how the officer’s personality may shape his decision-making behaviors. 
Unfortunately, as research regarding situational factors affecting police decision-making 
revealed, the influence of officer characteristics on an officer’s use of discretion is mixed.  
Gender. In terms of officer gender, researchers have traditionally assumed that 
female officers will act less forcefully in PCIs, compared to their male counterparts. To 
illustrate, Rabe-Hemp’s (2008) reanalysis of the widely used Project on Policing 
Neighborhoods (POPN) data set revealed that female officers were less coercive than 
male officers in PCIs. While controlling for officer characteristics, situational, and 
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suspect characteristics (e.g., officer experience, resistance), Rabe-Hemp (2008) stated, 
“Female officers were over 27 percent less likely than male officers to exhibit extreme 
controlling behaviors such as threats, physical restraint, searches, and arrest in their 
interactions with citizens” (p. 429). Some empirical studies, however, have not supported 
the traditional claim.  
Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) and Paoline and Terrill (2005) also used data from 
POPN to test whether gender impacted an officer’s decision-making in PCIs. Terrill and 
Mastrofski (2002) reported no significant differences between male and female officers’ 
level of force (measured on a continuum), controlling for several other factors (e.g., 
suspect characteristics, bystanders present, jurisdiction). A few years later, Paoline and 
Terrill (2005) found that the decision to use coercive action (e.g., force) did not differ 
between males and females, with their analyses also showing statistical insignificance. 
Differences between male and female officers in their decision to use coercion did not 
appear until Paoline and Terrill added other influencing factors (e.g., officer experience). 
For example, the authors reported higher levels of coercive action used by male police 
officers who also had a lower education level and who were less experienced. They also 
reported that, compared to female officers, male officers were more likely to apply force 
to a male suspect. Although these three studies contribute to our knowledge of how 
officer gender impacts police decision-making, the National Research Council (2004) 
noted that the literature is too small to draw firm conclusions. 
Race. Several scholars have addressed the impact of an officer’s race on his 
decision-making, with empirical evidence revealing mixed results. In their questionnaire 
assessing the attitudes of appropriate levels of force, Brooks, Piquero, and Cronin (1993) 
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reported that white officers rated higher on their disposition to use force, compared to 
nonwhite officers. In their analysis, Brooks et al. (1993) controlled for the officer’s other 
personal characteristics (e.g., education, age) and experience on the job. Further, Brown 
and Frank (2006) discovered that white officers were more likely to arrest a citizen, 
compared to African-American officers, all else equal (i.e., individual, situational, and 
community characteristics held constant). In their study, the authors explained that 
African-American officers’ arrest decisions were more heavily influenced by other 
extralegal factors (e.g., suspect age) than their white counterparts. 
Contrary to these results, Friedrich’s (1977) comparison of PCIs between African-
American and white officers suggested a racial difference in use of discretion. He stated, 
“Out of the nearly 20,000 police-citizen interactions observed, almost 50% involved 
white officers and black citizens, but only about 2.5% involved black officers and white 
citizens,” (p. 306). A further look at the segregation revealed that African-American 
officers were one-and-a-half times more likely to arrest a citizen than white officers, 
controlling for the race of the citizen. Also interesting is that Friedrich (1977) found that 
mixed-race (African-American and white) officers’ likelihood of arresting a suspect fell 
right in-between the two data points of African-American and white officers.  
Sun and Payne (2004) also reported a difference in coercive action between white 
and African-American officers. In their study of interpersonal disputes (both verbal and 
physical), they found that, compared to white officers, African-American officers 
responded more forcefully (ranging from verbal command to arrest) to these incidents, 
controlling for other officer characteristics, citizen characteristics, and community 
variables. Sun and Payne (2004) also tested interaction terms between officer race and 
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citizen race and between officer race and racial composition of the neighborhood, both of 
which failed to achieve statistical significance. 
Although some studies have provided statistically significant, yet mixed, results, 
other have produced null effects of officer race impacting an officer’s decision-making. 
Smith and Klein (1983) reported statistical insignificance in arrest decisions between 
African-American and white officers, net of other situational- and department-level 
factors. Later, Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) conveyed statistical insignificance of the 
effect of officer race on the level of force used, even after controlling for race/citizen 
combinations (e.g., white officer, African-American citizen).  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between an officer’s race and his decision-
making behavior is extremely varied. It may be that the effect of officer race on his 
decision-making is explained by additional factors not included in several studies (e.g., 
community characteristics). For instance, Friedrich (1977) argued that African-American 
officers have a greater likelihood of coming into contact with African-American citizens, 
which may explain differences in treatment between African-American and white 
citizens. Also, Fyfe (1988) argued that African-American officers are more likely to work 
in high-crime neighborhoods, which may play a role in shaping his use of discretion.  
In his 1988 article, Fyfe recanted his 1978 finding that African-American officers 
were twice as likely to shoot at citizens than white officers, and instead explained that 
African-American officers live in violent environments more often than white officers 
and many of the citizen shootings involved off-duty police work. Further, he explained 
that the differences between African-American and white officer on-duty police 
shootings were attributable to differences in rank and assignment. “One in six white 
 44 
NYPD officers (16.5%) held a supervisory or administrative rank (sergeant or above) in 
which exposure to street-level violence was limited or nil; fewer than one in 20 black 
officers (4.6%) held such a position” (Fyfe, 1988, p. 196). Whether officer race impacts 
his use of discretion in a PCI and whether decisions made on behalf of white and African-
American police officers are driven by other extralegal factors remains inconclusive. 
Education. Researchers have also studied the effect of an officer’s level of 
education on his use of discretion. Advocates of increased education for police officers 
believe officer education would be beneficial to police work through improving 
communication skills, critical thinking, and decision-making processes (Dantzker, 1993). 
Scholars described that increased education may reduce ethical misconduct and 
prejudices on behalf of police officers and may increase police legitimacy, tolerance of 
deviance, and overall job performance (see Baro and Burlingame, 1999; Shernock, 1992; 
Worden, 1990). Empirical evidence examining the impact of officer education on 
decision-making, however, remains mixed. 
Shernock (1992) examined the relationship between an officer’s education level 
(measured on an ordinal scale) and an officer’s use of discretion in order maintenance 
incidents (i.e., disorderly conduct, family disturbance, and noise disturbance). Shernock 
hypothesized, as prior researchers have, that disorder incidents would be more likely 
handled informally by more educated officers. Controlling for department size, officer 
experience, and officer sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., sex, age, income), 
Shernock (1992) reported that the relationship between an officer’s education and an 
officer’s discretion in order maintenance incidents was statistically insignificant. That is, 
officer education did not impact an officer’s decision-making.  
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Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002) study, however, concluded that an increase in 
officer education was associated with a decrease in the amount of force used in a PCI, net 
of other factors. Paoline and Terril (2007) also found that officers who were exposed to 
higher education (had at least some college) were less likely to rely upon verbal force 
(e.g., threats) to gain citizen compliance. When it comes to physical force, however, 
Paoline and Terril (2007) reported that exposure to college did not have an impact; 
officers who had received their bachelor’s degree or higher were significantly less likely 
to rely upon physical force, compared to their less educated counterparts.  
Conversely, Worden (1996)
7
 reported that officers with a four-year college degree 
had a higher likelihood of using “reasonable” physical force that included justifiable 
restraint, but the effects of education did not have a statistically significant relationship 
with “improper force” (e.g., misuse of force); Worden (1996) recognized that his 
analyses overall demonstrated a weak effect. Brooks et al. (1993) reported a positive 
relationship between an officer’s level of education and his disposition to use force 
(measured through a questionnaire), taking the officer’s personal characteristics (e.g., 
age, race) and experience into consideration. The National Research Council (2004) 
explained that many of the studies examining the impact of officer education on his 
decision-making lack proper measurement of both variables in statistical models (e.g., 
education and coercive action), stating that the quality of education, nor the ability to 
control for other variables (e.g., performance test, training levels, officer rank), have not 
                                                 
 
7
 Worden’s (1996) study analyzed data from the Police Services Study (PSS) that 
incorporated both street and motor vehicle police-citizen encounters, but it is unclear 
which type of encounter dominates the analyses. 
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been addressed (see also Fyfe, 1988). Therefore, the committee argued that research on 
the impact of officer education on his decision-making during a PCI is incomplete 
(National Research Council, 2004). Furthermore, many of the studies lack any discussion 
on the possible intervening mechanisms at play (e.g., community-level variables). 
Experience. An officer’s experience impacting his decision-making has also been 
a common topic among police researchers. Researchers explain that, compared to less 
experienced officers, more experienced officers have the necessary knowledge and skills 
to call upon their coercive powers less frequently and only use them in cases they deem 
necessary; they are believed to be better able to recognize dangerous situations or those 
worthy of coercive action (e.g., arrest) (Crawford and Burns, 1998). Therefore, it is often 
hypothesized that more experienced officers will use coercive action less than officers 
with less experience.  
In 1977, Friedrich noted that the quality of police treatment (e.g., bureaucratic 
behavior) of a citizen decreased with more experienced officers, yet it is the most 
experienced officers that gave citizens the highest levels of treatment. He did, report, 
however, that when dealing with an offender, more experienced officers treated them in a 
negative manner 38% of the time, compared to less experienced officers who treated 
them in a negative manner 28% of the time. He stated, “The stereotypes of both the 
"friendly" and the "tough" old cop, oddly enough, both find some empirical support” (p. 
278). When analyzing coercive action, however, Friedrich found that an officer who has 
served on the police force longer is less likely to take formal action (e.g., written report).  
Likewise, Alpert (1989) suggested that less experienced officers tend to use 
deadly force more often than veteran officers; the hypothesis is only affirmed when all 
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officer-involved shootings were considered (e.g., including accidental shootings). 
Moreover, Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) and Paoline and Terrill (2007) reported that 
higher levels of force were more often used by less experienced officers, compared to 
more experienced officers. Crawford and Burns (1998) also reported that an increase in 
time served on the force is associated with a decrease in the amount of force (measured 
on a continuum) used during an arrest, controlling for other factors (e.g., officer gender, 
suspect characteristics).  
Contrary to these findings, Smith and Klein (1983) reported that the relationship 
between officer experience and his decision to arrest a suspect was statistically 
insignificant. Although Alpert’s (1989) study confirmed that less experienced officers 
shoot more frequently than more experienced officers, the hypothesis falls short when a 
“year-by-year computation of intentional shootings” is examined (p. 487). He claimed 
“The general hypothesis that younger, less-experienced officers shoot more than older, 
more experienced officers” cannot be supported (Alpert, 1989, p. 487).  
Scholars have suggested that other confounding factors may be contributing to an 
officer’s decision-making, interfering with clear results from the “experience” variable. It 
is argued that officers with more job experience are less likely to be involved in violent 
street encounters, compared to the less experienced officers (Worden, 1996). The officers 
with the most experience (and in this case, education and age) are often those with a 
higher rank and serve desk jobs instead of routine patrol (Worden, 1996; see also Fyfe, 
1988). 
Personality. Along with the demographic characteristics of the officer, the 
influence of the officer’s personality on his decision-making has also been studied. A 
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popular stereotype in society is that officers are more authoritative than the average 
person. That is, police officers are more conservative, expect the rules to be followed, and 
adhere to middle-class values, suggesting that police officers will naturally increase their 
use of coercive behaviors, based on their personality (Balch, 1972; Frenkel-Brunswick, 
Levinson, and Adorno, 1993). However, evidence does not fully support the 
“authoritative personality” perspective and instead implies that each person responds 
differently to each situation (e.g., Balch, 1972).  
Muir (1977) quoted a typical officer’s response to his adopted code of conduct, 
“’I use in my job a lot of my upbringing, my religion, my experiences in my own family 
situation…’” (p. 190). Generally speaking, an officer’s personal characteristics (i.e., his 
gender, race, education, experience, and personality) may or not play a role in shaping his 
use of discretion during PCIs, depending upon the study examined and the definitions of 
officer characteristics used for analyses (National Research Council, 2004).  
Organizational Factors  
Brooks (2001) recognized that police discretion exists at both the individual-level 
and at the department-level, where the officer’s decision-making is both regulated and 
encouraged. The third extralegal factor that is seen to influence police use of discretion is 
organizational factors. In one of the first notable studies on the organizational influences 
of police behavior, Muir (1977) illustrated that every police officer is affected by the 
characteristics of the department in which he works (e.g., its history, size, clientele, and 
even the sergeant’s behavior). Alpert and Fridell (1992) argued that departmental policy 
regulates an officer’s decision-making in certain situations (e.g., use of deadly force), but 
also encourages individual-level discretion in others (e.g., decision to stop and frisk a 
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citizen). The National Research Council (2004) stated that “police culture is a set of 
widely shared outlooks that are formed as adaptations to a working environment 
characterized by uncertainty, danger, and coercive authority and that serves to manage 
the strains that originate in this work environment” (p. 131). Researchers have found that 
an officer’s use of discretion in a PCI is influenced by both the recognized structure and 
the informal code consistent with the values of his department (e.g., Brown, 1981; Smith, 
1984).  
Scholars who have empirically examined the impact of the organization on an 
officer’s decision-making have uncovered a variety of impacting department-level 
factors. It is often argued that a department that is more bureaucratic (e.g., a tall rank 
structure) and professional (e.g., citizen respect and service are emphasized) tends to 
produce officers who use coercive action more often in PCIs (Smith, 1984). Smith (1984) 
reported that 11.3% of PCIs that resulted in arrest occurred in departments characterized 
by more bureaucracy and professionalism, compared to 6.9% of PCIs resulting in arrest 
occurring in departments characterized by less bureaucracy and less professionalism. 
Further, Smith and Klein (1984)’s study of interpersonal disputes found that an officer 
working for a department that is more bureaucratic and professional has a higher 
probability of arresting a suspect, compared to their counterparts. The authors noted that 
these two variables individually did not produce significant effects in their study; it is the 
interaction between bureaucracy and professionalism that impacted an officer’s decision-
making. Smith and Klein (1983) did, however, find individual effects from the two 
variables. In their examination of street-encounters, Smith and Klein (1983) reported that 
officers in more bureaucratic departments were more likely to arrest suspects, controlling 
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for situational- and other department-level factors. They also reported that officers 
working for more professional departments were less likely to arrest suspects, net of other 
factors.  
Moreover, large departments and those with close supervision often live up to the 
stereotype of increased coercion (see e.g., Mastrofski, 1983). Smith and Klein (1983) 
discussed that larger agencies were more independent from the community, which 
created a degree of autonomy among the officers and allowed them to act more 
punitively. They stated, “in smaller police agencies, external community pressure may 
constrain the degree to which strict and aggressive law enforcement becomes the 
dominant operating ethic of the police” (p. 71). Unfortunately, it is too difficult to parse 
out effects of the size of the department on an officer’s decision-making. The majority of 
empirical analyses that include department size in their study use the variable to create 
their index of department bureaucratization (see Smith and Klein, 1983). For example, 
Worden (1996) examined the level of bureaucratization (using the size of the department 
in his measure) and found that officers working for more bureaucratic agency were more 
likely to use force, compared to those working for a less bureaucratic agency. Worden 
(1996) supported his claims by describing that the smaller size of the department may 
have a direct effect on the officer’s performance because the chief is in a better position 
to keep an eye on everyday police practices. He claimed, “The chiefs of larger 
departments are scarcely in a position to take advantage of these sources of information,” 
which include reading daily reports and listening in on radio calls (p. 45). 
In terms of supervisory capacities, Smith and Klein (1983) argued that 
departments that emphasize a centralization of decision-making (i.e., through a 
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supervisor) would have an increase in officers that have adopted a more punitive police 
role (see also Manning, 1977). For example, Smith and Klein (1983) reported a 
significant increase in the likelihood of arrest when a supervisor was involved in an 
encounter, compared to encounters where a supervisor was not involved. Also, Engel 
(2000) examined the latent styles of police supervisor roles (using an additive scale of 
beliefs and attitudes) and their impact on patrol officer’s coercive activities. In her study 
she controlled for legal factors (e.g., offense type), situational factors (e.g., suspect 
demeanor, bystanders) and community context. Engel (2002) reported that officers were 
much more likely to arrest a suspect when in the presence of a supervisor, regardless of 
the style of supervision. She also found that officers were more likely to use force when 
the supervisor was more “active,” but there was no difference in use of force if the 
supervisor was present or not. Alpert and MacDonald (2001) also reported that agencies 
whose supervisors filled out official police forms significantly lowered the use of force 
rates. Smith and Klein (1984), on the other hand, did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between the level of supervision (e.g., no supervisor present to supervisor 
taking charge) and the officer’s decision to arrest in interpersonal disputes.  
Wilson (1978) proposed that an officer’s decision-making is impacted by the 
policing style (i.e., watchman, legalistic, or service style) adopted by the police 
department. The watchman style of policing focuses heavily on order maintenance; 
disruptions to order maintenance (e.g., drunk in public or drawing a crowd) and, of 
course, serious crimes are most likely to be handled formally in departments that have 
adopted the watchman style (Wilson, 1978). The legalistic style imposes formal police 
actions (ticket or arrest) on all ranges of offenses from traffic violations to misdemeanor 
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offenses. Crank (1990) and Smith (1984) found that police working for departments that 
have adopted the legalistic style will enforce the full extent of the law, no matter the 
situation or individual involved. Lastly, the service style of policing combines 
components of the watchman style and the legalistic style of policing; police will respond 
to all situations, yet are more likely to handle cases informally. Alpert, MacDonald, and 
Dunham (2005) reported that police who follow the service style are less likely to arrest 
for low-level crimes. 
In his test of Wilson’s theory of political culture present in police departments, 
Langworthy (1985) corroborated his findings that police behavior in PCIs is shaped by 
the policing style under which his department operates. However, in 2005 Zhao and 
Hassell retested Wilson’s theory using arrest statistics and found that it cannot be fully 
supported in contemporary police departments. Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) wrote, “One 
of the most common findings of the last few decades of organizational research is that it 
is the immediate work or peer group and not the larger organization that motivates and 
controls the individual’s behavior” (p. 251). 
Scholars have also recognized that an officer’s decision-making is impacted by 
the policing strategy (community versus traditional) their department endorses (e.g., 
Novak et al., 2002). Officers working in departments that follow a traditional style of 
policing emphasize calls for service and responding to crime, while officers working in 
departments that have endorsed community policing efforts focus on building 
relationships with citizens and preventing crime (Dejong, Mastrofski, and Parks, 2001). 
Mastrofski et al. (1995) noted that officers that support community-style policing relied 
heavier upon extralegal factors (e.g., suspect characteristics), rather than legal factors 
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(e.g., evidence) in their decision-making processes; they also reported a lower inclination 
to arrest. Further, in their comparison of juvenile arrest rates between traditional beat 
officers and community officers, Novak et al. (2002) reported that community police 
officers arrested at a lower rate than traditional beat officers, controlling for other 
situational factors.  
Several organization factors have been shown to influence an officer’s use of 
discretion. The formalized rules and structure, along with the values and culture of the 
organization has been argued to impact an officer’s decision-making processes. The 
police department intentionally manipulates police behavior through its procedures and 
rules, but also inadvertently molds an officer’s belief and communication systems 
through the department’s principles and values (Brown, 1981). Although the department 
an officer works for is seen to impact his decision-making, the broader context of the 
officer’s community plays an integral role in shaping his discretion. 
Community Characteristics  
The fourth extralegal factor that is seen to influence police use of discretion is 
community characteristics, or the structural features of the officer’s working environment 
(e.g., community sociodemographics). Many scholars have predicted the influence of 
neighborhood characteristics, rather than individual or organizational influences, on 
police decision-making in PCIs. Terrill and Reisig (2003) illustrated the importance of 
the environment on police behavior stating, “Police officers come to readily 
compartmentalize various geographic areas, within which the potential exists to behave in 
accordance to the environment as opposed to the suspect’s characteristics" (p. 296). 
Empirical evidence supports the idea that the socioeconomic and demographic makeup of 
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the community shapes an officer’s decision-making processes. In his discussion of officer 
discretion, Brown (1981) stated that patrolmen “expect to behave differently in the raw, 
turbulent environment of a black, lower-class ghetto than in the placid environs of 
suburbia” (p.55).  
Known as the “neighborhood context hypothesis,” researchers agree that where an 
officer works (i.e., the community) plays a role in shaping the interactions he has with 
citizens (Smith, 1986). In his 1986 study, Smith analyzed sixty U.S. neighborhoods to 
test the neighborhood context hypothesis and found that police were more likely to arrest 
in low-income neighborhoods and were more likely to use coercive authority (i.e., use of 
force) in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. Further, in their study of the mediating 
effects of neighborhood context on the association between suspect sociodemographics 
and police use of force in officer beats, Terrill and Reisig (2003) reported that police used 
higher levels of force in neighborhoods marked by disadvantage and high crime, 
irrespective of suspect behavior and other statistical controls (e.g., citizen audience). 
Terrill and Reisig’s findings corroborated Smith’s (1986) findings and supported the 
neighborhood context hypothesis. 
Other researchers have also substantiated the conclusion that officers become 
more coercive in disadvantaged or low-income neighborhoods. From their analysis of 
officer UF-250 reports (mandated report for a police-initiated stop of a citizen), Fagan 
and Davies (2000) found that the NYPD disproportionately targets racial minorities 
located in neighborhoods marked by poverty and disadvantage. Also, in their multilevel 
examination of neighborhood effects on police use of arrest and use of force, Sun et al. 
(2008) concluded that the greatest impact of officer coercion was seen in neighborhoods 
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marked by concentrated disadvantage, independent of other factors (see also Lee et al., 
2010; Smith and Klein, 1984).  
Some studies, however, have reported that police are less likely to use coercion in 
disadvantaged and high crime areas. In 1997, Klinger suggested an ecological theory to 
explain police leniency in high crime areas. Klinger (1997) argued that officers would be 
less likely to arrest a suspect or write up a report of a crime occurring in a high crime 
neighborhood because crime incidents are more likely to be viewed as “normal” and 
better accepted by its residents. He said that an officer who believes an assault is 
commonplace for a specific community would be less likely to act punitively, compared 
to an assault occurring in an affluent neighborhood. Klinger’s ecological theory was 
developed, in part, by Stark’s (1987) explanation that people living in “stigmatized” 
neighborhoods are less likely to complain about crime and that police “tend to accept the 
premise that vice will exist somewhere” (p. 902). Khruakham and Hoover’s (2012) multi-
level analysis confirmed Klinger’s propositions by revealing that police were less likely 
to make an arrest in areas marked by disadvantage and high crime, controlling for other 
situational factors (e.g., suspect demeanor, race). However, Sobol, Wu, and Sun (2013) 
offered a partial test of Klinger’s ecological theory and did not find support for his 
propositions. Sobol et al. (2013) concluded that higher crime neighborhoods experienced 
an increase in police vigor (on a continuum ranging from no action to arrest) during 
PCIs, more consistent with propositions set forth by Smith (1986) (see also Johnson and 
Olschansky, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Sobol, 2010).  
Researchers have also offered culturally-based explanations on the observed 
relationship between an officer’s coercive action and the characteristics of the 
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community. Kania and Mackey (1977) proposed that police violence is directly related to 
the culture of the community, regardless of the structural components of the community. 
In their study of police use of force, they argued that residents living in a community 
marked by a higher rate and acceptance of violent behaviors would be subjected to more 
violent actions by police officers because officers would adopt the culture of the 
community. From their analyses, Kania and Mackey (1977) determined that police use of 
force fluctuates with levels of violence within the communities and that the police acted 
more forcefully in communities more accepting of violent behaviors. They explain these 
findings by concluding that police behavior in PCIs is generated by the officer’s 
observations and responses he deems appropriate in each situation.  
Also, Brown (1981) explained that police behavior is influenced by the 
relationships police have with the residents in each community and is not impacted by the 
structural features of the community alone. That is, neighborhoods marked by an 
increased distance between the values of police officers and the values of the 
community’s residents are at a higher risk of receiving increased police coercive action 
(see also Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969). Werthman and Piliavin (1967) see this 
phenomenon as “ecological contamination,” or the view that people who are encountered 
in a “bad” neighborhood are bad. Terrill and Reisig’s (2003) police use of force study 
supported Werthman and Piliavin’s ecological contamination hypothesis.  
Macro-level researchers recognize that several interrelated factors create the 
“undesirable” environment in which an officer works; high-crime areas are related to 
declining property values and lower socioeconomic status areas, which tend to be also 
characterized by a greater social distance between police and residents, higher rates of 
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single-parent households, a higher percentage of minorities, and high residential 
instability (e.g., Sampson and Wilson, 1995; Stretesky, Schuck, and Hogan, 2004). All of 
these community-level factors contribute to an officer’s decision-making in PCIs, with 
the majority of research illustrating that police are more punitive in disadvantaged and 
high crime areas. The underlying causes of exactly what shapes police decision-making 
in each community, however, still remains a mystery. Some researchers argue that 
macro-level criminological theories, that are normally used to explain criminal behavior, 
can also be used to explain police behavior. Specifically, arguments for conflict theory 
and social disorganization theory shaping an officer’s decision-making processes have 
made their mark in police research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF POLICE USE OF DISCRETION IN PCIS  
Researchers have argued that police use of discretion differs across areas and 
groups and not across specific individuals (Rose and Clear, 1998; Sampson, 2002). 
Macro-level criminological theories have been used to explain police decision-making 
processes; specifically, conflict theory and social disorganization theory have been 
applied to these processes. Over several years, conflict theory has received much 
attention in police research, with scholars arguing that the demographics of the 
community shape an officer’s use of discretion (e.g., Alpert et al., 2005; Quinney, 1970). 
Social disorganization theory, compared to conflict theory, has received little 
consideration among police researchers. Some scholars have recognized the potential for 
social disorganization theory shaping an officer’s use of discretion during a PCI (e.g., 
Sun et al., 2008); however, reasons behind these claims have not been fully developed.  
3.1 Conflict Theory  
Conflict theory asserts that the privileged classes (e.g., affluent racial majorities) 
are threatened by the potential increase in power by the underprivileged (e.g., poor racial 
minorities) and, therefore, act to keep the underprivileged powerless; laws were 
specifically made to keep these groups incapable of rising up in society (Quinney, 1970). 
Black (1976) posited a positive relationship between punitiveness and the less wealthy 
and those that are culturally distanced from the majority (i.e., minorities). A “social 
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distance” between officers and citizens exists (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Black, 
1976; Lum, 2011); the greater the difference in culture, ethnicity, and worldviews 
between officer and citizen creates an increased risk of police responding coercively.  
Disparity or Discrimination?  
Disparities in crime rates exist across race, gender, age, and social status. It is well 
known that minorities, males, the young, and the poor are overrepresented in arrest 
statistics. The United States Department of Justice (2012), for example, reported that 
whites have a .03% chance of arrest, while African-Americans have a .07% chance of 
arrest, holding all other factors constant. Scholars agree that police have preferred targets; 
it is argued that these targets mostly consist of racial and ethnic minorities, juveniles, and 
those living in disadvantaged neighborhoods (e.g., Sherman, 1980; Walker et al., 2000; 
see also Silver’s 1967 discussion of the dangerous classes). However, whether these 
“preferred targets” are chosen through discrimination or are simply a disparity in 
everyday policing practices is a common subject among police researchers.  
Walker et al. (2000) explained that disparity refers simply to a difference. That is, 
a higher population of minorities in one city will naturally have higher amounts of 
minority arrests in that city. Discrimination, on the other hand, is a difference based on 
differential treatment of a group (Walker et al., 2000). An example would be police 
seeking out and arresting minorities based on their racial or ethnic background. Kennedy 
(1997) expressed the need for differentiating between officers who use race as a tool to 
guide their use of discretion and officers who are blatantly discriminatory towards 
minorities. As Skolnick (1994) reported, the average police officer is not fond of African-
Americans; Skolnick proclaimed, “even an officer who admits to hating blacks and who 
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openly characterize them in the most pejorative terms will usually not admit to being 
racially biased or prejudiced” (p. 79).  
Although targeting racial and ethnic minorities potentially poses a threat to 
American’s civil liberties and the perceived fairness of the police, some argue that 
targeting minorities is beneficial to police work. For example, Borooah (2011) noted that 
police targeting minorities and the young could be efficient since the relationship 
between race and age is significant with crime, or it could be biased, where police target 
them simply based on their demographics. Before concluding that police unfairly target 
types of people, Ridgeway (2007) argued that scholars must incorporate other key factors 
that influence police decisions (e.g., differences in criminal participation between the 
races). Likewise, Bittner (1990) stated, “the risks of the kinds of breakdowns that require 
police action are much more heavily concentrated in the lower classes than in other 
segments of society, police surveillance is inherently discriminatory” (p. 129). Police 
often use their knowledge of crime and the “typical offender” to produce their “preferred 
targets,” or those most deserving of police coercive action (Smith, Makarios, and Alpert, 
2006). 
Smith et al. (2006) developed a theoretical perspective on police use of discretion, 
arguing that subconscious suspicion is the foundation of an officer’s decision-making in 
PCIs. Although their study is based on data from motor vehicle stops, the theoretical 
foundation behind their examination may also apply to street encounters. The authors 
stated, “police are more suspicious of those who are disproportionately involved in street 
crime and that police arrest behavior is driven by those beliefs” (p. 272). In their 
empirical test of subconscious suspicion, Smith et al. (2006) concluded, “suspicion is a 
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significant predictor for arrest, net of other factors” (p. 286). In sum, the authors showed 
that suspect suspicion, caused by disparities in the criminal justice system (e.g., more 
minorities are arrested than whites), is an influencing factor behind police use of 
discretion, which is often mistaken for discrimination.  
Racial profiling. When discussing racial discrimination versus racial disparity in 
PCIs, an important topic is racial profiling, a term used to describe the situations in which 
race is an indicator of criminal propensity (Batton and Kadleck, 2004). Racial profiling 
potentially violates citizens’ constitutional rights (i.e., Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments), with a fine line between racially motivated coercive action and justified 
coercive action. The law states that police cannot use coercive action (e.g., frisk) simply 
based on race or use race as a purpose for harassment (U.S. Const., amend. IV). The law, 
however, also implies that the use of profiling is based on the officer’s professional 
judgment and reasonable suspicion (Fagan and Davies, 2000). 
Police often use racial profiling as a mechanism of awareness and suspicion of 
citizens; they recognize that minorities are more often engaged in criminality (e.g., Smith 
et al., 2006 subconscious suspicion). However, some scholars have argued that police 
specifically target racial minorities, which accounts for their overrepresentation in the 
criminal justice system (e.g., Walker et al., 2000). Skolnick (1994), for example, noted 
that police officers have “come to identify the African-American man with danger” (p. 
47). Studies have investigated the use of racial profiling in police coercive actions and 
attempt to determine whether discrimination exists between whites and minorities in 
PCIs; the NYPD has been at the forefront of these investigations (Trone, 2010).  
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The CCR (2012) reported that 84% of police stops made in New York City 
consisted of racial minorities, who only accounted for about 25% of the population in 
New York City. Gelman et al. (2007) examined the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy among 
pedestrians and found that officers are 1.5-2.5 times more likely to stop minorities than 
whites, controlling for differences in population and crime rates. Fagan (2012) also 
reported that African-Americans and Latinos were significantly more likely to be stopped 
than whites, controlling for crime rates, social conditions, and police concentration. Even 
more interesting is that Khruakham and Hoover (2012) reported that the NYPD officers 
are more likely to arrest Hispanics and Asians, compared to whites and African-
Americans. The CCR (2012) specifically reported, “the NPYD engaged in a pattern of 
unconstitutional stops and the main factor for determining who gets stopped, even after 
controlling for crime rates, is race” (p.1). The studies provide compelling empirical 
evidence of racial discrimination within the NYPD. Spitzer (1999) stated, “even when 
crime data is taken into account, minorities are still ‘stopped’ at a higher rate than would 
be predicted by both demographics and crime rates” (p. 89). It is noted, however, that 
these authors do not make claims of racial discrimination within the NYPD and only 
provide statistical evidence to test their hypotheses. 
Some researchers explain that racial disparities in police use of discretion exist 
because of the political, social, and economic inequalities within our society (e.g., 
LaFree, O’Brien, and Baumer, 2006). For instance, there are apparent differences 
between salaries of whites and African-Americans in the same job, as well as the access 
to government programs, housing, and education between races (LaFree et al., 2006; 
Wilson, 1996). In terms of PCIs, researchers suggest that racial discrimination is 
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imbedded within the application of the law (Chambliss, 1969; Chambliss and Seidman, 
1971; see also Knowles and Prewitt’s 1969 discussion on institutional racism). That is, 
police and the laws are naturally discriminatory as a result of social inequality.  
As recognized by Bayley and Mendelsohn (1969), a social distance between 
officers and citizens exists; this may explain an officer’s use of coercion towards those in 
which he does not relate. For example, an officer may act more formally in cases 
involving domestic violence, because those behaviors are not in line with his values and 
worldviews. The idea of a social distance has been a common theme in American society 
for many years, with scholars first acknowledging police control of the so-called 
“dangerous classes.” 
Scholars have recognized society’s need to protect citizens from the “dangerous 
classes” and the inequality of institutional practices (e.g., job opportunities) between the 
privileged and underprivileged (see e.g., Silver, 1967; Knowles and Prewitt, 1969). In 
explaining police decision-making behaviors, conflict theorists argue that police officers 
use more coercive activities (e.g., arrest) toward those that are socially or economically 
underprivileged, in order to maintain the status of the privileged groups (Sun et al., 2008). 
Moreover, Silver (1967) stated that police were developed in order to control the 
“dangerous classes” from the “peaceful and propertied classes” (p. 8; see also Jacobs, 
1979).  
Dangerous Classes 
Early sociological scholars have alluded to awareness of the “dangerous classes” 
in society that require government control to uphold public safety. Tiedeman’s (1885) 
article addressed “the police control of dangerous classes, other than criminal, - persons 
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whose unrestrained freedom involves elements of danger to the State and society, and yet 
whose acts do not bring them within the reach of criminal prosecutions” (p. 548). These 
dangerous classes, as described by Tiedeman include: those with contagious diseases; the 
insane; drunkards; vagrants and beggars; and habitual offenders, or those known for 
criminal acts. According to Silver (1967) the image of the dangerous classes is “one of 
unmanageable, volatile, and convulsively criminal class at the base of society” (p. 3).  
Silver (1967) believed crime was the result of mass immigration; immigrants 
were most likely poor, without employment skills, and accustomed to urban lifestyles, 
which created a potential for criminal behavior. During the late nineteenth century, the 
dangerous classes were associated with street misconduct, with police most likely to act 
informally until criminal actions became violent (Ellickson, 1996). Due to the view that 
immigrants were associated with crime, American citizens began putting pressure on the 
police to put an end to these behaviors, especially alcohol-related offenses among 
immigrants. In their study of police arrest practices in the 1900’s, Brown and Warner 
(1992) found that police made more arrests for crimes involving alcohol in areas marked 
by higher rates of foreign-born population. Lea (2000) recognized that police were used 
to protect the propertied middle class, which involved less crime control efforts and more 
surveillance of lower class groups.  
Silver (1967) further argued that the image of the dangerous classes was reborn in 
the 1960s as a result of civil rights’ mass rioting among African-Americans. In 1981, 
Jackson and Carroll tested this premise but their research did not find that riots were 
related to the amount of police expenditures. In other words, the number of riots 
occurring within a city did not dictate the resources allocated to policing efforts. Jackson 
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and Carroll (1981) did, however, report that the amount of police expenditures is directly 
influenced by the percent African-American population and the level of civil rights 
mobilization (e.g., boycotts). Jackson (1992) partially supported Jackson and Carroll 
(1981), but also stated that the impact of minority population on police expenditures 
dissipated in the late 1970’s and that percent of the population that is African-American 
in a city was no longer a statistically significant predictor of police expenditures. 
However, in her recent analysis of competing explanations in police force size across 
cities, Sharp (2006) reported that police force size in each city is, in fact, shaped by 
America’s history of the civil rights movement and the prevalence of racial minorities in 
today’s population. 
Police control of the dangerous classes continues today, with researchers 
recognizing that police decision-making is driven by the amount of minorities within an 
area (e.g., Sharp, 2006). Long before the civil rights movement, scholars analyzed 
whether immigration patterns affect police resources that were used to control behaviors 
deemed criminal by the majority group (e.g., public drunkenness). As a result of the civil 
rights movement, researchers have also argued that the American majority (i.e., whites) 
became threatened by the increase in power among minority groups and ended up relying 
on society’s institutional practices to keep minorities powerless.   
Institutional Racism 
In their 1969 book, Institutional Racism in America, Knowles and Prewitt 
described the difference between individual and institutional racism. They explained that 
institutions are racist against minorities (i.e., African-Americans) when they use race as a 
gauge for determining who will receive rewards and who will receive punishments. To 
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fully understand this concept, it is first important to understand what is meant by the term 
institution. “Institutions are fairly stable social arrangements and practices through which 
collective actions are taken;” these include hospitals, businesses, schools, and the law (p. 
5). The racial majority in power (i.e., whites) continues, whether intentionally or 
innocently, to keep racial minorities powerless through institutional practices (Knowles 
and Prewitt, 1969). Specifically, “Institutional racism refers to accumulated institutional 
practices that work to the disadvantage of racial minority groups even in the absence of 
individual prejudice or discrimination” (Link and Phelan, 2001, p. 372). To illustrate their 
point, Link and Phelan (2001) provided the example of business practices where 
employers rely upon personal recommendations from current employees to hire job 
candidates, with the majority of employers, current employees, and future employees all 
being white.   
Lopez (2000) posited that group interaction produces racial institutions, and racial 
institutions impact individual behavior. Similar to Link and Phelan (2001), Lopez argued 
that judges would be more inclined to nominate their friends, who are most likely whites, 
for open roles in the criminal justice system (e.g., grand jurors, police officers). Further, 
he noted that, “regardless of their decision to rely on or to reject racial considerations, 
however, every judge on the superior court drew on notions of White superiority at the 
nonconscious level” (p. 1814).  
Knowles and Prewitt (1969) explained that “Legal and political institutions 
determine what laws regulate our lives, how and by whom they are enforced, and who 
will be prosecuted for which violations” (p. 5). In their analysis of metropolitan 
fragmentation, DoHoog, Lowery, and Lyons (1991) noted that suburban governments, 
 67 
which are run by whites, implement zoning and land control laws that keep the poor 
blacks in the suburban ghettos. Long (1967) stated, “the suburb is the Northern way to 
insure separate and unequal” (p. 254).  
In terms of policing, researchers have recognized that police services, as a 
government agency, may be subjected to institutional racism. In their research on quality 
of police services, DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons (1991) found that black communities 
lacked the opportunity to secure higher levels of police services, compared to the white 
communities. Lea (2000) argued that understanding racism within a police organization is 
dependent on the types of contacts officers have with citizens. Officers who only have 
contact with racial minorities in law-enforcement situations (e.g., stop and frisk) are more 
likely to resent these populations and see them as criminal, compared to officers who 
have contact with minorities outside the policing context. Lea (2000) also recognized that 
institutional racism is perpetuated by the operations of the police. For example, young 
African-Americans males are overrepresented in stop and search statistics (Lea, 2000; see 
also Spitzer, 1999).  
Racial Threat 
In 1967, Blalock developed a theory of racial threat where members of the racial 
majority become vulnerable to the growth of minority populations and, therefore, attempt 
to reduce their competition. Taylor (1998) analyzed how the racial composition of a 
neighborhood impacts whites’ attitudes toward racial minorities; she reported that an 
increase in the local percentage of African-Americans brings an increase in prejudice 
against them. Interesting is that she did not find these results for Asians or Latinos, which 
is argued to provide further insight into the position of African-Americans in our society 
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(Taylor, 1998). Several scholars have reported a positive relationship between the size of 
the African-American population and social controls imposed upon them. These social 
controls include police force size, rates of arrest and incarceration, police use of deadly 
force, the number of executions, etc. 
Although there is an apparent consensus in the literature that as African-American 
population increases so do levels of social controls, researchers continue to debate why 
African-Americans pose a threat to whites. Three separate hypotheses remain in the racial 
threat literature: (1) the political threat, (2) the economic threat, and (3) threat of black 
crime (Eitle, D’Allesio, and Stolzenberg, 2002). The political threat hypothesis states that 
when African-Americans gain political power, whites use social control mechanisms to 
reduce their political power (see Blalock’s 1967 power threat hypothesis). The economic 
threat hypothesis claims that as African-Americans become better competitors for jobs 
and other economic resources, whites will impose increased social controls upon them 
(see e.g., Jacobs and Wood, 1999). Lastly, the threat of black-on-white crime is believed 
to influence criminal justice actors (Liska and Chamlin, 1984); social controls are 
intensified as a result of the increase of black-on-white crime. 
Eitle et al. (2002) examined three racial threat hypotheses in order to understand 
the association between the size of the African-American population and social control. 
The authors did not find support for the political threat or economic threat hypotheses, 
but did, however, find support for the threat of black-on-white crime hypothesis. Eitle et 
al. (2002) found that black-on-white crime has a positive effect on arrest rates among 
African-Americans, while black-on-black crime does not affect arrest rates.  
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In 1970, Quinney used conflict theory to explain high crime among minority 
groups, using concepts mirroring the racial threat thesis; our laws are designed 
specifically to keep minorities powerless. This is evidenced by the increased imposition 
of social controls over minorities and the overrepresentation of minorities in the criminal 
justice system (Lum, 2011). Scholars have consistently reported that police force size is a 
result of the increased amount of African-American population in an area (see e.g., 
Jackson and Carroll, 1981; Stults and Baumer, 2007). In 1969 Turk suggested that 
cultural and racial dissimilarities would result in minorities being disproportionately 
subjected to higher amounts of police coercion, which is apparent in today’s society.  
3.2 Empirical Evidence of Conflict Theory Impacting Police Decision-Making 
Increases in police coercion are often explained by conflict theory, with police 
responding coercively to keep minority and underprivileged groups powerless (Sun et al., 
2008). According to the propositions of conflict theory, police use of coercive action 
should be greater in areas where racial and economic inequality is greater (Quinney, 
1970). That is, areas marked by increased segregation should display an increase in 
police use of stops, arrests, etc. Sun et al. (2008) stated, “Support for conflict theory 
emerges in considering the findings that minorities and poor citizens were more likely to 
be subjected to coercive activities than were others” (p. 29).  
Liska and Chamlin (1984) found that income inequality, percentage nonwhite, 
and segregation led to increased arrests, independent of reported crime rates; they 
reported that the strongest effect came from income inequality (not race) on property 
offense arrests. In the examination of the effects of race on officer decision-making, 
Smith (1986) found support for the racial threat theory stating, “police act more 
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coercively toward suspects in nonwhite and racially mixed neighborhoods” (p. 329). 
Further, in their study of converging arrest rates between whites and African-Americans, 
LaFree et al. (2006) found support for racial threat, showing that, as a whole, police treat 
minorities more punitively. 
The applicability of conflict theory in the NYPD has also been examined by 
researchers, mostly as a result of its stop and frisk policy. Spitzer (1999) found that 
white-majority communities received less stop and frisks than communities marked by 
high rates of minorities in New York City precincts. Moreover, Gelman et al. (2007) also 
showed support for conflict theory and reported that the racial composition of a 
neighborhood positively predicts the likelihood of a minority being stopped by the 
NYPD, controlling for crime, other social features, and patrol strength within the 
community. Fagan’s (2012) later analyses also revealed results paralleling those from 
earlier NYPD studies. 
Although evidence suggests that an increase in the racial minority population 
leads to an increase in the use of coercive action, some studies do not support this claim. 
Lee et al. (2010) found that police use of force was not related to the community’s 
percent of African-American population. Also, Kane (2002) reported that the NPYD did 
not actively target racial minorities based on race alone, contradicting propositions of 
conflict theory.  
Conflict theory remains to be a strong predictor of police behavior, with the 
majority of research reporting that the racial composition of a community does shape an 
officer’s use of discretion. Whether or not the police are used to protect the socially and 
economically privileged, however, is still under examination (see National Research 
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Council, 2004). Some researchers suggest that the reasons driving police decision-making 
can be better understood in terms of interaction effects, where the propositions of conflict 
theory work together with other community-level factors (e.g., community 
disorganization) to produce certain police responses (Sun et al., 2008). Although conflict 
theory alone may have the potential to explain an officer’s decision-making in a 
community, another macro-level theory, social disorganization, may also predict an 
officer’s decision-making. 
3.3 Social Disorganization Theory 
Social disorganization theory is a macro-level theory that explains crime based on 
the structural features of the community. In 1925, Park and Burgess researched the 
natural distribution of social groups that occurred in Chicago and noticed that people of 
the lower classes tended to live in the city center (i.e., business district), while those in 
the upper classes could afford to live in the commuter zones, farthest from the city center. 
This phenomenon was coined the concentric zone model, in which urban areas grew from 
an inner core and worked their way outward, creating clear differences in social problems 
along the way (Park and Burgess, 1925).  
Stemming from work completed by Park and Burgess, Shaw and McKay 
(1942/1969) introduced the idea of social disorganization theory in order to explain rates 
of juvenile delinquency. Social organizations such as family, church, and school failed to 
create a positive environment for youth, which delinquency and criminality often was the 
result (Shaw and McKay, 1942). “In its purest formulation, social disorganization refers 
to the inability of local communities to realize the common values of their residents or 
solve commonly experienced problems” (Bursik, 1988, p. 521). The deficiency in social 
 72 
organizations decreased capacities for social control and created an environment 
conducive to criminal activity (see also Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). Several theorists 
have extended social disorganization theory to help clarify the underlying processes at 
work; the connection between crime and structural features of the community, as 
proposed by the tenets of social disorganization theory, are further explained in the 
following sections of the current paper.  
According to social disorganization theory, three community-level components 
lead to reduced social ties and inefficient social control, which in turn lead to increased 
crime: poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability. Poverty can be defined as 
the deprived socioeconomic state of the community, most often measured by the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line or those receiving public assistance 
income (see e.g., Clear et al., 2003). Due to the lack of resources, Shaw and McKay 
(1942) explained that a low socioeconomic status community would have a weaker 
organizational base than an affluent community. Ethnic heterogeneity represents various 
groups of racial and ethnic backgrounds within the community, which reduces the ability 
of residents to realize common goals (see also Kornhauser, 1978). And, residential 
instability occurs when the neighborhood’s residents are constantly in flux, or moving in 
and out of the community, which disrupt social relations (Shaw and McKay, 1942). 
Varied combinations of these macrostructual processes create a disorganized community, 
or one that lacks the capacity to regulate residents’ illegal behaviors (see also Sampson 
and Groves, 1989).  
Over the years social disorganization theory has gained renewed interest; 
Sampson and Groves’s (1989) research demonstrated that the theory, in fact, has 
 73 
relevance for explaining variations in community-level crime rates. Lowenkamp, Cullen, 
and Pratt (2003) later replicated this research and concluded that, “the findings of the 
initial classic study were not artifactual but illuminated an underlying empirical pattern 
that has persisted over time” (p. 351) (see also Sun, Triplett, and Gainey, 2004 for 
support); meaning, the causal processes characterizing a socially disorganized community 
(i.e., lack of social controls) continue to be relevant in predicting crime rates today. 
Generally speaking, researchers have concluded that various macrostructural 
characteristics of communities (e.g., poverty) are associated with higher rates of crime 
and delinquency (Block, 1979; Pratt and Cullen, 2005). Although basic relationships 
between structural features of the community and crime rates have been found, theorists 
have attempted to refine the underlying propositions of social disorganization theory 
(e.g., Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).  
3.4 Extensions to Social Disorganization Theory 
It was not until almost forty years after Shaw and McKay that scholars developed 
a renewed interest in social disorganization theory. The theory fell out of favor because 
of its perceived lack of explanation of the causal processes at work in determining a 
community’s crime rates; the traditional theory has been expanded to explain the 
mediating or intervening factors associated with structural features and crime (Byrne and 
Sampson, 1986; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). A number of researchers have identified 
various underlying social processes at work in social disorganization theory, which help 
explain why increased poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability lead to 
increased crime.  
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Social Control 
In 1988, Bursik recognized that recent work in the social disorganization tradition 
has attempted to clarify the theory through observed processes of formal and informal 
social controls. Kornhauser (1978) was one of the first scholars to revive the theory; in 
her research she identified an underlying process of the theory, namely social control. 
Social control is defined as the perceived rewards or punishments that arise from 
conformity to societal norms or deviation from the norms. Social controls are important 
for crime control because they highlight the power (or weakness) of the community to 
regulate residents’ unwanted behaviors.  
There are two types of social control; Bursik (1988) identified informal social 
controls as “the ability of local neighborhoods to supervise the behavior of their 
residents” (p. 527) and formal controls as “local neighborhood associations with 
community crime prevention” (p. 528). Although the majority of criminological research 
focuses on the processes of informal social controls, formal control is also an important 
concept of social disorganization theory (see e.g., Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). Rose and 
Clear (1998) believed that the literature disregards the effects of formal controls on 
community crime because formal controls are often thought of as responses to crime; 
however, Bursik and Grasmick’s (1993) systemic model suggested that formal social 
controls are equally as important as informal social controls in explaining the processes 
of social disorganization theory. 
Bursik and Grasmick (1993) developed a systemic model of crime comprised of 
three elements: (1) the original components of social disorganization theory (2) relational 
networks of social capital and (3) social control (both informal and formal) in a 
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community. This model hypothesized that an increase in disorganization leads to a 
decrease in relational networks, which increases formal controls (e.g., police responses) 
and decreases informal social controls. Both formal and informal social controls have a 
negative relationship with crime; a decrease in informal social controls, as a result of 
community disorganization, leads to an increase in crime (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; 
see also Rose and Clear, 1998). Likewise, an increase in formal social controls, as the 
result of community disorganization, is hypothesized to lead to a decrease in crime. Some 
scholars, however, have recognized that police responses to crime exacerbate the effects 
of disorganization. As a result of the increased formal controls, residents of disorganized 
communities begin to overlook the importance of informal social controls and crime rate 
increases in these communities (Clear et al., 2003). Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) 
recognized that formal controls may influence residents’ informal control practices.  
Formal and informal social control processes have important implications for 
social disorganization theory. Social controls, as an extension to social disorganization 
theory, did not only help explain the underlying processes linking a socially disorganized 
community to crime, but also opened the door for other theoretical extensions.  
Broken Windows  
Broken windows theory proposes that community deterioration and physical 
disorder increases the potential for criminal behavior (Wilson and Kelling, 1982); a 
community’s ability to uphold informal social control becomes weakened by physical 
disorder within the community (Skogan, 1990). Criminals become attracted to areas 
marked by disorder because of the opportunities they provide; these areas often 
unwillingly tolerate illegalities such as drug use, prostitution, gambling, and public 
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drunkenness (Skogan, 1990). The cycle of disorder and crime is further perpetuated by 
the lack of informal social controls and an increase in community deterioration (e.g., 
Sampson, 2013).  
Gau and Pratt (2008) noted that the primary goal of a police officer is to foster the 
growth of informal social controls in neighborhoods characterized by disorder, while 
engaging in eradicating minor disorders. Because minor disorders are theorized to lead to 
more serious offenses, aggressive policing efforts send the message that disorders will 
not be tolerated, which allows community residents to come together and forbid criminal 
offenses through informal social controls (Gau and Pratt, 2008). Empirical evidence, 
however, has not supported the propositions set forth by broken windows theory.  
In their 1999 comprehensive evaluation of the theory, Sampson and Raudenbush 
used systematic social observations of the streets of Chicago to examine the correlation 
between disorder and predatory crime. Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) reported, when 
other neighborhood characteristics (e.g., poverty) were taken into account, no connection 
between disorder and predatory crime (robbery was an exception). Later, Sampson, 
Raudenbush, and Earls (2004) examined individual perceptions of disorder; they argued 
that people’s perception of disorder was the foundation behind broken windows theory. 
The authors reported that social structure was a more important predictor of perceived 
disorder than actual community disorder, demonstrating a lack of support for broken 
windows theory. The general consensus is that the physical characteristics of the 
community alone do not serve as worthy predictors of crime and it may be that other 
essential factors contribute to shaping people’s behaviors within a community. 
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Collective Efficacy 
Sampson et al. (1997) rejected the notion that differences in crime rates across 
communities were a result of the macrostructural features of the community. Instead, they 
proposed, “the differential ability of neighborhoods to realize the common values of 
residents and maintain effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood 
variation in violence” (p. 918). The authors coined the term collective efficacy, or the 
neighborhood’s ability to control illegitimate behaviors through informal means. 
Specifically, it is “the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the 
common good that defines the neighborhood context of collective efficacy” (Sampson et 
al. 1997, p. 919). 
Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) recognized that communities with low rates of social 
ties might be able to continue to ward of criminal behaviors, as long as the community 
was characterized by high rates of collective efficacy. However, Sampson et al. (1997) 
indicated that collective efficacy depends, in large part, upon the social ties and social 
controls present in a community. They explained that collective efficacy would most 
likely perish if residents did not have friendship networks or mutual trust between one 
another.  
It is often argued that collective efficacy is absent in disorganized communities. 
Sampson et al. (1997) illustrated that social characteristics influence the degree of 
collective efficacy within a community. That is, residential instability, poverty, family 
disruption, and racial composition of a community lead to lower rates of collective 
efficacy. A lack of collective efficacy will allow the community’s residents to become 
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unruly, which ultimately leads to an increase in crime rates in these areas (Sampson et al., 
1997).  
Contrary to the primary assumption set forth by Sampson et al. (1997), Patillo 
(1998) argued that strong social ties may be formed in communities marked by gangs and 
drugs. In her research, she examined the presence of kinship networks and social controls 
in poor, crime-ridden, African-American communities. She reported that a criminal 
minority exists in these communities and, often times provide support to local African-
American families. Patillo’s (1998) research showed not only that collective efficacy can 
be present in disorganized areas, but that common goals can be realized through licit and 
illicit networks.  
Overall, however, scholars have empirically supported a negative relationship 
between levels of community collective efficacy and crime, independent of other factors. 
For example, Maimon and Browning (2010) found that an increase in community 
collective efficacy resulted in a 14% reduction in youth violent offending (see also 
Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001). 
Browning (2002) also found that communities with higher levels of collective efficacy 
have lower levels of partner violence and women in these communities were more likely 
to seek social support networks.  
Code of the Street 
Kornhauser (1978) claimed that social disorganization theory is a mixed model of 
control (e.g., social controls) and cultural deviance. Cultural deviance proposes that crime 
and delinquency are caused by the conformation to a deviant subculture (i.e., one with 
atypical values and norms) (Kornhauser, 1978). Specifically, residents conforming to a 
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subculture of violence are what predict high levels of crime in a community (Anderson, 
1999). Elijah Anderson sets forth his subculture of violence thesis in his 1999 book Code 
of the Street (for an earlier version see Anderson, 1994). Anderson’s code of the street 
provides an underlying explanation as to why socially disorganized communities are 
associated with high rates of violent crime.  
Through his ethnographic research in Philadelphia, Anderson (1999) analyzed 
communities where residents were inclined to violence (i.e., those with higher rates of 
violent crime and delinquency). He explained that neighborhood street culture shapes the 
behavior of its residents and he attributed high crime rates to the violent “code” plaguing 
the inner-city. According to Anderson (1999), violence prevails as a response to 
disrespect from another person. He referred to this as “code of the street,” where “a set of 
informal rules governing interpersonal public behavior, particularly violence” (p. 33) 
guides how the disrespected person should respond. Physical violence is met with 
physical violence, perpetuating the cycle of violence that characterizes the subculture that 
these residents have adopted.  
Anderson explained that the structural features of the community (e.g., 
disadvantage and racial composition) contribute to the code of the street, because 
residents face economic barriers and become isolated from conventional society (see also 
Sutherland, 2011). Their community becomes marked by high rates of poverty, 
joblessness, and mistrust of the police (Anderson, 1999). The residents lack the 
opportunity to display self-worth in conventional ways because of the lack of available 
economic resources and, as a result, instill a subculture that rejects mainstream values 
(Brezina, Agnew, Cullen, and Wright, 2004). This subculture emphasizes toughness, 
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aggression, and revenge, which maintains violent crime in these neighborhoods. Violence 
becomes the acceptable means in gaining status, respect, and street credibility 
(Wilkinson, 2003; see also Matsueda, Drakulich, and Kubrin, 2006).  
Researchers have recognized the value in Anderson’s thesis; the subculture of 
violence thesis seems to be prevalent in disorganized communities, which may lead to an 
increase in violent crime. In their quantitative study of the applicability of Anderson’s 
thesis on youth violent crime, Brezina et al. (2004) reported that, consistent with previous 
studies, youth who prescribe to the code of the street are more likely to engage in acts of 
violence. Stewart, Schreck, and Simons (2006), however, also reported that youth who 
adhere to the violent subculture were more likely to be victims of violence. 
Stewart and Simons (2010) analyzed the moderating effects of neighborhood 
street culture on individual-level street code values and violence and reported that 
neighborhood street culture is a significant predictor of juvenile violence. That is, 
residents readily accept the code of the street present within the community, regardless of 
individual-level processes. Moreover, Wilkinson (2001) found that young men 
committed robberies in an attempt to gain street respect among their peers. Sampson and 
Bartusch (1998) suggested that youth adhere to the subculture of violence as a result of 
the effects of the inner-city ghetto (e.g., racial isolation and poverty). The structural 
features of the community ultimately shape an individual’s perception of the code of the 
street. 
Concentrated Disadvantage 
In his 1987 seminal book The Truly Disadvantaged, William Julius Wilson 
evaluated the convergence of race and poverty in the inner-city. Wilson’s most 
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contributing concept to the social disorganization tradition was “concentration effects.” 
Sampson and Wilson (1995) explained that concentration effects are a result of the 
constraints and lack of opportunity residents of the inner-city face “in terms of access to 
jobs and job networks, involvement in quality schools, availability of marriageable 
partners, and exposure to conventional role models” (p. 42). This concentration effect 
occurred, in part, due to the out-migration of middle-class families, which leaves poor, 
African-American communities marked by a number of social problems (Wilson, 1987). 
Wilson (1987) argued that several factors interact to create concentration effects, 
including: female-headed households with dependent children; the lack of education and 
available jobs; the outmigration of white, middle class families; the lack of male role 
models; and the lack of transportation out of the urban inner-city. Sampson and Wilson 
(1995) stated that patterns of residential inequality faced by African-Americans escalated 
social isolation and ecological concentration of the “truly disadvantaged.”  
Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990) argued that Wilson’s (1987) concentration 
effects set the stage for the methodological association between community-level social 
indicators (e.g., family disruption) and economic structure (e.g., poverty) used in 
predicting rates of crime. In their examination of the structural covariates of homicide, 
Land et al. (1990) used principal components analysis to identify the elements contained 
in Wilson’s (1987) concentration effects hypothesis. They concluded that communities 
with higher levels of resource deprivation were associated with higher rates of homicide. 
More importantly, Land et al.’s (1990) methodological advances allowed researchers to 
test the clustering of social and economic elements associated with a disadvantaged 
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community, which helped researchers understand the influence of a community’s 
macrostructural characteristics on rates of crime.  
According to Clear et al. (2003), concentrated disadvantage “is meant to reflect 
the fact that some urban areas are afflicted by multiple problems that place them at a 
disadvantage” (p. 43). For example, scholars recognize that with poverty comes a lack of 
education and employment opportunities, reliance upon government sources of income, 
and family disruption (Clear et al., 2003). Disadvantage is also concentrated in certain 
areas, which situates crime in geographic “hot spots” (Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-
Rowley, 2002). That is, areas with higher levels of disadvantage display higher levels of 
crime. 
Today, researchers often measure concentrated disadvantage in terms of an index 
of race, class, and other variables (e.g., family disruption and education) (Krivo and 
Peterson, 1996; Land et al., 1990; Small and Newman, 2001). Although studies have 
differed in their community-level features that constitute the concentrated disadvantage 
index, there are a few predictors that are consistent throughout the literature. These 
include variables associated with economic disadvantage and family disruption (e.g., 
percent of the population below the poverty line and percent of female-headed 
households), as well as a measure of racial composition. Because African-Americans 
often live in disadvantaged neighborhoods, researchers use the percent African-American 
population as a proxy for determining levels of disadvantage within an area (see e.g., 
Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). In their meta-analysis of the predictors of crime, Pratt 
and Cullen (2005) stated, “Indicators of ‘concentrated disadvantage’ (e.g., racial 
heterogeneity, poverty, and family disruption) are among the strongest and most stable 
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predictors” (p. 373). As a result of Wilson’s research on the macrostructural 
characteristics that lead to social isolation, measures of community social disorganization 
often include a measure of concentrated disadvantage.  
3.5 Contemporary Status of Social Disorganization Measures 
Contemporary scholars modeling the social disorganization framework have 
turned to concentrated disadvantage as one component, yet have maintained that ethnic 
heterogeneity and residential instability are important constructs predicting neighborhood 
crime rates (see e.g., Sampson et al., 1997). Today, ethnic heterogeneity is measured 
using an index of the percent of the population that is Hispanic with percent of the 
population that is foreign born; recent literature reports ethnic heterogeneity as 
“concentrated immigration” (Sampson et al., 1997). 
Early scholars testing concentrated immigration hypothesized that an increase in 
immigrant concentration would be associated with an increase in crime because of the 
decreased capacity to realize common goals and to achieve informal social controls 
(Sampson et al., 1997). Furthermore, immigrants often live in areas marked by 
disadvantage and high crime, where they are subjected to the lack of opportunities in 
these communities (Bui, 2013). Recently this hypothesis has been rejected and 
researchers now suggest that neighborhoods marked by higher concentrated immigration 
tend to produce lower rates of crime because immigrants moving into disorganized 
communities provide a new sense of organization (Martinez, 2006).  
Lee and Martinez (2002) offer an explanation through the immigration 
revitalization thesis where “new forms of social organization may include ethnically 
situated informal mechanisms of social control and enclave economies that provide stable 
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jobs to co-ethnics” (p. 376). Therefore, heavy immigration in one area may strengthen 
social controls and reduce crime in those areas (Lee and Martinez, 2002, 2006; Martinez, 
Stowell, and Lee, 2010).  
This phenomenon is also apparent in the immigrant paradox literature, where 
scholars have suggested that first generation immigrants have better social outcomes (i.e., 
health and education), despite their poor economic situations (Bui, 2013). Suarez-Orozco, 
Rhodes, and Milburn (2009) reported a decline in academic achievement and aspirations 
in immigrant youth the longer they stayed in the United States. Likewise, Bui (2013) 
found the presence of the immigrant paradox in substance use among white, Asian, and 
Hispanic youth. That is, recent immigrant youth were socially better off than their non-
immigrant counterparts. 
Although ethnic heterogeneity has changed over the years, residential instability 
has remained a central component of social disorganization; scholars maintain that 
collective efficacy and informal social controls are reduced in unstable environments, 
which leads to crime (see Shaw and McKay, 1942). The contemporary measures of 
residential instability include an index of the percent of the population living in renter-
occupied homes and the percent of recent (last 5 years) movers (Sampson et al., 1997). 
As Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, and Sealand (1993) explained, residential 
instability coupled with low rates of home ownership has remained strong correlates of 
problem behaviors among residents in changing areas. The majority of empirical 
literature suggests that an increase in residential instability is associated with an increase 
in crime (e.g., Morenoff et al., 2001; Sampson et al., 1997) 
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The extensions to social disorganization theory have given rise to a renewed 
interest in the theory. Scholars agree that several structural dimensions create a setting 
favorable for disorganization, which helps explain high crime (Shaw and McKay, 1942; 
Sampson et al., 1997). In terms of examining the structural features that create an 
environment conducive for crime, Wilson’s (1987) contribution provided explanation for 
a link between the macrostructural characteristics of concentrated disadvantage (e.g., 
economic distress, family disruption) and crime. Renewed interest in social 
disorganization theory also encouraged researchers to examine the mediating variables 
(e.g., social control, collective efficacy) associated with the macrostructural 
characteristics of a community and their rates of crime (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; 
Sampson and Groves, 1989).  
Researchers often use measures of the structural characteristics of the community 
to assess the relationship between a socially disorganized community and crime. For 
example, Sampson et al. (1997) examined the link between neighborhood stratification 
(concentrated disadvantage, concentrated immigration, and residential instability) and 
collective efficacy, in order to predict levels of violence. Using structural measures of 
social disorganization, they determined that collective efficacy mediated the relationship 
between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and crime. Therefore, the 
structural features of the community created a setting favorable to criminal activity. 
Modern testing of social disorganization theory, from a structural standpoint, 
includes measures of concentrated disadvantage, concentrated immigration, and 
residential instability (e.g., Clear et al., 2003; Morenoff et al., 2001; Sampson et al., 
1997). Together these variables do not necessarily cause a “socially disorganized” 
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community; nevertheless, they remain important concepts for examining environments 
conducive to a deficiency in social controls and collective efficacy, leading to increased 
criminal behaviors (see e.g., Sampson et al., 1997). Furthermore, scholars have also 
argued that areas of extreme disadvantage suffer greater consequences of disorganization 
(e.g., higher amounts of crime), because these areas are characterized by severe resource 
deprivation (Clear et al., 2003). Often times, these contemporary macrostructural 
components are measured and statistically tested individually; the most common current 
day hypotheses are that concentrated disadvantage and residential instability have a 
positive relationship with crime (e.g., Sampson et al., 1997), while concentrated 
immigration has a negative relationship with crime (e.g., Lee and Martinez, 2002).  
3.6 Social Disorganization Theory Applied to an Officer’s Use of Discretion 
Social disorganization theory was designed by Shaw and McKay (1942) to 
explain differences in rates of delinquency based on the macrostructural characteristics of 
the community. The theory predicts that people’s behavior (whether criminal or 
legitimate) become a reflection of the community in which they reside (or spend a large 
portion of time) (see e.g., Sampson et al., 1997). Sampson (2002) states, “crimes are not 
randomly distributed in space. Rather, they are disproportionately concentrated in certain 
neighborhoods” (p. 243). Disorganized neighborhoods are subjected to higher amounts of 
crime because residents lack the informal social controls necessary to regulate criminal 
conduct (Bursik, 1988). Researchers have argued that community context not only shapes 
the residents’ behaviors, but may also influence an officer’s decision-making behaviors 
(e.g., Smith, 1986; Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Three theoretical associations between a 
community’s level of social disorganization, normally predicting crime within a 
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community, and an officer’s decision-making can be reasoned (see Kane, 2002; Sun et 
al., 2008). 
The first theoretical connection is grounded in the basic relationship between the 
macrostructural characteristics (e.g., concentrated disadvantage) of a community and its 
crime rates. In its simplest form, the structural features that generate a socially 
disorganized neighborhood lead to higher rates of crime, compared to an affluent 
neighborhood (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Recent theoretical advances have shown a 
positive relationship between the amount of concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability and crime (Krivo and Peterson, 1996); it is argued that communities with 
higher levels of disorganization naturally have higher rates of crime (see Wilson, 1987). 
Police behavior, then, becomes driven by the amount of criminal activity within a 
community (Terrill and Reisig, 2003).  
An officer’s goal is to maintain order and uphold the law (National Research 
Council, 2004). As Sampson (2002) claimed, crimes are concentrated in certain areas; so, 
it can intuitively be argued that police will also be concentrated in certain areas. For 
example, rates of search and arrest will be more common in a disadvantaged and high 
crime neighborhood, compared to an affluent neighborhood, simply because of the sheer 
amount of police activity in those areas (see e.g., Smith, 1986). Police have a greater 
presence in these communities in order to reduce criminal behaviors; Fagan (2012) 
reported higher rates of stops in areas with greater police presence, which is expected.  
Moreover, in disadvantaged communities, where crime is high, police are 
(hypothetically) inclined to respond more coercively (e.g., Terrill and Reisig, 2003) to 
protect themselves and others from victimization. Because of the high amount of criminal 
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activity within a disadvantaged community, an officer is at a greater risk of facing a 
dangerous situation. An officer’s decision-making becomes a product of his perception of 
risk; an officer is more likely to act coercively toward a suspect (e.g., search) when the 
risk of danger is greater. Concentrated disadvantage, therefore, makes the relationship 
between the reason for the stop and the coercive action taken during the stop more 
meaningful. That is, concentrated disadvantage may encourage the officer to take a more 
coercive approach when a suspect is stopped. Furthermore, these effects will be 
pronounced in areas of extreme disadvantage, where crime and the officer’s perception of 
risk are maximized.  
Second, scholars have reasoned that a disorganized neighborhood is one marked 
by inefficient informal social controls used to regulate criminal behavior (Bursik and 
Grasmick, 1993). In disorganized neighborhoods, or those with a deficiency in friendship 
networks and collective efficacy (see Sampson et al., 1997), it becomes increasingly 
more difficult to control criminal behaviors through informal means. In these 
communities, the police are expected to fill in as representatives of control (Clear et al., 
2003). This is what Bursik and Grasmick’s (1993) systemic model explained. Their 
model suggested a negative relationship between relational networks (e.g., family groups) 
and formal social controls, and a negative relationship between formal controls and 
crime. That is, in communities where relational networks fail to regulate criminal 
conduct, formal controls must step in to regulate criminal conduct.  
Black (1976) recognizes that the use of the law varies inversely with informal 
social control. Black explained that when nonlegal authority (e.g., parental control of 
juveniles) is strong, little formal recourse (e.g., the law) is used. He stated, “Law is 
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stronger where other social control is weaker” (Black, 1976, p. 107). This would then 
suggest that officers respond more coercively to crimes occurring in areas with a 
deficiency in informal social controls. For example, Wilson (1978) stated that police 
officers were more likely to arrest and use physical force in areas that were believed to 
have weakened community or familial norms. This link suggests that an officer would be 
more inclined to act coercively in areas that do not have the means necessary to deal with 
criminal conduct. As agents of formal social control, the police are expected to act as 
mechanisms of control in the communities where residents lack the informal social 
controls necessary to regulate criminal behaviors (see also Rose and Clear, 1998).  
Further, Anderson (1999) argued that residents of disadvantaged communities are 
more likely to adopt a violent subculture because they are isolated from the norms and 
values of conventional society. In these communities that lack the conventional ways of 
controlling crime (e.g., informal social controls), police respond coercively to control 
criminal behaviors. Police use of coercion will be higher in disadvantaged communities, 
and even more pronounced in areas of extreme disadvantage, whose residents have 
adopted the subculture of violence; police will be more inclined to respond in a way that 
is normal to the deviant subculture (e.g., use of force) (Kania and Mackey, 1977). 
Through the lack of informal social controls and the residents’ adherence to the 
subculture of violence, concentrated disadvantage, again, makes the relationship between 
a suspect being stopped and coercive action more meaningful. 
An alternative hypothesis is that officers who work in areas marked by low 
amounts of informal social controls may be less likely to act coercively during a PCI. 
Khruakham and Hoover (2012), for example, reported that police use less coercion in 
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disadvantaged and high crime neighborhoods. A deficiency in informal social controls in 
these areas may, inadvertently, cause a breakdown in formal social controls, which can be 
explained by Klinger’s (1997) ecological theory of police behavior. Only the most 
serious crimes will be handled coercively because police feel cynical towards residents, 
officers see deviance as more accepting in these communities, and police are too busy 
with heavy workloads in these areas to deal with lower level offenses (Klinger, 1997). 
Police become cynical and desensitized to crime occurring in these areas, often 
perceiving victims as less deserving (Sobol et al., 2013). In communities marked by low 
informal social controls police often see their efforts as wasteful and, therefore, reduce 
their coercive responses to criminal conduct. In this theoretical connection, concentrated 
disadvantage has a weakening influence on the relationship between a stop and coercive 
action. That is, concentrated disadvantage may encourage the officer to take a less 
coercive approach when a suspect is stopped, with these effects exacerbated in extremely 
disadvantaged areas.  
In summary, the first theoretical connection lies in the simple link between 
disadvantage and high crime leading to an increase in police activity and risk of 
victimization. Areas with greater police activity and a greater risk of danger will naturally 
have higher amounts of police coercion (e.g., search and arrest rates) (e.g., Terrill and 
Reisig, 2003). The second and third theoretical connections would argue that police 
decision-making becomes molded by the intervening mechanisms at play (e.g., informal 
social controls and subculture) in a socially disorganized community. The second 
connection is that police use coercion more frequently to act as a mechanism of control, 
where informal social controls fail and a subculture of violence prevails (e.g., Clear et al., 
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2003). The third connection is that police use coercion less frequently in communities 
lacking informal social control because police perceive their efforts to be wasteful and 
victims as less deserving (e.g., Klinger, 1997). Literature examining police decision-
making in terms of these theoretical connections, however, remains scarce. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODS  
This dissertation explores the role of neighborhood-level disorganization on 
police decision-making. In 1997, Klinger proposed an ecological theory to explain police 
behavior, stating that police decision-making is driven by the features of the community. 
Social disorganization theory may be used to explain an officer’s decision-making within 
a community, though prior literature is quite scant (for an exception see Kane, 2002). 
Furthermore, Terrill and Reisig (2003) noted that previous literature examining 
neighborhood-level factors on police decision-making has relied upon statistical 
techniques not designed to analyze nested data (i.e., PCIs nested within neighborhoods). 
Multilevel modeling will provide insight into how contemporary measures of social 
disorganization theory account for an officer’s decision-making during a PCI. Multilevel 
modeling will also allow for a cross-sectional analysis of the moderating effects of 
concentrated disadvantage, as well as extreme disadvantage, on the relationship between 
stop predictors and an officer’s use of coercive actions.  
A socially disorganized or disadvantaged neighborhood may influence an 
officer’s decision to use coercion during a stop, but there may also be an interaction 
effect between neighborhoods and the reason for the stop and an officer’s decision to act 
coercively. Prior research has reported that neighborhood disadvantage shapes an 
officer’s use of discretion (e.g., Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Concentrated disadvantage, 
however, may also make the relationship between a stop and coercive action more 
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understandable. That is, officers may become more likely to respond in ways consistent 
with the features of the environment – high crime, lack of informal social controls, and 
the presence of a violent subculture. These effects are expected to be more pronounced in 
areas of extreme disadvantage, where concentrated disadvantage and high crime is 
prominent. Analyses using data from the NYPD will provide answers to two main 
questions:  
(1) Does neighborhood disorganization play a role in an officer’s decision to 
frisk, search, use force against, or arrest a suspect? 
 
(2) Does concentrated disadvantage strengthen or weaken the relationship 
between predictors of a stop and an officer’s decision to frisk, search, use 
force against, or arrest a suspect?  
 
4.1 Sample 
 The data set consists of police recorded stops of people in New York City along 
with information regarding neighborhood structural and demographic characteristics. The 
New York Police Department Stop, Question, and Frisk Database, 2011 (NYPD SQF) 
serves as the foundation of the data set. The NYPD SQF contains all reported street 
encounters between NYPD officers and citizens resulting in completion of a Unified 
Form 250 (UF-250) report during 2011.
8
  As previously explained, a UF-250 report gives 
details of each street stop between an officer and citizen, as recorded by the reporting 
officer. The measures used from this database are discussed below. 
New York City neighborhood (tract) data were obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010 and was subsequently combined with data from the NYPD SQF database. 
                                                 
 
8
 It is important to note that the NYPD SQF does not contain information from traffic 
stops and only includes stops made during street encounters. 
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The data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau included information from census tracts, 
which are frequently used to approximate a neighborhood context. Fagan (2012) 
explained that census tracts are often used in research examining the effects of small 
areas on crime and enforcement, and are well-known boundaries for such studies (see 
also Krivo and Peterson, 1996). 
In order for the NYPD SQF database to be combined with census tract structural 
and demographic characteristics, geocoding procedures had to be utilized. The NYPD 
SQF database contains individual stop events listed as x, y coordinates. Each stop event 
was geocoded using ArcGIS version 10.2 to allow the stop incident to be mapped into a 
New York City census tract boundary (neighborhood). The final sample consists of 
654,485 stop incidents nested within 2,114 tracts.
9
 
Weaknesses of UF-250 Reports 
Although the stop and frisk policy mandates the completion of UF-250 form 
under certain circumstances of a stop, it cannot be fully verified that the officer followed 
proper procedures. In the 1999 investigation of the NYPD’s use of the stop and frisk 
policy, the officers selected for interviews reported that even those stops that mandated a 
completion of a UF-250 report were, at times, not completed; the officers did not provide 
reasons or the degree of the underreporting (Spitzer, 1999). Although stop and frisk 
reporting procedures are much more rigorous ten years later, it is possible that officers 
                                                 
 
9
 Seven percent of stop incidents were dropped from the data set due to missing x,y 
coordinates and .26% of the stops did not fall within a New York City census tract. A 
total of 52 census tracts had no households and 47 of the 52 had no population statistics, 
which also were dropped from the data set. Further, 7 census tracts had no stops 
occurring within them, and were therefore not included in the analyses.  
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still do not follow proper guidelines outlined by the NYPD Patrol Guide. In 2007, 
Ridgeway questioned NYPD officers about the stop and frisk policy. Ridgeway reported 
that officers freshly out of the academy (one year or less) seemed to lack knowledge on 
proper stop and frisk procedures, stating:  
While it appears that some of the newest members of the force are uncertain about 
how to document street encounters properly, this is not entirely surprising. The 
interviewed are working essentially alone in extremely busy areas and are 
learning to put their academy training into practice. Officers interviewed who had 
a year or more on the job knew the policies and the practices well and expressed 
no confusion on the issue. (p. 3-4). 
The NYPD currently has several layers of auditing checks to ensure police 
officers are properly reporting stops (Ridgeway, 2007). Once the officer fills out the UF-
250 report, it is reviewed by a supervisor, then screened by data entry staff, and then is 
reviewed by the integrity control officer (ICO) to assess any incongruences that may be 
present between the initial stop and the coercive action taken by the officer, in particular 
arrests. Lastly, the NYPD’s Quality Assurance Division reviews the ICO’s audits, 
randomly collecting UF-250 reports from each command to ensure proper procedures are 
being followed (Ridgeway, 2007).   
Unfortunately there is no auditing process to ensure the officers are filling out the 
UF-250 report for every mandated PCI. John Timoney (in Trone, 2010) postulated that 
when an arrest occurs, officers most likely fill out the required arrest forms, but most 
likely do not fill out the UF-250 documenting the stop, losing the detailed information 
between the stop and the arrest. However, in one eight-hour shift observation of PCIs and 
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monitored radio communication, Ridgeway (2007) reported that officers did submit all 
mandated UF-250 reports.  
Although there are audits and quality checks of the UF-250 reports, the officer 
could have misreported (either accidentally or purposefully) what occurred during the 
stop, potentially going unnoticed by auditors. For example, the officer could have 
checked the wrong box that reports the circumstance that lead to the stop or checked the 
wrong box for the coercive activity that occurred during the stop. The officer could also 
have not remembered the exact reason for the stop or that he used multiple forms of 
coercive activity during the stop. If the officer searched the suspect, along with enacting a 
type of force and arresting the suspect and only checked the boxes for use of force and 
arrest, then, in this case, would have inaccurately reported.  
Further, an officer’s use of discretion (e.g., whether or not to arrest the suspect 
when a small amount of illegal drugs were found on their person) may have interfered 
with the accuracy of the data. A police sergeant was quoted, “’I’m wondering...whether 
contraband and possibly weapons have been found, but the officer utilizing their 
discretion has not made an arrest; and whether that’s skewing the data somehow’” 
(Trone, 2010, p.8). Regardless of these potential limitations, the UF-250 reports remain 
the most valuable data source for purposes of the current analysis.  
In terms of the amount of stops, Ridgeway (2007) notes that a certain number of 
officers may be over- or under-representing the number of stops that are occurring in 
New York City. In RAND’s examination of 2006 NYPD stops it was reported that “…the 
analysis flagged 0.5 percent of the 2,756 NYPD officers most active in pedestrian-stop 
activity. Those 2,756 most active officers, about 7 percent of the total number of officers, 
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accounted for 54 percent of the total number of 2006 stops” (Ridgeway, 2007). 
Regrettably, the current data does not allow for such an analysis; there is no officer 
identification number associated with the individual stop events to examine if a few 
officers are making up the majority of stops.
10
 This same phenomenon may also occur on 
the suspect side. That is, a person may have been stopped several times, but again, the 
current data do not allow for such an analysis. 
Another weakness to the data is the way the UF-250 report is formatted; the 
variables included in the report are not clearly defined. The data mostly consists of 
dichotomies (yes and no) and do not provide significant detail into officer responses on 
the UF-250. For example, the stop predictor furtive movements does not specifically 
explain the type of movements the suspect was performing, only that the officer stopped 
(or did not stop) the person for this reason. Furtive movements remains one of the most 
commonly used stop predictor (occurring in 51% of recorded stops) and is argued by 
Jones-Brown, Gill, and Trone (2010) to be “a term that is highly ambiguous and 
undefined” (p. 22). A retired NYPD officer was quoted saying, “Is that furtive 
movements like I’m looking over my shoulder because I don’t want to get mugged in my 
neighborhood?...Furtive movements right there tells me that cops are out there winging it 
a bit” (Trone, 2010, p.11).  
Furthermore, there are “other” categories on the UF-250 report that offer no 
detailed description. The outcome variable use of force has an “other” category that the 
                                                 
 
10
 If data permitted, a within-officer examination of stops incidents and the coercive 
activity used during the stop could have provided insight into officer proactivity within 
certain neighborhoods. 
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officer may have marked on the UF-250 report. It is unclear what “other” methods of 
force the officer may have utilized; only logical inferences may be made. For example, 
the officer using his hands against the suspect was listed as an option in the UF-250 
report, but the officer kicking the suspect was not included in the report. It can be 
logically inferred that an officer may have chosen the “other” category in these situations. 
Likewise, the individual-level stop predictors had an “other reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity” category that also did not provide explanation for the reason of the 
stop. Again it can be inferred that an officer may check this box if the reason the officer 
stopped the suspect was not otherwise listed on the UF-250 report.  
Measures 
 This study uses data collected from the NYPD UF-250 reports and from New 
York City census tracts. There are five main types of police coercive responses included 
in the UF-250 reports (no coercive action/stop only, frisk, search, use of force, and 
arrest). It is unlikely that a single method of estimation will properly capture the full 
picture behind factors influencing an officer’s decision to use coercion. As such, the 
outcome variables used in this analysis are measured three ways: (1) as a dichotomy of 
each coercive response occurring or not occurring during the stop (2) on a continuum of 
coercive action and (3) using the highest level of coercive action that occurred during the 
stop (see also Klinger’s 1995 and Garner and Maxwell’s 1999 police use of force 
measures). Table 4.1 describes the outcome measures used in the current analysis.  
Dichotomous outcomes. 
The first method that will be employed is analyzing each coercive action as a 
separate dichotomy (e.g., Garner and Maxwell, 1999). The first outcome, No Coercive 
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Table 4.1 Description of outcome measures 
Variable            Mean            SD Minimum-Maximum 
Dichotomous Outcomes    
No coercive action/stop only .42 -- 0-1 
Frisk  .56 -- 0-1 
Search  .09 -- 0-1 
Use of force .20 -- 0-1 
Arrest .06 -- 0-1 
Coercive Action Continuum 3.01 3.09 1-16 
1. No coercive action/stop only .42 -- 0-1 
2. Frisk only .31 -- 0-1 
3. Search only .00 -- 0-1 
4. Frisk and search .03 -- 0-1 
5. Use of force only .01 -- 0-1 
6. Frisk and use of force .15 -- 0-1 
7. Search and use of force .00 -- 0-1 
8. Frisk, search, and use of force .02 -- 0-1 
9. Arrest only .01 -- 0-1 
10. Frisk and arrest .01 -- 0-1 
11. Search and arrest .00 -- 0-1 
12. Frisk, search, and arrest .02 -- 0-1 
13. Use of force and arrest .00 -- 0-1 
14. Frisk, use of force, and arrest .00 -- 0-1 
15. Search, use of force, and arrest .00 -- 0-1 
16. Frisk, search, use of force, and arrest .01 -- 0-1 
Highest Level of Coercion Used 2.15 1.30  1-5 
1. No coercive action/stop only .42 -- 0-1 
2. Frisk .31 -- 0-1 
3. Search .03 -- 0-1 
4. Use of force .18 -- 0-1 
5. Arrest .06 -- 0-1 
 
Action, means that the suspect was stopped only; no other action was taken against the  
suspect (n=274,463). The second outcome, Frisk, represents whether or not the suspect 
was frisked, which occurs when the officer “pats down” or moves his or her hands 
quickly over the person’s body in order to detect weapons or other illegal contraband 
(Harris, 1994a). In 56% of the recorded stops, the suspect was frisked (n=365,206). The 
third outcome of interest, Search, signifies whether or not the officer investigated the 
suspect’s possessions (e.g., his bag or his pants pockets) (Harris, 1994a). In 9% of 
recorded stops the suspect was searched (n=55,668). The fourth outcome variable 
analyzed, Use of force, denotes whether or not force was used against the suspect. Use of 
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force can be defined as the officer’s exertion of power to coerce or contain the behaviors 
of others (Kania and Mackey, 1977).
11
 The use of force variable was comprised of eight 
categories that included the officer using his hands against the suspects, putting the 
suspect on the ground or against a wall, drawing a weapon and/or pointing a weapon at 
the suspect, using a baton or pepper spray during the stop, and using other methods of 
force directed at the suspect. In 20% of the recorded stops an officer used force against 
the suspect (n=132,210).
12
 Arrest, the fifth outcome variable of interest, was whether or 
not the suspect was taken to the police department, where a booking sheet, a property 
voucher, and other paperwork was formally processed (Spitzer, 1999). Officers arrested 
the suspects in 6% of recorded stops (n=38,985). The frequency of each coercive 
outcome that occurred during a stop is displayed in figure 4.1. 
Coercive action continuum. 
The coercive action variables were also categorized into a continuum based on the 
level of coercion the officer used during the stop. Similar to literature examining police 
                                                 
 
11
 Following practices of Klinger (1995), the use of force variable was originally 
measured on a continuum based on level of discomfort or potential injury to the suspect, 
ranging from the least severe to most severe use of force option. The levels of force were 
operationalized using a combination of the use of force variables available in the NYPD 
SQF database and included categories of low, moderate, and high force. The multiple 
levels of force were, however, subsequently combined into a dummy measure of use of 
force because the number of incidents of moderate and high force was too few (e.g., 184 
total incidents of moderate force out of 654,485 total stops). 
12
 The majority of use of force incidents involves the officer using his hands against the 
suspect (92% of all use of force involves the officer using his hands), which may explain 
why use of force is more common in police stops than searches (20% of stops resulted in 
use of force, while 9% of stops resulted in a search). 
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use of force on a continuum (e.g., Klinger, 1995; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002), the 
coercive action continuum ranges from the least intrusive coercive action to the most 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Coercive action occurring during a stop 
Note: The total number of coercive actions exceeds the total number of stops because officers can check 
multiple coercive actions for a single stop. 
 
intrusive coercive action (see also Sobol et al.’s 2013 continuum of police vigor). This 
will provide a deeper look into the various levels of coercive action used by police 
officers, not simply whether some form of coercive action was used (e.g., Terrill and 
Mastrofski, 2002). The categories consisted of each coercive response alone (e.g., frisk 
only), as well as combinations of the coercive responses ranked by degree of 
intrusiveness experienced by the suspect, ranging from 1-16.  
The least intrusive coercive action consisted of the officer only stopping the 
suspect, which occurred in 42% of all stops (n=274,463). The suspect being only frisked 
was the next category, which happened in 31% of all stops (n=204,355). The subsequent 
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category, the suspect was only searched, occurred in .0006% of all stops (n=412). A 
combination of the suspect being frisked and searched was the next category of 
intrusiveness, which occurred in 3% of all stops (n=16,789). Following, the officer using 
force against the suspect happened in 1% of all stops (n=8,240). Frisk combined with use 
of force (15% of all stops; n=97,443), search combined with use of force (.0002% of all 
stops; n=128), and frisk combined with search and use of force (2% of all stops; 
n=13,670) were the next three categories on the continuum.  
The next category along the continuum consisted of the suspect being only 
arrested, which occurred in 1% of all stops (n=3,797). Then, the suspect being frisked and 
arrested (1% of all stops; n=7,054), the suspect being searched and arrested (.002% of all 
stops; n=1,425), and the suspect being frisked, searched, and arrested (2% of all stops; 
n=13,979) were the next three categories on the continuum. Following, the suspect 
having force used against him and being arrested accounted for .0006% of all stops 
(n=418). The next category was the suspect being frisked, force used against him, and he 
was arrested, which occurred in .005% of all stops (n=3,047). After this category, the 
suspect was searched, force was used against him, and he was arrested, which happened 
in .0006% of all stops (n=396). Lastly, the most intrusive coercive action used, is all 
types of coercion combined. The suspect was frisked, searched, force was used against 
him, and he was arrested in this category, which occurred in 1% of all stops (n=8,869). 
Figure 4.2 displays the frequency of the coercive action continuum categories. 
Highest level of coercion used 
In Klinger’s (1995) observational study of Metropolitan Dade County Police 
Department he suggested multiple methods for measuring levels of police use of force. 
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Figure 4.2 Coercive action continuum 
 
Because multiple methods of force may be used in one PCI (e.g., an officer may use 
verbal commands and his baton), Klinger proposed an examination of the highest level of 
force used in each incident to explore this dynamic (see also Paoline and Terrill, 2007; 
Terrill and Reisig, 2003). The data for this dissertation also follow this pattern; an officer 
may have used multiple forms of coercive action in a stop (e.g., a suspect may have been 
frisked and arrested). Therefore, I also examine the highest level of coercion used in each 
stop performed by the NYPD. 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
N
o
 c
o
er
ci
ve
 a
ct
io
n
/S
to
p
 o
n
ly
Fr
is
k 
o
n
ly
Se
ar
ch
 o
n
ly
Fr
is
k 
an
d
 s
ea
rc
h
U
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e
Fr
is
k 
an
d
 u
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e
Se
ar
ch
 a
n
d
 u
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e
Fr
is
k,
 s
e
ar
ch
, a
n
d
 u
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e
A
rr
e
st
Fr
is
k 
an
d
 a
rr
e
st
Se
ar
ch
 a
n
d
 a
rr
es
t
Fr
is
k,
 s
e
ar
ch
, a
n
d
 a
rr
es
t
U
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e
 a
n
d
 a
rr
es
t
Fr
is
k,
 u
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e
, a
n
d
 a
rr
es
t
Se
ar
ch
, u
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e,
 a
n
d
 a
rr
e
st
Fr
is
k,
 s
e
ar
ch
, u
se
 o
f 
fo
rc
e,
 a
n
d
…
274463 
204355 
412 
16789 
8240 
97443 
128 
13670 
3797 7054 1425 
13979 
418 3047 396 
8869 
Coercive action continuum 
Number of stops
 104 
To create this ordinal outcome, the five coercive action variables were ranked 
according to their degree of intrusiveness, from low to high: no coercive action/stop only, 
frisk, search, use of force, and arrest (Sobol et al., 2013). The outcome ranges from one to 
five. No coercive action/stop only (one) was the highest level of intrusiveness in 42% of 
all stops (n=274,462). Frisk (two) was the highest level of intrusiveness in 31% of all 
stops (n=204,354); search (three) was the highest level of intrusiveness in 3% of all stops 
(n=17,201); use of force (four) was the highest level of intrusiveness in 18% of all stops 
(n=119,481); and arrest (five) was the highest level of intrusiveness in 6% of all stops 
(n=38,985). Figure 4.3 displays the frequency of the highest levels of coercive action 
used in each stop. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Highest level of coercion used in each stop 
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Individual-Level Measures  
The predictor variables included both individual- and neighborhood-level 
measures and are described in Table 4.2. For the individual-level variables, several stop  
Table 4.2 Description of Independent Measures 
Variable           Mean            SD Minimum-Maximum 
Stop-level reason for the stop variables    
Carrying suspicious object .02 -- 0-1 
Fits a relevant description .16 -- 0-1 
Casing a victim or location .32 -- 0-1 
Acting as a lookout .18 -- 0-1 
Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime .05 -- 0-1 
Actions indicative of a drug transaction .07 -- 0-1 
Furtive movements .51 -- 0-1 
Actions of engaging in violent crime .10 -- 0-1 
Suspicious bulge .08 -- 0-1 
Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .17 -- 0-1 
Stop-level control variables    
Area under investigation .14 -- 0-1 
Area has a high crime incidence .60 -- 0-1 
Time of day fits crime incidence .42 -- 0-1 
N1 =          654,485   
Neighborhood-level variables    
Concentrated disadvantage 0.0 1.0 -1.57 to 6.36 
Extreme disadvantage .10 .30 0 to 1 
Concentrated immigration 0.0 1.0 -2.37 to 4.77 
Percent recent movers 10.95 7.19 0 to 60.82 
Percent renters 62.48 25.96 0 to 100 
Percent African-American 26.49 31.46 0 to 100 
Percent Hispanic 26.22 23.20 0 to 100 
Neighborhood-level control variables    
Manhattan .13 -- 0 to 1 
Bronx .16 -- 0 to 1 
Brooklyn .35 -- 0 to 1 
Queens .30 -- 0 to 1 
Staten Island .05 -- 0 to 1 
N2 =           2,114   
 
predictors, or reason the officer stopped the citizen, were included in the analysis. Figure 
4.4 displays the frequency of each stop predictor that led to the officer stopping the 
person; an officer may have checked more than one reason for the stop on the UF-250 
report. Carrying a suspicious object represents whether or not the suspect was carrying an 
object in plain view that could potentially be used in commission of a crime (e.g, slim 
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jim/pry bar). In 2% of all stops the officer believed the suspect was carrying a suspicious 
object (n=13,089). Fits a relevant description signifies that the officer believed the 
suspect fit a description of someone who was previously involved in criminal activity.  
 
Figure 4.4. Reason for the stop 
Note: The total number of reasons for the stop exceeds the total number of stops because officers can check 
multiple reasons for a single stop. 
 
An officer’s account of the basis for fitting a relevant description is described in Spitzer 
(1999), “At TPO [time and place of occurrence] male was person who fit description of 
person wanted for GLA [grand larceny auto] in 072 pct. log…upon approach male 
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discarded small coin roller which contained 5 bags of alleged crack” (p. 137). The 
suspect being stopped for fitting a relevant description occurred in 16% of all stops 
(n=104,717).  
Casing a victim or location denotes that the officer believed the suspect displayed 
actions of casing a victim or location, which occurred in 32% of all stops (n=209,435). 
Acting as a lookout represents that the officer believed the suspect displayed actions of 
assisting in criminal activity. The suspect being stopped for acting as a lookout occurred 
in 18% of all stops (n=117,807). Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime signifies that 
the officer believed that the suspect intended to engage in criminal activity, based on his 
or her attire; this occurred in 5% of all stops (n=32,724). Actions indicative of a drug 
transaction symbolizes that the officer believed the suspect was displaying actions 
commonly used in drug deals. The officer stopped the person based on these actions in 
7% of all recorded stops (n=45,813). Furtive movements means that the officer believed 
the suspect was demonstrating secretive or sneaky movements, which occurred in 51% of 
the recorded stops (n=333,787). Over the years of collected UF-250 data furtive 
movements continues to be the most frequently chosen reason for the officer making the 
stop.  
Actions of engaging in a violent crime denotes that the officer believed the 
suspect was currently involved in violent criminal activity, which was observed in 10% 
of the recorded stops (n=65,448). Suspicious bulge represents that the officer saw a 
prominent object on the suspect that could potentially be dangerous. An officer’s account 
stated, “Observed person with large bulge in front right coat, thought to be a weapon” 
(Spitzer, 1999, p. 138). Suspicious bulge made up 8% of recorded stops (n=52,358). 
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Lastly, other reasonable suspicion of engaging in criminal activity is when the officer 
believed the suspect was involved in criminal activity not previously listed in the UF-250 
report’s reasons for the stop; this occurred in 17% of the recorded stops (n=111,262). 
Neighborhood-Level Measures 
The neighborhood-level variables included measures of disorganization within 
New York City neighborhoods, all retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American 
Fact Finder. A principle components analysis of seven neighborhood-level indicators 
revealed a two factor solution explaining 69% of the variation in the indicators (Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .74). The factors represent the structural 
features of the neighborhood, namely, concentrated disadvantage and concentrated 
immigration (see e.g., Morenoff et al., 2001; Sampson et al., 1997). Concentrated 
disadvantage (Eigenvalue = 1.66) is comprised of the following: percent of civilian 
working age population unemployed; percent female-headed households; percent of 
population receiving public assistance; percent of population age 16-19 who dropped out 
of high school; and percent of population living in poverty. Concentrated immigration 
(Eigenvalue = 3.15) reflects the percent of population that is Asian and percent of 
population foreign born. This measure does not follow the usual pattern found in prior 
literature examining concentrated immigration, which is often comprised of the percent 
of population that is foreign born and the percent of population that is Hispanic (e.g., 
Sampson et al., 1997). This concentrated immigration variable may be explained by the 
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increase in Asian immigration in New York City in the past few years.
13
 According to the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2011), the sub-groups of all Asian immigrants have progressively 
inclined from year 2000 to 2010, while sub-groups of Hispanic population have either 
declined or stayed steady during this time in New York City. For example, from year 
2000 to 2010, the Dominican immigrant population changed to a decrease of 11.2%, 
while the Chinese immigrant population changed to a 34% increase in New York City 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). This dramatic increase in Asian immigrants in New York 
City may explain why the percent of the population that is foreign born loads on the same 
factor as the percent of the population that is Asian. 
Variables that were also included in the analysis were extreme disadvantage, 
percent recent movers, percent renters, percent African-American, and percent Hispanic. 
Extreme disadvantage represents the worst off neighborhoods within New York City. 
Recall that the effects of disorganization and high crime may be exacerbated in areas of 
extreme disadvantage (Clear et al., 2003), with police potentially more (or less) inclined 
to respond coercively in these areas. The extreme disadvantage measure was created 
using the top 10% of the concentrated disadvantage index. Percent recent movers and 
percent renters are variables used to approximate the residential instability component of 
social disorganization.
14
 In the principal components analysis, percent African-American 
                                                 
 
13
 Immigrants from the Dominican Republic made up 12.4% of the foreign born 
population, while Chinese immigrants made up 11.4% of the foreign born population in 
New York City (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).  
14
 Residential instability customarily consists of two variables (1) percent of the 
population that has moved within the past 5 years and (2) percent of households renter-
occupied. In New York City, the percent of renter-occupied households does not load 
with the other measure of residential instability. It seems that because households within 
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did not load with the variables of concentrated disadvantage, as in prior literature, and is 
included in the analysis as a separate variable. Likewise, percent Hispanic is also 
included as a separate variable in analyses. 
 Finally, control variables were used to help avoid misspecification of the risk of 
being stopped by the police in a particular neighborhood. These measures were collected 
form the UF-250 reports and included: Ongoing investigation, which denotes that the 
area is under investigation of crime patterns (e.g., robbery pattern); Time of day fits crime 
incidence, which represents whether or not the time of the day, the day of the week, or 
the season corresponds to reports of criminal activity; and area has high crime incidence 
signifies that the area has high reports of offenses of the type under investigation.   
 Another control variable used in the analysis is the New York City borough in 
which the stop occurred. Borough is included as a control to account for variation across 
boroughs that are not accounted for by census tract data (e.g., differences in rates of 
crime, department policies, recent political agendas, etc.; see e.g., Fagan, 2012). Staten 
Island, because of its dissimilar rates of NYPD stops, is used as the reference category in 
this analysis. In 2011 Staten Island reported 26,310 stops while the other boroughs 
(Brooklyn, Bronx, Manhattan, and Queens) had over 125,000 stops occurring within their 
boundaries.
15
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
New York City are largely renter-occupied, it does not necessarily denote that the 
neighborhood is marked by transiency. Therefore, percent of the population that has 
moved in the past one year and percent renters are included separately to represent 
residential instability. The past one year, as opposed to the past 5 years, was believed to 
be a better indicator of recent residential instability within a neighborhood.  
15
 Brooklyn reported 221,975 stops, Bronx reported 127,608 stops, Manhattan reported 
133,929 stops, and Queens reported 144,673 stops. 
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4.2 Analytic Strategy 
Multilevel modeling techniques using HLM 7.01 software were used to 
accommodate the hierarchical structure of the nested data (individual stop events nested 
within neighborhoods). First, diagnostic tests for multicollinearity were conducted using 
linear regression modeling and revealed no issues (all VIFs were ≤ 1.33 and condition 
index values were ≤ 6.28). In order to adjust for within neighborhood-level clustering, 
robust standard errors were used. Two distinct models were run, one including the 
concentrated disadvantage index as a neighborhood-level predictor and the other 
including the extreme disadvantage measure as a neighborhood-level predictor. 
Dichotomous Outcomes 
The dichotomous outcomes were analyzed using hierarchical generalized linear 
modeling with the Bernoulli option. The analyses began with estimating unconditional 
models. Unconditional models do not have any predictor variables; they are used to 
assess the amount of variation in the outcomes that lie within and between the aggregates 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Here, unconditional models represent the differences in 
police coercive responses within and between the neighborhoods. This model is 
illustrated below
16
 and revealed significant variation in each dichotomous outcome across 
neighborhoods (p ≤ .001). 
                                                 
 
16
 All illustrations represent the stop only (no greater coercive action used) dichotomous 
model. The outcome variable was changed in each model to reflect the outcome being 
analyzed (i.e., frisk outcome variable was substituted in the next analysis, followed by 
search, use of force, and arrest); these models are not illustrated in the text. 
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Level-1 Model (Stop-level) 
    Prob(STOP_ONLYij=1|βj) = ϕij 
    log[ϕij/(1 - ϕij)] = ηij 
    ηij = β0j  
Level-2 Model (Neighborhood-level) 
    β0j = γ00 + u0j 
Random coefficient models were then estimated, which do not contain any level-2 
predictor variables, but assess the effects of the level-1 measures on each outcome. 
Random coefficients models in this analysis assessed the effects of the stop predictors 
(e.g., suspicious bulge) on each police coercive response (e.g., frisk). This model (shown 
below) revealed that the effects of almost all of the stop predictors for each coercive 
action were stronger in some neighborhoods versus others (p≤ .05).  
    Prob(STOP_ONLYij=1|βj) = ϕij 
    log[ϕij/(1 - ϕij)] = ηij 
    ηij = β0j + β1j*(AC_INVESij) + β2j*(CS_OBJCSij) + β3j*(CS_DESCRij) + 
β4j*(CS_CASNGij) + β5j*(CS_LKOUTij) + β6j*(CS_CLOTHij) + β7j*(CS_DRGTRij) + 
β8j*(CS_FURTVij) + β9j*(CS_VCRIMij) + β10j*(CS_BULGEij) + β11j*(CS_OTHERij) + 
β12j*(AC_INCIDij) + β13j*(AC_TIMEij)  
 
All of the level-1 variables were grand-mean centered in order to control for 
compositional differences in individual stop events across neighborhoods.  
For the third step of the analysis, the neighborhood-level predictors (e.g., 
concentrated disadvantage) were entered into the intercepts-as-outcomes model. This 
permitted an examination of research question number one, the main effects of 
neighborhood disorganization on the level-1 (police coercive action) intercepts. This 
model showed how neighborhood disorganization directly impacts police coercive 
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activities, while controlling for stop-level effects. The level-1 model (random 
coefficients) stayed the same, while the level-2 model is illustrated by the following:
17
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(PC_BLACKj) + γ02*(PC_HISPAj) + γ03*(PC_RECENj) + 
γ04*(PC_HHRENj)  + γ05*(CDj/WORST_CDj) + γ06*(CIj) + γ07*(MANHATTAj) + 
γ08*(BRONXj)  + γ09*(BROOKLYNj) + γ010*(QUEENSj) + u0j 
 
Lastly, intercepts-and-slopes-as-outcomes models were estimated in order to 
answer the second research question regarding moderating (cross-level) effects. This 
model produced analyses examining the impact of neighborhood disadvantage on the 
relationship between each stop predictor and each police coercive activity, while 
controlling for the main effects of stop-level and neighborhood-level characteristics. In 
this model, the level-1 random coefficients model and the level-2 main effects model 
stayed the same, while the cross-level model took the following form: 
    ηij = γ00 + γ01*PC_BLACKj + γ02*PC_HISPAj + γ03*PC_RECENj  
    + γ04*PC_HHRENj + γ05*CDj/WORST_CDj + γ06*CIj  
    + γ10*AC_INVESij  
    + γ20*CS_OBJCSij + γ21*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_OBJCSij  
    + γ30*CS_DESCRij + γ31*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_DESCRij  
    + γ40*CS_CASNGij + γ41*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_CASNGij  
    + γ50*CS_LKOUTij + γ51*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_LKOUTij  
    + γ60*CS_CLOTHij + γ61*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_CLOTHij  
    + γ70*CS_DRGTRij + γ71*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_DRGTRij  
    + γ80*CS_FURTVij + γ81*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_FURTVij  
    + γ90*CS_VCRIMij + γ91*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_VCRIMij  
    + γ100*CS_BULGEij + γ101*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_BULGEij  
    + γ110*CS_OTHERij + γ111*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_OTHERij  
    + γ120*AC_INCIDij  
    + γ130*AC_TIMEij  
     + u0j + u1j*AC_INVESij  + u2j*CS_OBJCSij  + u3j*CS_DESCRij  
     + u4j*CS_CASNGij  + u5j*CS_LKOUTij  + u6j*CS_CLOTHij  + u7j*CS_DRGTRij  
                                                 
 
17
 CD/WORST_CD represents the neighborhood-level effects of the two disadvantage 
models. When running analyses for the concentrated disadvantage model, the variable 
CD was used and when running analyses for the extreme disadvantage model, 
WORST_CD replaced CD. 
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     + u8j*CS_FURTVij  + u9j*CS_VCRIMij  + u10j*CS_BULGEij  + u11j*CS_OTHERij  
     + u12j*AC_INCIDij  + u13j*AC_TIMEij  
Coercive Action Continuum 
 The next outcome measure consists of the coercive action continuum, which was 
analyzed using hierarchical linear regression using the continuous outcome option. The 
same process used for the dichotomous outcomes was used to estimate the linear 
regression of the coercive action continuum, beginning with the unconditional model. 
This model revealed significant variation in the coercive action continuum across 
neighborhoods (p ≤ .001) and is illustrated by the following: 
Level-1 Model 
    COERCIONij = β0j + rij  
Level-2 Model 
    β0j = γ00 + u0j 
Succeeding the unconditional model, random coefficients models were run, which assess 
the effects of the level-1 measures on the coercive action continuum; the model is 
illustrated as: 
COERCIONij = β0j + β1j*(AC_INVESij) + β2j*(CS_OBJCSij) + β3j*(CS_DESCRij) + 
β4j*(CS_CASNGij) + β5j*(CS_LKOUTij) + β6j*(CS_CLOTHij) + β7j*(CS_DRGTRij) + 
β8j*(CS_FURTVij) + β9j*(CS_VCRIMij) + β10j*(CS_BULGEij) + β11j*(CS_OTHERij) + 
β12j*(AC_INCIDij) + β13j*(AC_TIMEij) + rij  
 
Next, intercepts-as-outcomes model was represented by the same level-1 random 
coefficients model, while the level-2 model took the form:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(PC_BLACKj) + γ02*(PC_HISPAj) + γ03*(PC_RECENj) + 
γ04*(PC_HHRENj) + γ05*(CDj) + γ06*(CIj) + γ07*(MANHATTAj) + γ08*(BRONXj) + 
γ09*(BROOKLYNj) + γ010*(QUEENSj) + u0j 
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The final model, intercepts-and-slopes-as-outcomes (below) allows for a more thorough 
investigation of the research question on moderating effects. The level-1 random 
coefficients model and the level-2 main effects models stayed the same, while the cross-
level model took the following form: 
COERCIONij = γ00 + γ01*PC_BLACKj + γ02*PC_HISPAj + γ03*PC_RECENj  
    + γ04*PC_HHRENj + γ05*CDj/WORST_CDj + γ06*CIj + γ07*MANHATTAj  
    + γ08*BRONXj + γ09*BROOKLYNj + γ010*QUEENSj  
    + γ10*AC_INVESij  
    + γ20*CS_OBJCSij + γ21*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_OBJCSij  
    + γ30*CS_DESCRij + γ31*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_DESCRij  
    + γ40*CS_CASNGij + γ41*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_CASNGij  
    + γ50*CS_LKOUTij + γ51*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_LKOUTij  
    + γ60*CS_CLOTHij + γ61*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_CLOTHij  
    + γ70*CS_DRGTRij + γ71*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_DRGTRij  
    + γ80*CS_FURTVij + γ81*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_FURTVij  
    + γ90*CS_VCRIMij + γ91*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_VCRIMij  
    + γ100*CS_BULGEij + γ101*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_BULGEij  
    + γ110*CS_OTHERij + γ111*CDj/WORST_CDj *CS_OTHERij  
    + γ120*AC_INCIDij  
    + γ130*AC_TIMEij  
     + u0j + u1j*AC_INVESij  + u2j*CS_OBJCSij  + u3j*CS_DESCRij  
     + u4j*CS_CASNGij  + u5j*CS_LKOUTij  + u6j*CS_CLOTHij  + u7j*CS_DRGTRij  
     + u8j*CS_FURTVij  + u9j*CS_VCRIMij  + u10j*CS_BULGEij  + u11j*CS_OTHERij  
     + u12j*AC_INCIDij  + u13j*AC_TIMEij + rij 
Highest Level of Coercion Used 
The third outcome measure consists of using the highest level of coercive action 
enacted during the stop, an ordinal measure ranging from the lowest level of coercion to 
the highest level of coercion used during the stop, with 5 categories (Stop only, frisk, 
search, use of force, and arrest). First, to see how the effects of the independent variables 
vary across the categories of the dependent variable, a generalized ordered logit model 
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(GOLM) was estimated in Stata version 13.
18
 To approximate the HLM model, all level-
1, level-2, and interaction variables were included. Unfortunately the model failed to 
converge. Consequently, a procedure suggested by Long (1997) (i.e., Brant test) was 
estimated, which is a reasonable approximation to the GOLM (Williams, 2006)
 19
. The 
Brant test revealed that the proportional odds assumption was violated (p ≤ .001). 
However, as Williams (2006) noted, even trivial violations of this assumption may be 
statistically significant when the sample size is large. Given that, the sample size of the 
current study is 654,485, it is likely that the Brant test indicated that the assumption was 
violated, when in fact, it may not have been. Nonetheless, results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
The highest level of coercion used during the stop was examined using the ordinal 
option in the basic model specifications of the HLM software and the same step-by-step 
process outlined above was followed (see also Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, and 
du Toit, 2004). Again, the unconditional model revealed significant variation in the 
ordinal outcome across neighborhoods (p ≤ .001) and is illustrated by the following: 
                                                 
 
18
 HLM software does not currently have the capability to test the proportional odds 
assumption.  
19
 Williams (2006) suggested that Long’s series of binary logits approximates the GOLM 
where “the first panel contrasts category 1 with categories 2, 3, and 4; the second panel 
contrasts categories 1 and 2 with categories 3 and 4; and the third panel contrasts 
categories 1, 2, and 3 with category 4.2 Hence, positive coefficients indicate that higher 
values on the explanatory variable make it more likely that the respondent will be in a 
higher category of Y than the current one, whereas negative coefficients indicate that 
higher values on the explanatory variable increase the likelihood of being in the current 
or a lower category” (p. 63). 
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Level-1 Model  
    Prob[Rij <= 1|βj] = ϕ
*
1ij = ϕ1ij  
    Prob[Rij <= 2|βj] = ϕ
*
2ij = ϕ1ij + ϕ2ij 
    Prob[Rij <= 3|βj] = ϕ
*
3ij = ϕ1ij + ϕ2ij + ϕ3ij 
    Prob[Rij <= 4|βj] = ϕ
*
4ij = ϕ1ij + ϕ2ij + ϕ3ij + ϕ4ij 
    Prob[Rij <= 5|βj] = 1.0 
    ϕ1ij = Prob[COER_HIGH(1) = 1|βj] 
    ϕ2ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (2) = 1|βj] 
    ϕ3ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (3) = 1|βj] 
    ϕ4ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (4) = 1|βj] 
    log[ϕ*1ij/(1 - ϕ
*
1ij)] = β0j  
    log[ϕ*2ij/(1 - ϕ
*
2ij)] = β0j + δ2  
    log[ϕ*3ij/(1 - ϕ
*
3ij)] = β0j + δ3  
    log[ϕ*4ij/(1 - ϕ
*
4ij)] = β0j + δ4  
Level-2 Model 
    β0j = γ00 + u0j 
    δ2    δ3    δ4 
Random coefficients models assess the effects of the level-1 measures on the ordinal 
outcome, which is modeled as:  
    Prob[Rij <= 1|βj] = ϕ
*
1ij = ϕ1ij  
    Prob[Rij <= 2|βj] = ϕ
*
2ij = ϕ1ij + ϕ2ij 
    Prob[Rij <= 3|βj] = ϕ
*
3ij = ϕ1ij + ϕ2ij + ϕ3ij 
    Prob[Rij <= 4|βj] = ϕ
*
4ij = ϕ1ij + ϕ2ij + ϕ3ij + ϕ4ij 
    Prob[Rij <= 5|βj] = 1.0 
    ϕ1ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (1) = 1|βj] 
    ϕ2ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (2) = 1|βj] 
    ϕ3ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (3) = 1|βj] 
    ϕ4ij = Prob[COER_HIGH (4) = 1|βj] 
    log[ϕ*1ij/(1 - ϕ
*
1ij)] = β0j + β1j*(AC_INVESij) + β2j*(CS_OBJCSij) + β3j*(CS_DESCRij) 
+ β4j*(CS_CASNGij) + β5j*(CS_LKOUTij) + β6j*(CS_CLOTHij) + β7j*(CS_DRGTRij) + 
β8j*(CS_FURTVij) + β9j*(CS_VCRIMij) + β10j*(CS_BULGEij) + β11j*(CS_OTHERij) + 
β12j*(AC_INCIDij) + β13j*(AC_TIMEij)  
    log[ϕ*2ij/(1 - ϕ
*
2ij)] = β0j + β1j*(AC_INVESij) + β2j*(CS_OBJCSij) + β3j*(CS_DESCRij) 
+ β4j*(CS_CASNGij) + β5j*(CS_LKOUTij) + β6j*(CS_CLOTHij) + β7j*(CS_DRGTRij) + 
β8j*(CS_FURTVij) + β9j*(CS_VCRIMij) + β10j*(CS_BULGEij) + β11j*(CS_OTHERij) + 
β12j*(AC_INCIDij) + β13j*(AC_TIMEij) + δ2  
    log[ϕ*3ij/(1 - ϕ
*
3ij)] = β0j + β1j*(AC_INVESij) + β2j*(CS_OBJCSij) + β3j*(CS_DESCRij) 
+ β4j*(CS_CASNGij) + β5j*(CS_LKOUTij) + β6j*(CS_CLOTHij) + β7j*(CS_DRGTRij) + 
β8j*(CS_FURTVij) + β9j*(CS_VCRIMij) + β10j*(CS_BULGEij) + β11j*(CS_OTHERij) + 
β12j*(AC_INCIDij) + β13j*(AC_TIMEij) + δ3  
    log[ϕ*4ij/(1 - ϕ
*
4ij)] = β0j + β1j*(AC_INVESij) + β2j*(CS_OBJCSij) + β3j*(CS_DESCRij) 
 118 
+ β4j*(CS_CASNGij) + β5j*(CS_LKOUTij) + β6j*(CS_CLOTHij) + β7j*(CS_DRGTRij) + 
β8j*(CS_FURTVij) + β9j*(CS_VCRIMij) + β10j*(CS_BULGEij) + β11j*(CS_OTHERij) + 
β12j*(AC_INCIDij) + β13j*(AC_TIMEij) + δ4  
 
Next, intercepts-as-outcomes was represented by the same level-1 random coefficients 
model, while the level-2 model took the form:  
    β0j = γ00 + γ01*(PC_BLACKj) + γ02*(PC_HISPAj) + γ03*(PC_RECENj) + 
γ04*(PC_HHRENj) + γ05*(CDj) + γ06*(CIj) + γ07*(MANHATTAj) + γ08*(BRONXj) + 
γ09*(BROOKLYNj) + γ010*(QUEENSj) + u0j 
 
For the final model, intercepts-and-slopes-as-outcomes, the level-1 random coefficients 
model and the level-2 main effects model stayed the same, while the cross-level model is 
illustrated as: 
    β0j = γ00 + γ01*(PC_BLACKj) + γ02*(PC_HISPAj) + γ03*(PC_RECENj) + 
γ04*(PC_HHRENj)  
         + γ05*(CIj) + γ06*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + γ07*(MANHATTAj) + γ08*(BRONXj)  
         + γ09*(BROOKLYNj) + γ010*(QUEENSj) + u0j 
    β1j = γ10 + u1j 
    β2j = γ20 + γ21*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u2j 
    β3j = γ30 + γ31*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u3j 
    β4j = γ40 + γ41*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u4j 
    β5j = γ50 + γ51*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u5j 
    β6j = γ60 + γ61*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u6j 
    β7j = γ70 + γ71*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u7j 
    β8j = γ80 + γ81*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u8j 
    β9j = γ90 + γ91*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u9j 
    β10j = γ100 + γ101*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u10j 
    β11j = γ110 + γ111*( CDj/WORST_CDj) + u11j 
    β12j = γ120 + u12j 
    β13j = γ130 + u13j 
    δ2    δ3    δ4
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 Before delving into the primary findings, it is important to note that the typical 
stop made by the NYPD consisted of a relatively low level of coercive action used by 
police. In 42% of stops there was no greater coercive action used (i.e., that suspect was 
only stopped) and in 56% of stops the suspect was frisked. Higher levels of coercion (i.e., 
search, use of force, and arrest) occurred at a much lower rate (≤ 20%).  
5.1 Dichotomous Outcomes 
Officer Stops (no greater coercive action used)  
Table 5.1 contains the stop-level effects on officer stops (no greater coercive  
Table 5.1 Stop-Level Effects on Officer Stops (no greater coercive action used)  
 
   Coef.   OR 95% CI             
Intercept -.280
**
 .756 0.740 - 0.772 
Stop-level Effects    
  Carrying suspicious object -.101
**
 .903 0.865 - 0.944 
  Fits a relevant description -.530
**
 .589 0.575 - 0.602 
  Casing a victim or location -.072
**
 .931 0.913 - 0.949 
  Acting as a lookout .082
**
 1.085 1.063 - 1.108 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime -.337
**
 .714 0.691 - 0.738 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction -.238
**
 .789 0.758 - 0.819 
  Furtive movements -.707
**
 .493 0.484 - 0.502 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime -.657
**
 .518 0.505 - 0.532 
  Suspicious bulge -1.542
**
 .214 0.208 - 0.220 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .248
**
 1.282 1.251 - 1.314 
Control variables     
Area under investigation -.112
**
 0.894 0.873 - 0.915 
Area has a high crime incidence .124
**
 1.132 1.112 - 1.153 
Time of day fits crime incidence -.070
**
 0.932 0.916 - 0.949 
N1 = 654,485    
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
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action used). As determined by the random coefficients model, all stop predictors in this 
model were statistically significant (p ≤ .05), meaning that the relationship between each 
stop predictor and being stopped only (no greater coercive action used) varied among 
neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped for carrying a suspicious object, fitting a 
relevant description, casing a victim or location, wearing clothes commonly used in a 
crime, displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive movements, actions of 
engaging in a violent crime, or a suspicious bulge, the odds of receiving no greater 
coercive action decreased; in other words, the suspect was more likely to experience a 
greater level of coercion when stopped for these reasons.  
Regarding inverse effects, when the suspect was stopped for carrying a suspicious 
object, the odds of receiving no greater coercive action were .903 lower, compared to not 
being stopped for carrying a suspicious object. The odds of receiving no greater coercive 
action when the suspect was stopped for fitting a relevant description were .589 lower, 
compared to suspects who were stopped for reasons other than fitting relevant 
description. When the suspect was stopped for casing a victim or location the odds of him 
receiving greater coercive action were .931 lower than if he was not stopped for casing a 
victim or location. Likewise, the odds of a suspect receiving greater coercive action were 
.714 lower when he was stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime. 
Compared to suspects not stopped for displaying actions indicative of a drug 
transaction, suspects who did display these actions had .789 lower odds of receiving no 
greater coercive action. When the suspect was stopped for furtive movements, the odds of 
receiving no greater coercive action were .493 lower than if he was stopped for not 
displaying furtive movements. Similarly, when the suspect was stopped for displaying 
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actions indicative of a violent crime, the odds of receiving no greater coercive action 
were .518 lower, compared to being stopped for other reasons. Lastly, the odds of 
receiving no greater coercive action were .214 lower when the suspect was stopped for a 
suspicious bulge. 
Regarding positive effects, being stopped for acting as a lookout or other 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were both associated with a higher likelihood of 
being stopped, without greater coercive action used. When the suspect was stopped for 
acting as a lookout, his odds of receiving no greater coercive action were 1.085 higher, 
compared to being stopped for another reason. And, when the suspect was stopped for 
other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, his odds of receiving no greater coercive 
action were 1.282 higher, compared to suspects stopped for other reasons. 
In terms of control variables, analyses revealed that a suspect who was 
encountered in a neighborhood that is under investigation (OR = .894) or during time of 
the day that fit the crime incident (OR = .932) lower the odds of receiving no greater 
coercive action. Conversely, when the suspect was stopped in a high crime neighborhood, 
the odds of receiving no greater coercive action were 1.132 higher, compared to suspects 
stopped in low crime neighborhoods.  
 Table 5.2 shows the main and moderating effects on officer stops (no greater 
coercive action used).
20
 In both the concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage
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 Main effects for the concentrated disadvantage and the extreme disadvantage model 
most often revealed the same results on all neighborhood-level predictors, except for 
disadvantage. There were a few cases where the odds ratios for the predictors differed 
between the models. Unless otherwise noted, the differences in neighborhood-level 
variables between the models were less than .003. 
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Table 5.2 Main and Moderating Effects on Officer Stops (no greater coercive action used) 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
      Coef.   OR 95% CI       Coef.  OR    95% CI 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) -.273
**
 .761 0.748 - 0.775 -.273
**
 .761 0.748 - 0.775 
Percent population African-American -.003
**
 .996 0.996 - 0.997 -.004
**
 .996 0.996 - 0.997 
Percent population Hispanic -.003
**
 .997 0.996 - 0.998 -.003
**
 .997 0.996 - 0.998 
Percent population recent mover .003
*
 1.002 1.000 - 1.006 .003
*
 1.003 1.000 - 1.006 
Percent population renters -.002
**
 .998 0.997 - 0.999 -.002
**
 .998 0.997 - 0.999 
  Disadvantage -.023 .977 0.947 - 1.009 -.085
*
 .919 0.862 - 0.980 
  Concentrated immigration -.079
** 
.924 0.905 - 0.945 -.082
** 
.921 0.902 - 0.942 
Control variables       
Manhattan -.150
**
 .861 0.789 - 0.939 -.149
**
 .861 0.790 - 0.939 
Bronx -.355
**
 .701 0.643 - 0.765 -.345
**
 .708 0.648 - 0.774 
Brooklyn -.023 .976 0.902 - 1.057 -.024 .976 0.902 - 1.057 
Queens -.419
**
 .658 0.607 - 0.713 -.412
**
 .662 0.612 - 0.716 
N2 = 2,114       
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
     
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect -.113
** 
.894 0.853 - 0.936 -.100
** 
.905 0.865 - 0.946 
  x Disadvantage .093
**
 1.098 1.055 - 1.142 .156
*
 1.169 1.051 - 1.300 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect -.540
**
 .582 0.569 - 0.597 -.537
**
 .585 0.571 - 0.599 
  x Disadvantage .035
**
 1.040 1.015 - 1.058 .128
**
 1.136 1.071 - 1.206 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect -.091
**
 .913 0.895 - 0.931 -.080
**
 .923 0.905 - 0.941 
  x Disadvantage .094
**
 1.100 1.080 - 1.118 .176
**
 1.192 1.133 - 1.255 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect .070
**
 1.073 1.050 - 1.096 .079
**
 1.082 1.060 - 1.105 
  x Disadvantage .088
**
 1.092 1.072 - 1.113 .169
**
 1.184 1.123 - 1.247 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect -.334
**
 .716 0.690 - 0.744 -.337
**
 .714 0.689 - 0.739 
  x Disadvantage -.009 .991 0.962 - 1.020 .020 1.020 0.947 - 1.099 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect -.261
**
 .770 0.738 - 0.803 -.240
**
 .787 0.756 - 0.820 
  x Disadvantage .157
**
 1.170 1.131 - 1.211 .353
**
 1.424 1.315 - 1.542 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect -.717
**
 .488 0.479 - 0.497 -.718
**
 .488 0.479 - 0.497 
  x Disadvantage -.005 .995 0.980 - 1.010 .018 1.018 0.977 - 1.062 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect -.676
**
 .509 0.495 - 0.523 -.671
**
 .511 0.498 - 0.525 
  x Disadvantage .034
*
 1.034 1.011 - 1.059 .093
*
 1.097 1.031 - 1.167 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect -1.602
**
 .202 0.195 - 0.208 -1.575
**
 .207 0.201 - 0.213 
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  x Disadvantage .120
**
 1.128 1.099 - 1.157 .285
**
 1.329 1.247 - 1.417 
Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect .243
**
 1.274 1.242 - 1.308 .250
**
 1.284 1.252 - 1.317 
  x Disadvantage .057
**
 1.059 1.036 - 1.083 .146
**
 1.157 1.085 - 1.233 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio
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models, results revealed that suspects stopped in neighborhoods with a higher percentage 
of African-Americans, a higher percentage of Hispanics, a higher percentage of 
households that are renter-occupied, or higher levels of concentrated immigration were 
less likely to be stopped with no greater coercive action used. In other words, suspects 
stopped in neighborhoods with these structural features were more likely to experience 
higher levels of coercive action.  
 For the inverse main effects, results revealed that a suspect stopped in a 
neighborhood characterized by a higher percentage of African-Americans had .996 lower 
odds of receiving no greater coercive action; in a neighborhood with a higher percentage 
of Hispanics, the odds of receiving no greater coercive action were about the same (OR = 
.997). When a suspect was stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of renters, 
the odds of receiving no greater coercive action was .998 lower, compared to 
neighborhoods with a higher percentage of home owners. Lastly, suspects stopped in 
neighborhoods with higher levels of concentrated immigration had .924 lower odds of 
receiving no greater coercive action. 
In both the concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models, 
however, the odds of a suspect receiving no greater coercive action were 1.002 higher 
when the suspect was stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of recent 
movers. The effect of disadvantage differed between the models. Concentrated 
disadvantage was not a significant predictor of the suspect receiving no greater coercive 
action, yet suspects encountered in an extremely disadvantaged neighborhood had .919 
lower odds of receiving no greater coercive action. In other words, suspects encountered 
in extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods were more likely to experience greater levels 
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of coercive action when stopped, while suspects stopped in concentrated disadvantaged 
neighborhoods did not impact an officer’s use of coercive action. 
Results for control variables at the neighborhood-level revealed similarities 
between the two models. Compared to Staten Island, a suspect stopped in Manhattan had 
.861 lower odds of receiving no greater coercive action. Likewise, a suspect stopped in 
the Bronx had .701 (.708 for extreme disadvantage model) lower odds of receiving no 
greater coercive action, compared to Staten Island. A suspect who was stopped in Queens 
had .658 (.662 for extreme disadvantage) lower odds of receiving no greater coercive 
action, compared to Staten Island. Brooklyn, however, did not show a statistically 
significant difference from Staten Island.  
 Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and a suspect experiencing no greater coercive action was 
examined. Results revealed significant differences between the concentrated 
disadvantage model and the extreme disadvantage model.  
For the disadvantage model, results revealed that the relationships between being 
stopped for carrying a suspicious object, fitting a relevant description, casing a victim or 
location, displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, displaying actions of 
engaging in a violent crime, or a suspicious bulge and officer stops with no greater 
coercive action used were weakened by the effect of concentrated disadvantage. That is, a 
suspect stopped for these reasons in a disadvantaged neighborhood was more likely to 
experience greater coercive action, compared to suspects stopped for these reasons in an 
affluent neighborhood. However, the relationship between the suspect being stopped for 
acting as a lookout or other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and no greater 
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coercive action used against him were strengthened (amplified) by concentrated 
disadvantage. In other words, when stopped for either of these two reasons in a 
disadvantaged neighborhood, the suspect had a lower likelihood of having greater 
coercive action used against him. 
 The moderating effects for the extremely disadvantaged model revealed that 
suspects face a higher likelihood of having no greater coercive action used against him 
when stopped for carrying a suspicious object, fitting a relevant description, casing a 
victim or location, acting as a lookout, displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, 
displaying actions of engaging in a violent crime, a suspicious bulge, or other reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Suspects stopped for these reasons in extremely 
disadvantaged neighborhoods were less likely to receive greater coercive action, 
compared to suspects stopped in neighborhoods not characterized by extreme 
disadvantage. In both models, disadvantage was not a statistically significant predictor of 
impacting the relationship between a suspect being stopped for wearing clothes 
commonly used in a crime or for displaying furtive movements and the officer only 
stopping the suspect, with no greater coercive action used. 
Frisk 
Table 5.3 contains the stop-level effects on officer frisks. Nine out of ten of the 
stop predictors in this model were statistically significant (p ≤ .05), meaning that the 
relationships between these nine stop predictors and an officer frisking a suspect varied 
across neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped for fitting a relevant description, 
casing a victim or location, wearing clothes commonly used in a crime, displaying 
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actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive movements, actions of engaging in a 
violent crime, or a suspicious bulge, the odds of the suspect being frisked increased.  
Table 5.3 Stop-Level Effects on Officer Frisks 
 
   Coef.  OR 95% CI             
Intercept .190
**
 1.209 1.184 - 1.236 
Stop-level Effects    
  Carrying suspicious object .031 1.032 0.989 - 1.077 
  Fits a relevant description .506
**
 1.659 1.621 - 1.697 
  Casing a victim or location .094
**
 1.098 1.077 - 1.120 
  Acting as a lookout -.067
**
 .936 0.916 - 0.955 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime .347
**
 1.414 1.368 - 1.463 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction .176
**
 1.192 1.146 - 1.240 
  Furtive movements .739
**
 2.095 2.057 - 2.133 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime .666
**
 1.947 1.898 - 1.998 
  Suspicious bulge 1.599
**
 4.947 4.806 - 5.092 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity -.284
**
 .753 0.734 - 0.772 
Control variables     
Area under investigation .125
**
 1.133 1.107 - 1.160 
Area has a high crime incidence -.109
**
 .897 0.881 - 0.913 
Time of day fits crime incidence .086
**
 1.090 1.071 - 1.109 
N1 = 654,485    
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
 
Regarding positive effects, when the suspect was stopped for fitting a relevant 
description, the odds of being frisked were 1.659 higher than suspects who were stopped 
for other reasons. The odds of being frisked when the suspect was stopped for casing a 
victim or location 1.098 higher, compared to suspects who were stopped for reasons other 
than casing a victim or location. When the suspect was stopped for wearing clothes 
commonly used in a crime the odds of him being frisked were 1.414 higher than if he was 
not stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime. Likewise, the odds of a 
suspect being frisked were 1.192 higher when he was stopped for displaying actions 
indicative of a drug transaction. Compared to suspects not stopped for furtive 
movements, suspects who did display these actions had 2.095 higher odds of being 
frisked. When the suspect was stopped for actions of engaging in a violent crime, the 
odds of being frisked were 1.947 higher than if he was stopped for not displaying these 
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actions. Similarly, when the suspect was stopped for a suspicious bulge, the odds of being 
frisked were 4.947 higher, compared to being stopped for other reasons.  
Regarding inverse effects, being stopped for acting as a lookout and other 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were both associated with a lower likelihood of 
being frisked. When the suspect was stopped for acting as a lookout, his odds of being 
frisked were .936 lower, compared to being stopped for another reason. And, when the 
suspect was stopped for other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, his odds of being 
frisked were .753 lower, compared to suspects stopped for other reasons. The suspect 
being stopped for carrying a suspicious object did not have a statistically significant 
effect on officer frisks.  
In terms of control variables, analyses revealed that a suspect who was 
encountered in a neighborhood that is under investigation (OR = 1.133) or during the 
time of the day that fit the crime incident (OR = 1.090) have higher odds of being frisked. 
Conversely, when the suspect was stopped in a high crime neighborhood, the odds of 
being frisked were .897 lower, compared to suspects stopped in low crime 
neighborhoods. 
Table 5.4 shows the main and moderating effects on officer frisks.
21
 In both the 
concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models, results revealed that 
suspects stopped in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of African-Americans, a 
higher percentage of Hispanics, a higher percentage of households that are renter- 
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 Unless otherwise noted, the differences in neighborhood-level predictors between the 
concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models were less than .002. 
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Table 5.4 Main and Moderating Effects on Officer Frisks 
 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
      Coef.  OR 95% CI      Coef.  OR 95% CI 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) .183
**
 1.201 1.179 - 1.223 .183
**
 1.200 1.179 - 1.222 
Percent population African-American .004
**
 1.004 1.003 - 1.005 .004
**
 1.004 1.003 - 1.004 
Percent population Hispanic .004
**
 1.004 1.003 - 1.005 .004
**
 1.004 1.003 - 1.005 
Percent population recent movers -.003
*
 .997 0.994 - 0.999 -.003
*
 .997 0.994 - 0.999 
Percent population renters .002
**
 1.002 1.001 - 1.003 .002
**
 1.002 1.001 - 1.003 
  Disadvantage .009 1.010 0.978 - 1.042 .049 1.050 0.986 - 1.118 
  Concentrated immigration .076
** 
1.079 1.056 - 1.103 .078
** 
1.081 1.058 - 1.105 
Control variables       
Manhattan .060 1.062 0.974 - 1.158 .061 1.063 0.975 - 1.159 
Bronx .313
**
 1.367 1.253 - 1.491 .305
**
 1.356 1.243 - 1.481 
Brooklyn .012 1.012 0.935 - 1.096 .013 1.013 0.936 - 1.097 
Queens .417
**
 1.517 1.399 - 1.645 .415
**
 1.514 1.398 - 1.639 
N2 = 2,114       
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
     
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect .044
 
1.045 0.999 - 1.094 .033
 
1.034 0.989 - 1.080 
  x Disadvantage -.095
**
 .909 0.874 - 0.946 -.176
**
 .839 0.754 - 0.933 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect .518
**
 1.679 1.638 - 1.720 .517
**
 1.676 1.637 - 1.716 
  x Disadvantage -.019 .982 0.962 - 1.002 -.108
**
 .898 0.846 - 0.953 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect .113
**
 1.120 1.098 - 1.142 .102
**
 1.108 1.086 - 1.130 
  x Disadvantage -.095
**
 .909 0.894 - 0.925 -.176
**
 .839 0.796 - 0.883 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect -.055
**
 .946 0.926 - 0.967 -.064
**
 .938 0.919 - 0.958 
  x Disadvantage -.086
**
 .918 0.901 - 0.935 -.161
**
 .851 0.808 - 0.896 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect .346
**
 1.413 1.361 - 1.468 .348
**
 1.416 1.367 - 1.467 
  x Disadvantage .009 1.009 0.979 - 1.040 -.018 .982 0.909 - 1.061 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect .206
**
 1.229 1.178 - 1.282 .183
**
 1.201 1.152 - 1.251 
  x Disadvantage -.166
**
 .847 0.818 - 0.877 -.361
**
 .697 0.643 - 0.756 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect .753
**
 2.124 2.083 - 2.164 .754
**
 2.126 2.087 - 2.166 
  x Disadvantage .015 1.015 0.999 - 1.030 .007 1.007 0.966 - 1.051 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect .685
**
 1.983 1.929 - 2.039 .680
**
 1.974 1.923 - 2.027 
  x Disadvantage -.027
*
 .974 0.951 - 0.997 -.068
*
 .934 0.876 - 0.997 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect 1.677
**
 5.350 5.167 - 5.539 1.650
**
 5.208 5.048 - 5.372 
  x Disadvantage -.105
**
 .900 0.877 - 0.924 -.246
**
 .782 0.733 - 0.834 
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Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect -.277
**
 .758 0.739 - 0.778 -.285
**
 .752 0.733 - 0.772 
  x Disadvantage -.065
**
 .937 0.916 - 0.958 -.164
**
 .849 0.796 - 0.905 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio
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occupied, or higher levels of concentrated immigration were more likely to be frisked, 
compared to suspects stopped in neighborhoods with lower levels of these population. 
For these positive effects, a suspect stopped in a neighborhood characterized by a higher 
percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics had 1.004 higher odds of being frisked. 
When a suspect was stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of renters, the 
odds of being frisked were 1.002 higher, compared to neighborhoods with a higher 
percentage of home owners. Lastly, suspects stopped in neighborhoods with higher levels 
of concentrated immigration had 1.079 higher odds of being frisked. 
Regarding the negative effects, in both the concentrated disadvantage and extreme 
disadvantage models, the odds of a suspect being frisked were .997 lower when the 
suspect was stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of recent movers. The 
effect of concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage was not a statistically 
significant predictor of officer frisks. Results for control variables at the neighborhood- 
level revealed similarities between the two models. Compared to Staten Island, a suspect 
stopped in the Bronx had 1.367 higher odds of being frisked, while suspects stopped in 
Queens had 1.517 higher odds of being frisked. Manhattan and Brooklyn did not reveal a 
statistically significant difference in officer frisks from Staten Island.  
Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and a suspect being frisked was examined. Results revealed 
that the relationship between the suspect being stopped for carrying a suspicious object, 
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fitting a relevant description,
22
 casing a victim or location, acting as a lookout, displaying 
actions indicative of a drug transaction, displaying actions indicative of violent crime, a 
suspicious bulge, or other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and being frisked was 
weakened in disadvantaged and extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods. Neighborhood 
disadvantage, however, did not impact the relationship between officer frisks and the 
suspect being stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime or for being stopped 
for furtive movements.  
Search 
Table 5.5 contains the stop-level effects on officer searches. All of the stop  
Table 5.5 Stop-Level Effects on Officer Searches  
 
   Coef.  OR 95% CI             
Intercept -1.758
**
 0.172 0.171 - 0.174 
Stop-level Effects    
  Carrying suspicious object .536
**
 1.709 1.653 - 1.766 
  Fits a relevant description .307
**
 1.360 1.339 - 1.381 
  Casing a victim or location -.047
**
 .954 0.943 - 0.966 
  Acting as a lookout .018
*
 1.018 1.005 - 1.031 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime .182
**
 1.200 1.172 - 1.229 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction .406
**
 1.501 1.463 - 1.539 
  Furtive movements .126
**
 1.134 1.121 - 1.147 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime .162
**
 1.176 1.155 - 1.197 
  Suspicious bulge .640
**
 1.897 1.842 - 1.952 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .180
**
 1.197 1.178 - 1.216 
Control variables     
Area under investigation .121
**
 1.129 1.112 - 1.146 
Area has a high crime incidence -.055
**
 .947 0.935 - 0.958 
Time of day fits crime incidence -.053
**
 .948 0.938 - 0.959 
N1 = 654,485    
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
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 Concentrated disadvantage did not moderate the relationship between the suspect being 
stopped for fitting a relevant description and being frisked. 
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predictors in this model were statistically significant (p ≤ .05), meaning that the 
relationships between the stop predictors and an officer searching a suspect varied across 
neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped for carrying a suspicious object, fitting a 
relevant description, acting as a lookout, wearing clothes commonly used in a crime, 
displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive movements, actions of 
engaging in a violent crime, a suspicious bulge, or other reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, the odds of the suspect being searched increased.  
Regarding positive effects, when the suspect was stopped for carrying a 
suspicious object, he had 1.709 higher odds of being searched, compared to a suspect 
stopped for another reason. The suspect being stopped for fitting a relevant description 
increased the odds of being searched by 1.36. The odds of being searched when the 
suspect was stopped for acting as a lookout casing was 1.018 higher, compared to 
suspects who were stopped for reasons other than acting as a lookout. When the suspect 
was stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime the odds of him being 
searched were 1.2 higher than if he was stopped for not wearing clothes commonly used 
in a crime. Likewise, the odds of a suspect being searched were 1.501 higher when he 
was stopped for displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction. Compared to suspects 
stopped for not displaying furtive movements, suspects who did display these actions had 
1.134 higher odds of being searched. When the suspect was stopped for actions of 
engaging in a violent crime, the odds of being searched were 1.176 higher than if he was 
stopped for not displaying these actions. Similarly, when the suspect was stopped for a 
suspicious bulge, the odds of being searched were 1.897 higher, compared to being 
stopped for other reasons. Lastly, when the suspect was stopped for other reasonable 
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suspicion of criminal activity, the odds of being searched were 1.197 higher, compared to 
being stopped for another reason. 
Conversely, inverse effects showed that when the suspect was stopped for casing 
a victim or location, his odds of being searched were .954 lower, compared to being 
stopped for another reason. In terms of control variables, analyses revealed that a suspect 
who was stopped in a neighborhood that is under investigation had 1.129 higher odds of 
being searched. On the other hand, when the suspect was stopped in a high crime 
neighborhood (OR = .947) or during the time of the day that fits the crime incident (OR = 
.948), the odds of being searched lowered. 
Table 5.6 shows the main and moderating effects on officer searches.
23
 In both the 
concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models, results revealed that 
suspects stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of African-Americans (OR 
= .999) or a higher percentage of Hispanics (OR = .999) had lower odds of being 
searched, compared to suspects stopped in neighborhoods with lower levels of these 
populations. The effect of concentrated disadvantage was not a statistically significant 
predictor of officer searches, while extreme disadvantage lowered the odds of a suspect 
being searched (OR = .963). All other neighborhood-level predictors were not 
statistically significant predictors of officer searches. 
Results for control variables at the neighborhood-level revealed similarities 
between the two models. Compared to Staten Island, a suspect stopped in Brooklyn had 
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 Main effects for the concentrated disadvantage and the extreme disadvantage model 
most often revealed the same results on all neighborhood-level predictors, except for 
disadvantage. 
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Table 5.6 Main and Moderating Effects on Officer Searches  
 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
      Coef.   OR 95% CI      Coef.  OR 95% CI 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) -1.796
**
 .166 0.164 - 0.168 -1.797
**
 .166 0.164 - 0.167 
Percent population African-American -.001
**
 .999 0.999 - 1.000 -.001
**
 .999 0.998 - 1.000 
Percent population Hispanic -.001
*
 .999 0.999 - 1.000 -.001
*
 .999 0.999 - 0.999 
Percent population recent movers -.001 .999 0.996 - 1.002 -.001 .999 0.996 - 1.002 
Percent population renters .002
1
 1.000 0.999 - 1.001 -.001 .999 0.998 - 1.001 
  Disadvantage .001
1
 1.000 0.963 - 1.039 -.038
*
 .963 0.928 - 0.998 
  Concentrated immigration .010
 
1.010 0.980 - 1.021 .009
 
1.009 0.985 - 1.034 
Control variables       
Manhattan .036 1.037 0.980 - 1.097 .030 1.030 0.974 - 1.090 
Bronx -.032 .968 0.916 - 1.023 -.025 .976 0.923 - 1.032 
Brooklyn -.132
**
 .876 0.834 - 0.921 -.136
**
 .873 0.831 - 0.917 
Queens .152
**
 1.164 1.106 - 1.224 .149
**
 1.160 1.103 - 1.220 
N2 = 2,114       
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
     
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect .585
** 
1.795 1.733 - 1.860 .583
** 
1.791 1.731 - 1.852 
  x Disadvantage -.005 .995 0.964 - 1.028 .043 1.044 0.956 - 1.141 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect .338
**
 1.402 1.378 - 1.425 .333
**
 1.395 1.372 - 1.418 
  x Disadvantage -.043
**
 .958 0.945 - 0.971 -.090
**
 .914 0.880 - 0.949 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect -.071
**
 .931 0.919 - 0.943 -.071
**
 .932 0.920 - 0.943 
  x Disadvantage .010 1.010 0.999 - 1.022 .044
*
 1.045 1.013 - 1.078 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect .054
**
 1.056 1.042 - 1.070 .051
**
 1.053 1.039 - 1.067 
  x Disadvantage -.009 .991 0.979 - 1.003 .026 1.027 0.990 - 1.064 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect .228
**
 1.256 1.223 - 1.290 .223
**
 1.250 1.219 - 1.282 
  x Disadvantage -.035
**
 .966 0.946 - 0.987 -.128
**
 .880 0.835 - 0.927 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect .455
**
 1.576 1.531 - 1.621 .452
**
 1.572 1.531 - 1.614 
  x Disadvantage -.016 .984 0.962 - 1.007 -.054
*
 .947 0.897 - 1.000 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect .119
**
 1.126 1.112 - 1.140 .114
**
 1.120 1.107 - 1.134 
  x Disadvantage -.050
**
 .952 0.941 - 0.962 -.126
**
 .881 0.857 - 0.906 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect .211
**
 1.235 1.211 - 1.260 .216
**
 1.241 1.219 - 1.264 
  x Disadvantage .026
*
 1.026 1.009 - 1.043 .081
**
 1.084 1.036 - 1.135 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect .759
**
 2.136 2.057 - 2.218 .719
**
 2.051 1.988 - 2.117 
  x Disadvantage -.120
**
 .887 0.862 - 0.913 -.210
**
 .811 0.767 - 0.857 
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Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect .212
**
 1.236 1.214 - 1.257 .217
**
 1.242 1.222 - 1.263 
  x Disadvantage .034
**
 1.035 1.020 - 1.050 .085
**
 1.089 1.045 - 1.134 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio; 1 = coefficients have been multiplied by 10. 
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.876 (.973 for extreme disadvantage model) lower odds of being searched, while suspects 
stopped in Queens had 1.164 higher odds of being searched. Manhattan and the Bronx 
did not reveal a statistically significant difference in officer searches from Staten Island.  
Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and a suspect being searched was examined. Results 
revealed that the relationship between the suspect being stopped for fitting a relevant 
description, wearing clothes commonly used in a crime, furtive movements, or a 
suspicious bulge and being searched was weakened in disadvantaged and extremely 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
On the contrary, neighborhood disadvantage strengthened the relationship 
between a suspect being search and a suspect being stopped for casing a victim or 
location, displaying actions indicative of a violent crime, or other reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. Neighborhood disadvantage, however, did not impact the relationship 
between officer searches and the suspect being stopped for carrying a suspicious object, 
acting as a lookout, or displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction. 
Use of Force 
Table 5.7 contains the stop-level effects on officer use of force. Nine out of ten of 
the stop predictors in this model were statistically significant (p ≤ .05), meaning that the 
relationships between these nine stop predictors and an officer using force against a 
suspect varied across neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped for carrying a 
suspicious object, fitting a relevant description, casing a victim or location, wearing 
clothes commonly used in a crime, displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, 
furtive movements, actions of engaging in a violent crime, a suspicious bulge, or other  
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Table 5.7 Stop-Level Effects on Officer Use of Force  
 
   Coef.  OR 95% CI             
Intercept -1.289
**
 .276 0.271 - 0.281 
Stop-level Effects    
  Carrying suspicious object .152
**
 1.164 1.127 - 1.203 
  Fits a relevant description .306
**
 1.358 1.334 - 1.383 
  Casing a victim or location .058
**
 1.059 1.043 - 1.076 
  Acting as a lookout .003 1.003 0.988 - 1.018 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime .204
**
 1.226 1.187 - 1.267 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction .156
**
 1.169 1.138 - 1.201 
  Furtive movements .302
**
 1.353 1.332 - 1.374 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime .398
**
 1.490 1.454 - 1.526 
  Suspicious bulge .691
**
 1.995 1.935 - 2.058 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .041
**
 1.041 1.022 - 1.061 
Control variables     
Area under investigation .123
**
 1.130 1.107 - 1.154 
Area has a high crime incidence -.042
**
 .959 0.944 - 0.974 
Time of day fits crime incidence -.020
*
 .980 0.965 - 0.996 
N1 = 654,485    
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the odds of the suspect having force used 
against him increased.  
Regarding positive effects, when the suspect was stopped for carrying a 
suspicious object, the odds of the officer using force against the suspect was 1.164 higher 
than if he was stopped for another reason. When the suspect was stopped for fitting a 
relevant description, the odds of having force used against him were 1.358 higher than 
suspects who were stopped for other reasons. The odds of being the recipient of police 
use of force when stopped for casing a victim or location were 1.059 higher, compared to 
suspects who were stopped for reasons other than casing a victim or location. When the 
suspect was stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime the odds of him 
having force used against him were 1.226 higher than if he was not stopped for wearing 
clothes commonly used in a crime. Likewise, the odds of a suspect having force used 
against him were 1.169 higher when he was stopped for displaying actions indicative of a 
drug transaction. Compared to suspects not stopped for furtive movements, suspects who 
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did display these actions had 1.353 higher odds of having force used against him. When 
the suspect was stopped for actions of engaging in a violent crime, the odds of having 
force used against him were 1.49 higher than if he was stopped for other reasons. 
Compared to suspects not stopped for a suspicious bulge, suspects who did display these 
actions had 1.995 higher odds of having force used against him. When the suspect was 
stopped for other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the odds of being the recipient 
of police use of force were 1.041 higher, compared to being stopped for other reasons.  
The suspect being stopped for acting as a lookout did not have a statistically 
significant effect on officer use of force. In terms of control variables, analyses revealed 
that a suspect who was encountered in a neighborhood that is under investigation have 
1.130 higher odds of having force used against him. When the suspect was stopped in a 
high crime area (.959) or during the time of the day that fit the crime incident (.980) he 
has lower odds of being the recipient of police use of force.  
 Table 5.8 shows the main and moderating effects on officer use of force.
24
 In both 
the concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models, results revealed that 
suspects stopped in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of African-Americans, a 
higher percentage of Hispanics, or higher levels of concentrated immigration were more 
likely to have force used against them, compared to suspects stopped in neighborhoods 
with lower levels of these populations.  
                                                 
 
24
 Main effects for the concentrated disadvantage and the extreme disadvantage model 
most often revealed the same results on all neighborhood-level predictors, except for 
disadvantage. There were a few cases where the odds ratios for the predictors differed 
between the models. Unless otherwise noted, the differences in neighborhood-level 
variables between the models were less than .002. 
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Table 5.8 Main and Moderating Effects on Officer Use of Force  
 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
      Coef.   OR 95% CI      Coef.  OR 95% CI 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) -1.319
**
 .267 0.263 - 0.272 -1.319
**
 .267 0.263 - 0.272 
Percent population African-American .004
**
 1.004 1.004 - 1.005 .004
**
 1.004 1.003 - 1.005 
Percent population Hispanic .005
**
 1.005 1.004 - 1.006 .004
**
 1.004 1.003 - 1.005 
Percent population recent movers .001 1.001 0.998 - 1.003 .001 1.001 0.999 - 1.004 
Percent population renters -.001 .999 0.998 - 1.000 -.001
*
 .999 0.998 - 1.000 
  Disadvantage -.035
*
 .966 0.935 - 0.998 .011 1.012 0.942 - 1.086 
  Concentrated immigration .099
** 
1.104 1.084 - 1.124 .097
** 
1.102 1.083 - 1.122 
Control variables       
Manhattan .217
**
 1.242 1.152 - 1.339 .233
**
 1.263 1.173 - 1.360 
Bronx .293
**
 1.340 1.238 - 1.452 .275
**
 1.316 1.215 - 1.426 
Brooklyn -.104
*
 .901 0.844 - 0.962 -.095
*
 .909 0.852 - 0.970 
Queens -.044 .957 0.897 - 1.022 -.025 .975 0.916 - 1.039 
N2 = 2,114       
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
     
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect .163
** 
1.177 1.136 - 1.218 .157
** 
1.170 1.132 - 1.210 
  x Disadvantage -.038
*
 .963 0.933 - 0.994 -.093
*
 .911 0.833 - 0.998 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect .321
**
 1.378 1.352 - 1.405 .317
**
 1.373 1.347 - 1.399 
  x Disadvantage -.031
**
 .969 0.953 - 0.985 -.108
**
 .897 0.857 - 0.939 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect .074
**
 1.077 1.059 - 1.094 .070
**
 1.072 1.055 - 1.089 
  x Disadvantage -.030
**
 .970 0.956 - 0.985 -.060
*
 .942 0.899 - 0.987 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect .015 1.015 0.999 - 1.031 .012 1.012 0.996 - 1.027 
  x Disadvantage -.021
*
 .979 0.966 - 0.993 -.025 .976 0.937 - 1.016 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect .216
**
 1.241 1.199 - 1.285 .217
**
 1.242 1.201 - 1.284 
  x Disadvantage -.001 .999 0.971 - 1.028 .011 1.011 0.931 - 1.098 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect .192
**
 1.211 1.176 - 1.247 .180
**
 1.197 1.164 - 1.231 
  x Disadvantage -.076
**
 .927 0.905 - 0.949 -.187
**
 .830 0.781 - 0.882 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect .316
**
 1.371 1.349 - 1.394 .314
**
 1.369 1.347 - 1.391 
  x Disadvantage -.025
**
 .975 0.961 - 0.990 -.070
**
 .933 0.896 - 0.971 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect .395
**
 1.484 1.447 - 1.522 .404
**
 1.498 1.462 - 1.535 
  x Disadvantage .042
**
 1.043 1.020 - 1.067 .075
*
 1.078 1.010 - 1.151 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect .721
**
 2.057 1.982 - 2.136 .715
**
 2.045 1.979 - 2.113 
  x Disadvantage -.049
**
 .952 0.925 - 0.980 -.178
**
 .837 0.783 - 0.894 
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Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect .030
*
 1.030 1.010 - 1.051 .030
*
 1.030 1.011 - 1.050 
  x Disadvantage -.020
*
 .981 0.964 - 0.998 -.099
**
 .906 0.862 - 0.952 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
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Regarding positive effects, a suspect stopped in a neighborhood characterized by 
a higher percentage of African-Americans had 1.004 higher odds of being the recipient of 
force and in a Hispanic neighborhood, the odds were 1.005 higher. When a suspect was 
stopped in a neighborhood with higher levels of concentrated immigration, his odds of 
having force used against him increased by 1.104 compared to neighborhoods with lower 
levels of concentrated immigration. Inverse effects were also apparent. In the 
concentrated disadvantage model, a suspect stopped in a more disadvantaged area had 
.966 lower odds of having force used against him, while the effect of was not significant 
in the extreme disadvantage model. Further, the suspect being stopped in a neighborhood 
characterized by higher percentages of recent movers or renters did not impact an 
officer’s use of force in either the concentrated disadvantage or extreme disadvantage 
models. 
Results for control variables at the neighborhood-level revealed similarities 
between the two models. Compared to Staten Island, a suspect stopped in Manhattan had 
1.242 (1.263 for extreme disadvantage model) higher odds of having force used against 
him, while suspects stopped in the Bronx had 1.34 (1.316 for extreme disadvantage 
model) higher odds of having force used against him. Suspects stopped in Brooklyn had 
.901 (.909 in extreme disadvantage model) lower odds of being the recipient of police use 
of force, compared to Staten Island. Queens did not reveal a statistically significant 
difference in officer use of force from Staten Island.  
 Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and a suspect being the recipient of police use of force was 
examined. Results revealed that the relationship between the suspect being stopped for 
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carrying a suspicious object, fitting a relevant description, casing a victim or location, 
acting as a lookout,
25
 displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, or a suspicious 
bulge and being the recipient of police use of force was weakened in disadvantaged and 
extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
On the contrary, neighborhood disadvantage strengthened the relationship 
between a suspect being the recipient of police use of force and a suspect being stopped 
for displaying actions indicative of a violent crime. Neighborhood disadvantage, 
however, did not impact the relationship between police use of force and the suspect 
being stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime.  
Arrest 
Table 5.9 contains the stop-level effects on officer arrests. Eight out of ten of the  
Table 5.9 Stop-Level Effects on Officer Arrests  
 
   Coef.  OR 95% CI             
Intercept -1.873
**
 .154 (0.152,0.155) 
Stop-level Effects    
  Carrying suspicious object .562
**
 1.755 (1.699,1.813) 
  Fits a relevant description .382
**
 1.465 (1.442,1.488) 
  Casing a victim or location -.028
**
 .973 (0.963,0.982) 
  Acting as a lookout .008 1.008 (0.999,1.017) 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime .119
**
 1.126 (1.106,1.147) 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction .526
**
 1.693 (1.647,1.740) 
  Furtive movements -.002 .998 (0.989,1.006) 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime .145
**
 1.157 (1.141,1.173) 
  Suspicious bulge .132
**
 1.142 (1.123,1.160) 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .238
**
 1.269 (1.251,1.287) 
Control variables     
Area under investigation .061
**
 1.063 (1.050,1.076) 
Area has a high crime incidence -.069
**
 .933 (0.925,0.941) 
Time of day fits crime incidence .012
*
 1.012 (1.003,1.020) 
N1 = 654,485    
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
                                                 
 
25
 The relationship between the suspect acting as a lookout and being the recipient of 
police use of force was not moderated by extreme disadvantage. 
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stop predictors in this model were statistically significant (p ≤ .05), meaning that the 
relationships between these eight stop predictors and an officer arresting a suspect varied 
across neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped for carrying a suspicious object, 
fitting a relevant description, wearing clothes commonly used in a crime, displaying 
actions indicative of a drug transaction, displaying actions of engaging in a violent crime, 
a suspicious bulge, or other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the odds of the 
suspect being arrested increased.  
Regarding positive effects, when the suspect was stopped for carrying a 
suspicious object, the odds of being arrested were 1.755 higher than suspects who were 
stopped for other reasons. The odds of being arrested when the suspect was stopped for 
fitting a relevant description were 1.465 higher, compared to suspects who were stopped 
for reasons other than fitting a relevant description. When the suspect was stopped for 
wearing clothes commonly used in a crime the odds of him being arrested were 1.126 
higher than if he was not stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime. 
Likewise, the odds of a suspect being arrested were 1.693 higher when he was stopped 
for displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction. When the suspect was stopped for 
actions of engaging in a violent crime, the odds of being arrested were 1.157 higher than 
if he was stopped for not displaying these actions. Similarly, when the suspect was 
stopped for a suspicious bulge, the odds of being arrested were 1.142 higher, compared to 
being stopped for other reasons. And, the odds of a suspect being arrested were 1.269 
higher when he was stopped for other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  
Conversely, inverse effects showed that when the suspect was stopped for casing 
a victim or location, his odds of being arrested were .973 lower, compared to being 
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stopped for reasons other than casing a victim or location. The suspect being stopped for 
acting as a lookout and furtive movements did not have a statistically significant effect on 
officer arrests.  
In terms of control variables, analyses revealed that a suspect who was 
encountered in a neighborhood that is under investigation (OR = 1.063) or during the 
time of the day that fit the crime incident (OR = 1.012) had higher odds of being arrested. 
However, when the suspect was stopped in a high crime neighborhood, the odds of being 
arrested were .993 lower, compared to suspects stopped in low crime neighborhoods.  
 Table 5.10 shows the main and moderating effects on officer arrests. In both the 
concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models, results revealed that 
suspects stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of African-Americans or a 
higher percentage of Hispanics were less likely to be arrested, compared to suspects 
stopped in a neighborhood with lower levels of these populations. A suspect stopped in a 
neighborhood characterized by a higher percentage of African-Americans had .999 lower 
odds of being arrested and suspect stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage of 
Hispanics had .998 lower odds of being arrested. A suspect stopped in neighborhoods 
with higher percentages of recent movers, renters, or higher levels of concentrated 
immigration did not significantly impact an officer’s decision to arrest.  
In the concentrated disadvantage model, disadvantage was a statistically 
significant predictor of officer arrests; suspects stopped in disadvantaged neighborhoods 
had 1.030 higher odds of being arrested, compared to suspects stopped in more affluent 
areas. Extreme disadvantage, however, was not a statistically significant predictor of 
officer arrests; differences in an officer’s decision to arrest a suspect in an extremely 
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Table 5.10 Main and Moderating Effects on Officer Arrests  
 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
      Coef.   OR 95% CI      Coef.  OR 95% CI 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) -1.919
**
 .147 0.146 - 0.148 -1.918
**
 .147 0.146 - 0.148 
Percent population African-American -.001
**
 .999 0.998 - 0.999 -.001
**
 .999 0.999 - 0.999 
Percent population Hispanic -.002
**
 .998 0.997 - 0.999 -.002
**
 .998 0.998 - 0.999 
Percent population recent movers -.001 .999 0.998 - 1.001 -.001 .999 0.998 - 1.001 
Percent population renters .004
1
 1.000 0.999 - 1.000 .001
1
 1.000 0.999 - 1.000 
  Disadvantage .029
*
 1.030 1.010 - 1.051 .018 1.018 0.979 - 1.058 
  Concentrated immigration -.009
 
.991 0.979 - 1.002 -.008
 
.993 0.981 - 1.004 
Control variables       
Manhattan .207
**
 1.230 1.164 - 1.299 .193
**
 1.213 1.149 - 1.281 
Bronx .076
*
 1.079 1.024 - 1.137 .083
*
 1.087 1.031 - 1.146 
Brooklyn -.012 .988 0.943 - 1.034 -.019 .981 0.938 - 1.027 
Queens .171
**
 1.187 1.133 - 1.244 .157
**
 1.169 1.117 - 1.224 
N2 = 2,114       
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
     
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect .610
** 
1.841 1.780 - 1.905 .610
** 
1.841 1.781 - 1.902 
  x Disadvantage .029 1.029 0.997 - 1.062 .133
*
 1.142 1.040 - 1.253 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect .427
**
 1.533 1.508 - 1.558 .424
**
 1.528 1.504 - 1.553 
  x Disadvantage -.061
**
 .940 0.928 - 0.953 -.159
**
 .853 0.821 - 0.887 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect -.050
**
 .951 0.941 - 0.962 -.049
**
 .952 0.942 - 0.962 
  x Disadvantage -.004 .996 0.986 - 1.005 .011 1.011 0.984 - 1.038 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect .043
**
 1.044 1.033 - 1.054 .042
**
 1.043 1.033 - 1.053 
  x Disadvantage -.027
**
 .973 0.965 - 0.982 -.053
**
 .948 0.924 - 0.973 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect .159
**
 1.172 1.148 - 1.197 .159
**
 1.173 1.150 - 1.196 
  x Disadvantage -.018
*
 .982 0.967 - 0.997 -.055
*
 .946 0.912 - 0.982 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect .591
**
 1.806 1.753 - 1.861 .590
**
 1.805 1.755 - 1.856 
  x Disadvantage .009 1.009 0.985 - 1.033 .020 1.020 0.957 - 1.088 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect -.018
**
 .982 0.973 - 0.991 -.019
**
 .981 0.973 - 0.990 
  x Disadvantage -.033
**
 .968 0.959 - 0.976 -.070
**
 .933 0.911 - 0.955 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect .178
**
 1.194 1.176 - 1.213 .177
**
 1.194 1.177 - 1.211 
  x Disadvantage -.030
**
 .970 0.958 - 0.983 -.068
**
 .934 0.904 - 0.965 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect .155
**
 1.167 1.142 - 1.193 .141
**
 1.151 1.130 - 1.173 
  x Disadvantage -.084
**
 .919 0.906 - 0.933 -.178
**
 .837 0.811 - 0.863 
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Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect .269
**
 1.308 1.289 - 1.328 .282
**
 1.326 1.307 - 1.345 
  x Disadvantage .063
**
 1.065 1.051 - 1.079 .143
**
 1.153 1.108 - 1.201 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio; 1 = coefficient has been multiplied by 10. 
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disadvantaged neighborhood and a less disadvantaged neighborhood were not apparent. 
Results for control variables at the neighborhood-level revealed similarities between the 
two models. Compared to Staten Island, a suspect stopped in Manhattan had 1.23 (1.213 
for extreme disadvantage model) higher odds of being arrested. Likewise, suspects 
stopped in the Bronx had 1.079 higher odds of being arrested and suspects stopped in 
Queens had 1.187 (1.169 for extreme disadvantage model) higher odds of being arrested, 
compared to suspects stopped in Staten Island. Brooklyn did not reveal a statistically 
significant difference in officer arrests from Staten Island.  
 Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and a suspect being arrested was examined. Results revealed 
that the relationship between the suspect being stopped for fitting a relevant description, 
acting as a lookout, wearing clothes commonly used in a crime, furtive movements, 
displaying action indicative of a violent crime, or a suspicious bulge and being arrested 
was weakened in disadvantaged and extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
On the contrary, neighborhood disadvantage strengthened the relationship 
between a suspect being arrested and a suspect being stopped for other reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Also, extreme disadvantage strengthened the relationship 
between a suspect being arrested and a suspect being stopped for carrying a suspicious 
object. Concentrated disadvantage did not moderate the relationship between a suspect 
being arrested and a suspect being stopped for carrying a suspicious object, while neither 
concentrated disadvantage or extreme disadvantage moderated the relationship between a 
suspect being arrested and the suspect being stopped for casing a victim or location, or 
being stopped for displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction.  
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5.2 Coercive Action Continuum 
Table 5.11 contains the stop-level effects on the coercive action continuum. All of  
Table 5.11 Stop-Level Effects on Coercive Action Continuum  
 
   Coef.  (SE) 
Intercept 3.040
**
 (.01) 
Stop-level Effects  (.05) 
  Carrying suspicious object 1.186
**
 (.02) 
  Fits a relevant description 1.022
**
 (.01) 
  Casing a victim or location -.116
**
 (.01) 
  Acting as a lookout -.156
**
 (.03) 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime .278
**
 (.04) 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction 1.017
**
 (.01) 
  Furtive movements .525
**
 (.02) 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime .639
**
 (.03) 
  Suspicious bulge 1.379
**
 (.02) 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .329
**
 (.01) 
Control variables    
Area under investigation .190
**
 (.02) 
Area has a high crime incidence -.230
**
 (.01) 
Time of day fits crime incidence -.059
**
 (.01) 
N1 = 654,485   
   
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05 
 
the stop predictors in this model were statistically significant (p ≤ .05), meaning that the 
relationships between the stop predictors and an officer’s decision to use coercion varied 
across neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped for carrying a suspicious object, 
fitting a relevant description, wearing clothes commonly used in a crime, displaying 
actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive movements, displaying actions of 
engaging in a violent crime, a suspicious bulge, or other reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, his likelihood of receiving higher levels of coercive action increased.  
Regarding positive effects, the suspect being stopped for carrying a suspicious 
object was associated with a 1.19 unit increase in the coercive action used against him. 
The coercive action used against a suspect when stopped for fitting a relevant description 
increased by 1.02 units. When the suspect was stopped for wearing clothes commonly 
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used in a crime, he was .28 units higher on the coercive action continuum. Likewise, the 
suspect being stopped for displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction was 
associated with a 1.02 unit increase in the coercive action used against him. The coercive 
action used against a suspect when stopped for furtive movements increased by .53 units. 
When the suspect was stopped for displaying actions indicative of violent crime, he was 
.64 units higher on the coercive action continuum. The suspect being stopped for a 
suspicious bulge was associated with a 1.38 unit increase in the coercive action used 
against him. And, when the suspect was stopped for other reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, he was .33 units higher on the coercive action continuum.  
Conversely, inverse effects showed that being stopped for casing a victim or 
location or acting as a lookout was associated with a decrease in the amount of coercive 
action he received. When the suspect was stopped for casing a victim or location, he was 
.12 units lower on the coercive action continuum. Lastly, when the suspect was stopped 
for acting as a lookout, he was .16 units lower on the coercive action continuum.  
In terms of control variables, analyses revealed that a suspect who was 
encountered in a neighborhood that is under investigation has a higher likelihood of 
receiving greater coercive action (.19 unit increase). However, the suspect being stopped 
in a high crime neighborhood (-.23) or during the time of the day that fit the crime 
incident (-.059) was associated with a reduction in the coercive action used against him.   
 Table 5.12 shows the main and moderating effects on the coercive action 
continuum. In both the concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage models, 
results revealed a positive association between suspects being stopped in a neighborhood 
with a higher percentage of African-Americans, a higher percentage of Hispanics, or 
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Table 5.12 Main and Moderating Effects on Coercive Action Continuum 
 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE) 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) 3.021
**
 (.01) 3.021
**
 (.01) 
Percent population African-American .002
**
 (.001) .002
**
 (.0004) 
Percent population Hispanic .002
*
 (.001) .002
*
 (.0006) 
Percent population recent movers -.002 (.002) -.003 (.002) 
Percent population renters .001 (.001) .001 (.0007) 
  Disadvantage .036 (.02) .181
**
 (.05) 
  Concentrated immigration .096
** 
(.01) .102
** 
(.01) 
Control variables     
Manhattan .328
**
 (.06) .331
**
 (.06) 
Bronx .332
**
 (.06) .302
**
 (.06) 
Brooklyn -.194
**
 (.05) -.191
**
 (.05) 
Queens .236
**
 (.05) .226
**
 (.05) 
N2 = 2,114     
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
   
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect 1.197
** 
(.05) 1.193
** 
(.05) 
  x Disadvantage .004 (.05) .206 (.14) 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect 1.058
**
 (.02) 1.044
**
 (.02) 
  x Disadvantage -.148
**
 (.02) -.398
**
 (.05) 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect -.105
**
 (.01) -.113
**
 (.01) 
  x Disadvantage -.058
**
 (.01) -.095
*
 (.04) 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect -.139
**
 (.01) -.151
**
 (.01) 
  x Disadvantage -.065
**
 (.01) -.078
*
 (.03) 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect .301
**
 (.03) .290
**
 (.03) 
  x Disadvantage -.073
*
 (.02) -.165
*
 (.06) 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect 1.053
**
 (.04) 1.037
**
 (.04) 
  x Disadvantage -.132
**
 (.04) -.313
**
 (.08) 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect .539
**
 (.01) .533
**
 (.01) 
  x Disadvantage -.064
**
 (.01) -.156
**
 (.03) 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect .642
**
 (.02) .642
**
 (.02) 
  x Disadvantage -.016 (.02) -.020 (.05) 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect 1.482
**
 (.04) 1.420
**
 (.03) 
  x Disadvantage -.241
**
 (.03) -.553
**
 (.05) 
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Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect .325
**
 (.02) .332
**
 (.02) 
  x Disadvantage .053
*
 (.02) .078 (.06) 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05 
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higher levels of concentrated immigration and greater coercive action. For every one 
percent increase in African-American population or Hispanic population, the suspect’s 
likelihood of receiving greater levels of coercive action increases by .002 units. Similarly, 
for every one unit increase in concentrated immigration, the suspect’s likelihood of 
receiving greater levels of coercive action increases by .10 units.  In both models, a 
suspect stopped in neighborhoods with higher percentages of recent movers or renters did 
not significantly impact an officer’s decision to use coercion.  
In the concentrated disadvantage model, disadvantage was not a statistically 
significant predictor of officer use of coercion. However, suspects who were encountered 
in extremely disadvantage neighborhoods had a higher likelihood of receiving greater 
levels of coercive action (.18 unit increase). Results for control variables at the 
neighborhood-level revealed similarities between the two models. Compared to Staten 
Island, a suspect stopped in Manhattan was associated with a .33 unit increase in the 
coercive action continuum; suspects stopped in the Bronx increased the level of coercion 
by .33 units (.30 for extreme disadvantage model); and suspects stopped in Queens 
increased the level of coercion by .23 units. Suspects encountered in Brooklyn, however, 
were associated with a .19 unit decrease in the coercive action continuum. Compared to 
Staten Island, officers in Brooklyn use less serious forms of coercive action when 
stopping a suspect. 
Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and the coercive action continuum was examined. Results 
revealed that the relationship between the suspect being stopped for fitting a relevant 
description, casing a victim or location, acting as a lookout, wearing clothes commonly 
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used in a crime, displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive movements, or 
a suspicious bulge and receiving greater levels of coercive action was weakened in 
disadvantaged and extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
On the contrary, concentrated disadvantage strengthened the relationship between 
a suspect receiving greater levels of coercive action and a suspect being stopped for other 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Neighborhood disadvantage did not moderate 
the relationship between a suspect receiving greater levels of coercive action and the 
suspect being stopped for carrying a suspicious object or displaying actions indicative of 
a violent crime. Further, extreme disadvantage did not moderate the relationship between 
a suspect receiving greater levels of coercive action and the suspect being stopped for 
other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  
5.3 Highest Level of Coercive Action Used 
Table 5.13 contains the stop-level effects on the highest level of coercion used 
outcome. Nine out of ten of the stop predictors in this model were statistically significant 
(p ≤ .05), meaning that the relationships between these nine stop predictors and an 
officer’s level of coercion varied across neighborhoods. When the suspect was stopped 
for carrying a suspicious object, fitting a relevant description, wearing clothes commonly 
used in a crime, displaying actions indicative of a drug transaction, furtive movements, 
displaying actions of engaging in a violent crime, or a suspicious bulge, the odds of the 
suspect being in a higher category of coercive action used against him decreased.  
When the suspect was stopped for carrying a suspicious object, the odds of being 
in a higher category of coercion were .641 lower than suspects who were stopped for 
other reasons. The odds of being in a higher category of coercion when the suspect was  
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Table 5.13 Stop-Level Effects on Highest Level of Coercion Used Ordinal Outcome 
 
   Coef.  OR  95% CI             
Intercept -.333
**
 .717 0.698 - 0.736 
Stop-level Effects    
  Carrying suspicious object -.444
**
 .641 0.605 - 0.680 
  Fits a relevant description -.658
**
 .518 0.505 - 0.531 
  Casing a victim or location -.019 .981 0.962 - 1.001 
  Acting as a lookout .102
**
 1.107 1.084 - 1.131 
  Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime -.321
**
 .725 0.701 - 0.750 
  Actions indicative of a drug transaction -.491
**
 .612 0.583 - 0.642 
  Furtive movements -.648
**
 .523 0.513 - 0.534 
  Actions of engaging in violent crime -.626
**
 .535 0.522 - 0.548 
  Suspicious bulge -1.288
**
 .276 0.268 - 0.284 
  Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .123
**
 1.131 1.099 - 1.164 
Control variables     
Area under investigation -.138
**
 .871 0.850 - 0.892 
Area has a high crime incidence .163
**
 1.177 1.154 - 1.200 
Time of day fits crime incidence -.021
*
 .979 0.961 - 0.997 
Thresholds    
δ2 1.570
**
 4.808 4.660 - 4.961 
δ3 1.729
**
 5.633 5.445 - 5.828 
δ4 3.478
**
 32.403 30.234 - 34.727 
N1 = 654,485    
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05. OR = Odds Ratio 
 
stopped for fitting a relevant description were .518 lower, compared to suspects who 
were stopped for reasons other than fitting a relevant description. When the suspect was 
stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a crime the odds of him being in a higher 
category of coercion were .725 lower than if he was not stopped for wearing clothes 
commonly used in a crime. Likewise, the odds of a suspect being in a higher category of 
coercion were .612 lower when he was stopped for displaying actions indicative of a drug 
transaction. When the suspect was stopped for furtive movements, the odds of him being 
in a higher category of coercion were .523 lower, compared to being stopped for other 
reasons. When the suspect was stopped for displaying actions of engaging in a violent 
crime, the odds of being in a higher category of coercion were .535 lower than if he was 
stopped for not displaying these actions. Similarly, when the suspect was stopped for a 
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suspicious bulge, the odds of being in a higher category of coercion were .276 lower, 
compared to being stopped for other reasons.  
Conversely, when the suspect was stopped for acting as a lookout, his odds of 
being in a higher category of coercion were 1.107 higher, compared to being stopped for 
reasons other than acting as a lookout. And, the odds of a suspect being in a higher 
category of coercion were 1.131 higher when he was stopped for other reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The suspect being stopped for casing a victim or location 
did not have a statistically significant effect on the ordinal outcome. In terms of control 
variables, analyses revealed that a suspect who was encountered in a neighborhood that is 
under investigation (OR = .871) or during the time of the day that fit the crime incident 
(OR = .979) had lower odds of being in a higher category of coercion. However, when 
the suspect was stopped in a high crime neighborhood, the odds of being in a higher 
category of coercion were 1.177 higher, compared to suspects stopped in low crime 
neighborhoods.  
 Table 5.14 shows the main and moderating effects on the highest level of coercion 
used outcome.
 26
 In both the concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage 
models, results revealed that suspects stopped in a neighborhood with a higher percentage 
of African-Americans, a higher percentage of Hispanics, or higher levels of concentrated 
immigration were less likely to be in a higher category of coercion, compared to suspects 
                                                 
 
26
 Main effects for the concentrated disadvantage and the extreme disadvantage model 
most often revealed the same results on all neighborhood-level predictors. There were a 
few cases where the odds ratios for the predictors differed between the models. Unless 
otherwise noted, the differences in neighborhood-level variables between the models 
were less than .001. 
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Table 5.14 Main and Moderating Effects on Highest Level of Coercion Used Ordinal Outcome 
 
 Concentrated Disadvantage Model Extreme Disadvantage Model 
      Coef.  OR 95% CI      Coef.  OR 95% CI 
Stop-level Main Effects (intercept as outcome) -.317
**
 .728 .712 - 0.745 -.317
**
 .728 0.712 - 0.745 
Percent population African-American -.004
**
 .996 .995 - 0.997 -.004
**
 .996 0.996 - 0.997 
Percent population Hispanic -.004
**
 .996 .995 - 0.997 -.003
**
 .997 0.996 - 0.998 
Percent population recent movers .002 1.002 .999 - 1.005 .002 1.002 0.999 - 1.004 
Percent population renters -.001 .999 .998 - 1.000 .003
1 
1.000 0.999 - 1.001 
  Disadvantage .027 1.028 .994 - 1.062 .026 1.026 0.962 - 1.094 
  Concentrated immigration -.109
** 
.897 .877 - 0.917 -.107
** 
.898 0.879 - 0.919 
Control variables       
Manhattan -.179
**
 .836 .757 - 0.924 -.189
**
 .827 0.750 - 0.913 
Bronx -.276
**
 .759 .688 - 0.836 -.272
**
 .762 0.691 - 0.840 
Brooklyn .148
**
 1.159 1.061 - 1.266 .142
*
 1.152 1.056 - 1.258 
Queens -.203
**
 .816 .748 - 0.892 -.216
**
 .805 0.739 - 0.878 
N2 = 2,114       
Neighborhood-level Moderating Effects (slopes and 
intercepts as outcome)  
     
Level-1 Carrying suspicious object Effect -.458
** 
.633 0.595 - 0.673 -.447
** 
.640 0.603 - 0.679 
  x Disadvantage .067
*
 1.069 1.012 - 1.131 .031 1.031 0.884 - 1.203 
Level-1 Fits a relevant description Effect -.672
**
 .510 0.497 - 0.524 -.663
**
 .516 0.502 - 0.529 
  x Disadvantage .082
**
 1.086 1.061 - 1.111 .222
**
 1.248 1.169 - 1.333 
Level-1 Casing a victim or location Effect -.033
*
 .967 0.947 - 0.988 -.022
*
 .978 0.958 - 0.998 
  x Disadvantage .076
**
 1.079 1.060 - 1.098 .140
**
 1.151 1.095 - 1.209 
Level-1 Acting as a lookout Effect .087
**
 1.091 1.067 - 1.115 .097
**
 1.101 1.078 - 1.125 
  x Disadvantage .068
**
 1.070 1.050 - 1.091 .103
**
 1.108 1.051 - 1.169 
Level-1 Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Effect -.321
**
 .725 0.697 - 0.755 -.323
**
 .724 0.699 - 0.751 
  x Disadvantage .026 1.026 0.996 - 1.057 .083
*
 1.087 1.009 - 1.170 
Level-1 Actions indicative of a drug transaction Effect -.519
**
 .595 0.565 - 0.627 -.500
**
 .607 0.577 - 0.638 
  x Disadvantage .150
**
 1.162 1.114 - 1.213 .339
**
 1.403 1.271 - 1.549 
Level-1 Furtive movements Effect -.650
**
 .522 0.511 - 0.533 -.646
**
 .524 0.513 - 0.535 
  x Disadvantage .046
**
 1.047 1.029 - 1.065 .134
**
 1.143 1.090 - 1.199 
Level-1 Actions of engaging in violent crime Effect -.622
**
 .537 0.522 - 0.552 -.618
**
 .539 0.525 - 0.553 
  x Disadvantage .030
*
 1.031 1.008 - 1.054 .086
*
 1.090 1.026 - 1.157 
Level-1 Suspicious bulge Effect -1.321
**
 .267 0.257 - 0.277 -1.277
**
 .279 0.270 - 0.288 
  x Disadvantage .172
*
 1.188 1.155 - 1.221 .397
**
 1.488 1.399 - 1.582 
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Level-1 Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Effect .118
**
 1.125 1.092 - 1.160 .120
**
 1.128 1.096 - 1.160 
  x Disadvantage .007 1.007 0.982 - 1.033 .035 1.035 0.959 - 1.117 
NOTES: 
 ** 
p < .01;
 * 
p < .05; 1 = coefficient has been multiplied by 10.
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stopped in a neighborhood with lower levels of these populations. A suspect stopped in a 
neighborhood characterized by a higher percentage of African-Americans and a higher 
percentage of Hispanics had .996 lower odds of being in a higher category of coercion. 
The odds of a suspect being in a higher category of coercion were .897 lower when 
stopped in neighborhoods marked by higher levels of concentrated immigration. A 
suspect stopped in neighborhoods with higher percentages of recent movers, renters, or 
higher levels of disadvantage did not significantly impact an officer’s decision to use 
coercion.  
Results for control variables at the neighborhood-level revealed similarities 
between the two models. Compared to Staten Island, a suspect stopped in Manhattan had 
.836 (.827 for extreme disadvantage model) lower odds of being in a higher category of 
coercion. Likewise, suspects stopped in the Bronx had .759 (.762 for extreme 
disadvantage model) lower odds of being in a higher category of coercion and suspects 
stopped in Queens had .816 (.805 for extreme disadvantage model) lower odds of being 
arrested, compared to suspects stopped in Staten Island. On the other hand, suspects 
stopped in Brooklyn faced a 1.159 (1.152 for extreme disadvantage model) higher odds 
of being in a higher category of coercion, compared to Staten Island. 
Next, moderating effects of neighborhood disadvantage on the relationship 
between each stop predictor and the highest level of coercion used was examined. Results 
revealed that the relationship between the suspect being in a higher category of coercive 
action and being stopped for any of the stop predictors listed in the UF-250 report was 
strengthened by neighborhood disadvantage. There were a few exceptions: concentrated 
disadvantage did not moderate the relationship between a suspect being in a higher 
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category of coercive action and being stopped for wearing clothes commonly used in a 
crime or a suspicious bulge, while extreme disadvantage did not moderate the 
relationship between a suspect being in a higher category of coercive action and being 
stopped for carrying a suspicious object or other reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Discussion of Results 
Researchers have observed that community characteristics are thought to be more 
statistically consistent in explaining an officer’s decision to act coercively, compared to 
the other conceptual frameworks (situational factors, officer characteristics, and 
organizational factors) (National Research Council, 2004). Although researchers have 
uncovered an important link between the structural features of the community and an 
officer’s decision-making behavior (e.g., Kane, 2002; Sun et al., 2008), the role of 
neighborhood social disorganization applied to police decision-making during street 
encounters has been understudied. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the 
influence of concentrated disadvantage (and extreme disadvantage) on the relationship 
between the reason for the stop (e.g., suspect fits a relevant description) and an officer’s 
use of coercion that may occur during a PCI (e.g., frisk, search, use of force, or arrest). 
Two main hypotheses were tested in this study: (1) how the factors of neighborhood 
disorganization effect an officer’s decision to use coercion (main effects) and (2) how 
neighborhood disadvantage impacts (or moderates) the relationship between the stop 
predictors and the coercive action the officer uses during the stop. The analyses revealed 
several patterns, which are discussed below.
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Summary of Main Effects 
In order to examine the effects of social disorganization on police use of coercion, 
the contemporary disorganization measures were used in this analysis. Table 6.1 depicts 
the summary of the main effects of the social disorganization measures on police use of 
coercion. One notable finding is that there are apparent similarities in communities 
marked by a higher percentage of African-Americans, a higher percentage of Hispanics, 
and a higher rate of concentrated immigration. Generally speaking, suspects stopped in 
communities with higher levels of these populations were more likely to be frisked, to be 
the recipient of police use of force, and to be on the more coercive end of the coercive 
action continuum. They were, however, less likely to be searched, arrested, and to be in a 
higher category of coercive action.
27
  
Although this study did not specifically analyze the individual-level effect of the 
suspect’s race on police use of coercion, it can be seen that police are more active in 
communities characterized by higher amounts of minority populations. These results 
seem to provide support for arguments that police may be threatened by increases in 
minority populations. Some researchers would argue that the components of conflict 
theory, racial discrimination, racial profiling, institutional racism, and racial threat are 
apparent in the NYPD, where officers impose increased social controls on minorities in 
order to keep them powerless (see e.g., Eitle, 2002; Link and Phelan, 2001; Trone, 2010; 
Walker et al., 2000). Findings from this study are consistent with the findings from past
                                                 
 
27
 Concentrated immigration was not a statistically significant predictor of officer 
searches or arrests 
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Table 6.1 Summary of Main Effects – Likelihood of Receiving Coercive Action 
 
 Greater Coer. Frisk Search Use of force Arrest Continuum Highest level 
Predictors CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD 
% AfrAm. + + + + – – + + – – + + – – 
% Hisp. + + + + –  –  + + –  –  + + –  –  
% Movers –  –  –  –            
% Renters + + + +    –        
Disadvant.  +    –  –   +   +   
Immigrat. + + + +   + +   + + –  –  
NOTES: Predictors’ names have been shortened. CD = Concentrated disadvantage model; ExCD = Extreme disadvantage model. –  = decreased 
likelihood of coercive action; + = increased likelihood of coercive action. To keep consistency of the interpretation of the table, the stop only  
column has been reversed to greater coercive action (i.e., + = the likelihood a suspect received greater coercive action increased).
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studies examining racial discrimination within the NYPD, stating that minorities are 
stopped and frisked at a much higher rate than whites, while controlling for other factors 
(Fagan, 2012; Gelman et al., 2007); findings also contradict Lee et al.’s conclusions 
(2010) that police use of force is not related to the community’s percent of minority 
population. 
Although suspects stopped in neighborhoods characterized by higher levels of 
minorities are more likely to be frisked and be the recipients of police use of force, they 
face lower odds of being searched and arrested. Officers may be more willing to frisk and 
use force against suspects encountered in these communities, potentially because the laws 
outlining these actions are less explicit than search and arrest, where the law states a 
specific need for probable cause. It seems that there may be a point where the law steps in 
to prevent outright discrimination and avert further punitive action against minorities, 
what several court rulings (e.g., Terry v. Ohio; Tennessee v. Garner) were designed to 
accomplish.  
Contrary to the view that NYPD officers are discriminatory toward suspects 
encountered in areas with higher levels of minorities, some researchers would argue that 
police are choosing their targets based on patterns of criminal activity and the “typical” 
offender (Smith et al., 2006). For example, Fagan and Davies (2000) explained that racial 
profiling is often based on the officer’s prior knowledge and reasonable suspicion; 
therefore, some would argue that results for this study may be explained by officers 
simply doing their job based on their past experiences and knowledge of crime patterns.  
Turning our attention to the residential instability component of social 
disorganization, recall that scholars often use the community’s percentage of recent 
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movers and the percentage of renters in an index that represents the unstable environment 
that may be associated with higher levels of criminal activity (Sampson et al., 1997). 
These two variables were included separately in this analysis because they did not load 
on the same factor; analyses of these variables revealed contradictory findings. Suspects 
stopped in neighborhoods marked by a higher percentage of recent movers were less 
likely to be stopped and frisked, while suspects stopped in neighborhoods marked by a 
higher percentage of renters were more likely to be stopped and frisked. It may be that in 
New York City, moving residences is more commonplace and officers do not see this as 
an indicator or predictor of problem behaviors or criminal activity, while lower rates of 
home ownership remains a predictor of problem behaviors (see Brooks-Gunn et al., 
1993). 
The main focus of this study, neighborhood disadvantage, was used to represent a 
community’s social and economic indicators (see Land et al., 1990). Results revealed that 
neighborhood disadvantage (and extreme disadvantage) was not a statistically significant 
predictor of police coercive action in many instances. Although, results did reveal that 
suspects encountered in disadvantaged areas were less likely to have force used against 
them and more likely to be arrested, while suspects encountered in extremely 
disadvantaged areas were less likely to be searched and more likely to be on the higher 
end of the coercive action continuum. In hindsight it does not seem that neighborhood 
disadvantage plays a substantial role in predicting an officer’s use of coercive action; 
however, moderating effects tell a different story. 
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Summary of Moderating Effects 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the effects of concentrated disadvantage and 
extreme disadvantage on the relationship between each stop predictor and each outcome. 
Concentrated disadvantage and extreme disadvantage had the same directional impact 
(e.g., strengthening or weakening) on the relationship between each stop predictor and 
each outcome. There were a few instances when one of the models had a statistically 
significant impact (e.g., concentrated disadvantage), yet the other model did not (e.g., 
extreme disadvantage). Regardless, a few overall patterns emerged.  
The general pattern of the moderating effects is that neighborhood disadvantage 
weakens the positive relationship between the stop predictors and coercive action. In 
other words, a suspect who is stopped for at least one of the reasons listed on the UF-250 
report in a disadvantaged (or extremely disadvantaged) neighborhood faces a lower 
likelihood of having coercive action used against him. This is a key finding for this study. 
Although neighborhood disadvantage did not have a substantial main effect on an 
officer’s use of coercive action, the moderating effects show support for the alternative 
hypothesis that officers who work in disadvantaged areas may be less likely to act 
coercively during a PCI.  
This study reasoned three theoretical connections between a community’s level of 
social disorganization, normally predicting crime within a community, and an officer’s 
decision-making. The first and second theoretical connections argued that police would 
become more coercive in disorganized and disadvantaged neighborhoods as a result of 
the high amount of crime and lack of formal social controls observed in these areas (e.g., 
Terrill and Reisig, 2003). The third theoretical connection posited that police would 
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Table 6.2 Summary of Moderating Effects – Likelihood of Receiving Coercive Action in a Disadvantaged Neighborhood 
 
 Greater Coer. Frisk Search Use of force Arrest Continuum Highest level 
Predictors CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD CD ExCD 
Sus. object –  – – –   –  –   +   +   
Description –  –   –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  +  +  
Casing  –  – –  –   + –  –    – – + + 
Lookout –  –   – –   –  – – – – + + 
Clothing     –  –    –  –  –  –   +  
Drugs –  – –  –   – –  –    –  –  +  +  
Movements     –  –  –  –  – – –  –  +  +  
Viol. crime –  – –  –  + + + + –  –    +  +  
Bulge –  – –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  +  +  
Other  –  – – – +  +  –  –  + + +   
 
NOTES: Predictors’ names have been shortened. CD = Concentrated disadvantage model; ExCD = Extreme disadvantage model. –  = decreased  
likelihood of coercive action; + = increased likelihood of coercive action. To keep consistency of the interpretation of the table, the stop only  
column has been reversed to greater coercive action (i.e., + = the likelihood a suspect received greater coercive action increased).
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become less coercive in these areas because they are overworked and these areas are 
more accepting of deviant behaviors (e.g., Klinger, 1997).  
Overall, findings from this study support the third theoretical connection that 
police are less likely to use coercive action against suspects encountered in disadvantaged 
areas. Main effects of disadvantage on coercive action provided mixed and, often times, 
statistically insignificant results. However, results from moderating effects provide 
support for Khruakham and Hoover’s (2012) findings that officers use less coercion in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. The general pattern is that neighborhood disadvantage acts 
as a weakening mechanism on the relationship between each stop predictor and the 
coercive action used during the stop. When a suspect is stopped, his chances of receiving 
any level of coercive action are reduced, if the stop occurred in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood. 
As a result of the sheer number of stops made in disadvantaged neighborhoods, 
suspects potentially face lower odds of receiving coercive action. A person may be more 
likely to be subjected to a stop in a disadvantaged and high crime neighborhood, but the 
odds of having coercion used against him is lower than if stopped in an affluent 
neighborhood. For example, if 100 stops were made in a disadvantaged neighborhood a 
suspect may have a 1/10 chance of having coercive action used against him; if 10 stops 
were made in an affluent neighborhood, the suspect may face a 1/3 chance of having 
coercive action used against him. Results from this study should not be interpreted as 
coercive action occurring less frequently in disadvantaged neighborhoods per se, only 
that disadvantage has a reduction effect on the coercive action an officer uses in each 
stop. It very well may be that higher levels of coercive action occur more frequently in 
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disadvantaged neighborhoods, yet a suspect faces a lower likelihood of receiving greater 
levels of coercive action in disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
Results from this study also lend support to Klinger’s (1997) ecological theory of 
police behavior. Klinger (1997) argued that residents perceive deviance as more 
accepting in disadvantaged communities and that officers are too busy with heavy 
workloads, which may cause officers to handle only the most serious offenses formally. 
This could be the case for NYPD stops made in 2011, which explains why neighborhood 
disadvantage reduces the chances of a suspect receiving greater levels of coercive action 
when stopped. When low-level criminal behavior (e.g., simple drug possession) is 
tolerated in disadvantage communities and occurs frequently, suspects face a lower risk 
of receiving higher levels of coercive action. Further, because police resources are slim 
and low-level criminal behavior is tolerated in these areas, a suspect stopped in a 
disadvantaged neighborhood has a lower likelihood of having coercive action used 
against him. If this same scenario played out in an affluent neighborhood, where police 
resources are abundant enough to apply coercion to low-level crimes, a suspect stopped 
would face a higher likelihood of having coercive action used against him. 
There are, however, a few exceptions to the general pattern found in the data 
analyses. Extreme disadvantage increases the likelihood a suspect will be searched when 
he is stopped for casing a victim or location. And, extreme disadvantage increases the 
likelihood a suspect will be arrested when he is stopped for carrying a suspicious object. 
Further, the stop predictors displaying actions indicative of a violent crime and other 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity often behave dissimilar to the general pattern. 
 170 
When a suspect is stopped for displaying actions indicative of a violent crime, he 
is more likely to be subjected to a search or police use of force when stopped in a 
disadvantaged neighborhood. It may be that when an officer believes a suspect is 
involved in committing a violent offense, the officer’s feelings to protect himself 
increases because of his perception of harm (Brown, 1981). The perception of harm 
would then lead to a greater likelihood of the suspect experiencing a search or police use 
of force. 
In terms of the suspect being stopped for other reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity in a disadvantaged neighborhood, he is more likely to be searched, arrested, and 
to receive higher levels of coercive action (as determined by the coercive action 
continuum). Suspects stopped for other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may 
encompass a wide variety of potential criminal conduct not outlined in the UF-250 report, 
making it difficult to speculate as to why this relationship occurs. Further, it may be that 
individual-level factors not included in this analysis are having an impact on this 
relationship. For example, scholars have reasoned that the amount of coercive action used 
by police may be attributed to the behavior of the suspect (Sun and Payne, 2004; Sun et 
al., 2008). These individual-level factors, however, are not included in this study, but 
may potentially help explain some of the dissimilar relationships to the general pattern.  
Another noteworthy finding is that the highest level of coercion used outcome 
provides results contrary to the general pattern. For this outcome, the relationship 
between each stop predictor and a suspect being in a higher category of coercive action is 
strengthened by neighborhood disadvantage. This could potentially be explained by the 
differences in measures between the two outcomes. Recall that the coercive action 
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continuum considered all possible combinations of police coercive action, while the 
ordinal measure only accounted for the highest coercive action imposed on the suspect. 
For example, if a suspect was frisked, searched, and arrested, the ordinal measure would 
only account for the arrest, while the coercive action continuum accounted for all 
coercive actions that occurred during the stop. For the ordinal measure, the highest level 
of coercive action was arrest. For the coercive action continuum, however, arrest fell 
midway on the continuum; arrest combined with other coercive actions was believed to 
be more intrusive and these measures were placed higher on the coercive action 
continuum. It could be that suspects were less likely to fall higher on the coercive action 
continuum because of the scale used in the continuum (e.g., coercive actions measured 
above arrest on the continuum included arrest combined with other types of coercion); 
results obtained from the continuum do not reveal exactly where the suspect fell on the 
continuum, only that he is less likely to fall “higher” on the continuum in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood.  
On the other hand, it can be argued that overall results dispute Klinger’s (1997) 
propositions. Klinger (1997) argued that officers are too busy with heavy workloads and 
police resources are slim in disadvantage and high crime areas, which may be a cause 
behind their leniency in these areas. The general pattern provides support for Klinger’s 
arguments, but results for the ordinal outcome produced conflicting conclusions – 
officers are more coercive in disadvantaged neighborhoods. A few possible explanations 
to these findings emerge.  
 First, as Klinger noted, officers are busy with heavy workloads and resources are 
slim in disadvantaged neighborhoods. So, it can be deduced that officers may actually be 
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employing these types of coercive action during a stop, but are not taking the already 
strained amount of time to fill out the UF-250 report accurately (i.e. checking the 
required boxes on the report). Further, officers may be more likely to ensure the accuracy 
of UF-250 reports in affluent neighborhoods in order to cover their tracks. In affluent 
neighborhoods, police chiefs have a higher likelihood of taking a citizen complaint of 
improper police behavior seriously (see e.g., Brunson, 2007). An officer may be more 
compelled to fill out the UF-250 to the best of his ability in case these reports do get 
filed. In a disadvantaged area, where UF-250 reports are abundant, the probability of 
having a complaint filed against the officer (and it being taken seriously) is low.  
If these scenarios are occurring, the data for the dichotomous and linear outcomes 
naturally become misleading. Lower levels of coercive action an officer used during a 
stop may (or may not) be reported on the UF-250, but it is expected that the highest level 
of coercion the officer used during the stop was accurately reported. It may be that this 
outcome is actually providing a more accurate picture of the type of coercive action a 
suspect is likely to endure, and how neighborhood disadvantage impacts that relationship. 
Meaning, suspects encountered in disadvantaged neighborhoods face a higher likelihood 
of coercive action being used against them.  
Based on prior evidence, the majority of police researchers would argue that a 
suspect’s risk of coercive action is higher in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Terrill and 
Reisig, 2003), yet only results for the ordinal outcome provide support for this 
speculation. There may be a deeper question of what takes place in these communities. It 
may not be that officers are more lenient in these areas, but that their reporting 
procedures differ between neighborhoods. This is a significant direction for this research 
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and should be explored further. Whether the possible misreporting occurs on accident 
(because of the heavy workload and slim police resources as explained by Klinger) or 
that officers are consciously making the decision to be more accurate on reports in an 
affluent neighborhood is a topic yet to be uncovered in police research.  
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
Limitations 
This study has provided an examination of the impact of neighborhood 
disadvantage on police use of coercive action; it is, however, not without limitations. The 
specific weaknesses of using the mandated UF-250 reports were previously discussed, yet 
more general limitations regarding the data may also pose threats to the overall 
conclusions acquired by this study. 
 Although three outcome measures were used to capture the full story of what 
occurs during an officer-initiated stop, these measures may have potential drawbacks. 
First, the dichotomous outcomes (e.g., stop only, frisk, search, use of force, and arrest) 
are not mutually exclusive categories. That is, an officer may have checked more than 
one box on the UF-250 report, illustrating the type(s) of coercive action used during the 
stop. This could be problematic because the dichotomous measures are not depicting the 
entire picture of what occurred during a stop. For example, if an officer frisked and 
searched a person during a stop, the frisk dichotomy will only show that the person was 
frisked (or not frisked); it does not take the other coercive actions into account. As an 
attempt to reduce this limitation, the coercive action continuum was created. The coercive 
action continuum provides a deeper look into all types of coercive actions used in a single 
stop; in the example above, the continuum would reveal that the suspect was both frisked 
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and searched, which is something the dichotomous outcomes cannot accomplish. 
However, this outcome also has its flaws.  
The categories included in the coercive action continuum outcome were created 
by following practices of police use of force continuums. Literature utilizing the police 
use of force continuum derives their categories from police department policies (e.g., 
Klinger, 1995; Garner and Maxwell, 1999), yet there is no departmental policy regarding 
the ranking of police officer coercive action. Here, the coercive action continuum is 
based on the “natural rankings” of intrusiveness a suspect may face (e.g., a frisk is 
perceived to be less intrusive than a search).  
Another potential limitation concerning the coercive action continuum and to the 
highest level of coercion used outcome is that the categories included in the measures do 
not meet the assumption of equal distance. For example, the distance between a suspect 
being stopped only and frisked only is assumed to be equivalent as a suspect being 
frisked only and searched only (see also Garner and Maxwell, 1999). The Brant test of 
proportional odds revealed the data do violate the assumption, yet this test is very 
sensitive to large sample sizes. Again, these outcomes may be an inadequate way of 
examining the effects of the social disorganization on officer decision-making. 
There is an obvious discrepancy in the conclusions made by the outcome 
measures used in this study. The coercive action continuum ranks all possible categories 
of coercive action that may occur during a stop (e.g., a frisk and use of force), while the 
highest level of coercive action used outcome only includes the most intrusive coercive 
action occurring during the stop (e.g., use of force). When filling out the UF-250 report, 
an officer may only find it necessary to report the highest level of coercion used (e.g., 
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only reported the force), which could explain why these results differ from the coercive 
action continuum. The accuracy of the UF-250 reports, however, is unknown and may 
help explain why the findings are contradictory. 
Another drawback is the lack of actual crime data included in this study. This 
study used the officer’s perception of crime in the area as a control variable, which is 
included in the UF-250 report. However, this measure relied upon the officer checking 
the designated box (area has a high crime incidence) and is, therefore, based on the 
officer’s belief that the area is marked by a high amount of criminal activity, and not on 
the actual amount of crime in the area. This could introduce biases, since every person’s 
perceptions differ. 
Future Directions 
The current study prompted several directions for future research. First and 
foremost, the contradictory findings reported by the different outcome measures need 
further exploration. One possible explanation as to why this finding occurred is that 
officers’ reporting procedures differ between affluent and disadvantaged neighborhoods. 
Officers may be less likely to check the box on the UF-250 report for every type of 
coercive action used during the stop, and this may be more likely to occur in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods where police resources are already strained. It may not be 
that officers’ use of coercive action differs between neighborhoods, but that their 
reporting procedures differ. Future research should examine the accuracy of UF-250 
reports to determine whether officers reporting procedures differ between neighborhoods 
or whether officers, in fact, do implement the types of coercive action during a stop based 
on the characteristics of the neighborhood.  
 176 
Another direction for future research involves further examination of the variables 
included in the study. As addressed in the weaknesses of the UF-250 reports, the stop 
predictor “other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” is undefined. This category 
comprises 17% of all the reasons for the stop in this analysis, which is a substantial 
number. Further, the use of force measure also includes an “other” category, which is 
also undefined. It is unclear exactly what these “other” categories are consisting of and 
whether or not they impact the conclusions drawn from this study. 
As previously discussed, the coercive action continuum and the highest level of 
coercion used outcomes rely on the ordering of categories based on natural rankings of 
intrusiveness. Preliminary tests (ordinal logistic regression) examined the coercive action 
continuum, originally a linear measure, on an ordinal scale. Results for stop-level 
predictors mirrored results from the highest level of coercion used outcome, showing that 
the method of operationalization is very important in drawing conclusions from analyses. 
In terms of control variables, future research should intend on including suspect 
characteristics and official crime data in analyses. Prior research has shown that the 
suspect’s behavior, race, gender, and socioeconomic status may influence officer 
decision-making processes (National Research Council, 2004), which the current 
research does not account for. Also, the amount of neighborhood crime in which the stop 
occurred may also influence an officer’s decision-making (Terrill and Reisig, 2003), and 
should be included as a control variable. Using the officer’s perception of the amount of 
crime in a neighborhood to explain officer decision-making is adequate, but may be 
biased; one officer may check the box “area has a high crime incidence” based solely on 
his experiences in that neighborhood, while another officer does not perceive that area to 
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have a high crime incidence. Future research should make an effort to collect and include 
these types of data as control variables.  
Future directions for this research also include an examination of the latest data to 
determine whether results remain applicable to future years. Due to policy changes within 
the NYPD, the number of stops drastically decreased over the past few years. A total of 
694,000 stops were made in the NYPD in 2011; this number dropped to 194,000 stops 
made in 2013 (Tracy, 2014). With these recent changes in the NYPD, would current data 
provide a more accurate explanation to the findings reported in this study? Future 
research should account for the current limitations to this study and pay particular 
attention to the conceptualization and operationalization of the measures used, in order to 
uncover the role of neighborhood disorganization on police use of coercion during an 
officer-initiated stop of a suspect. 
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